Beyond impressions and ideas: Hume vs. Reid

The Monist 70 (4):383 - 397 (1987)
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Abstract

Thomas Reid was a persistent and acute critic of the philosophy of David Hume. It is Reid’s contention that Hume’s theory cannot account for the facts of human conception and belief. Hume’s theory is deficient in that impressions and ideas are inadequate to account for the intentionality of human thought, the fact that human thoughts have objects, ones that may not exist. Impressions and ideas are also inadequate to account for the facts of belief, especially the fact of negative belief. Reid recognizes the genius of the attempt to account for human conception and belief in terms of impressions and ideas. He calls Hume the most acute metaphysician of the age and remarked, in correspondence, that if Mr. Hume were to stop writing, he and his cohorts in Aberdeen would have nothing to discuss. Reid remarks as well, however, that it is genius and not the lack of it that leads to false philosophy. Reid is not a mere modus tollens critic of Hume. Unlike G. E. Moore, Reid does not rest content with arguing that Hume’s theory cannot account for the facts but contends that we need not despair of a better. Reid’s philosophy is an attempt to offer a better theory. I shall describe Reid’s destructive and constructive efforts to refute the philosophy of Hume.

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Keith Lehrer
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

Thomas Reid on Induction and Natural Kinds.Stephen Harrop - 2022 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (1):1-18.
Reid, Kant and the philosophy of mind.Etienne Brun-Rovet - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):495-510.

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