Abstract

In his engagement with Kantian philosophy, Wilfrid Sellars offers both exegetical readings of Kant and suggestions for refining or adapting Kantian ideas. Two interrelated proposals include reconsidering categories not as a priori and innate concepts but as evolutionary inheritances, and introducing sense impressions as intermediaries between physical objects and our conceptualisations. Sellars sees these proposals as consistent with Kantian philosophy, although Kant himself does not take these steps. However, a careful examination of §27 of the “Transcendental Deduction” in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason reveals that Kant not only does not entertain these ideas, but explicitly refutes them, warning against their tendency to Humean skepticism. While this does not conclusively determine the validity of either position, it does show that Sellars’s position is fundamentally different from Kant’s and more in line with a Humean perspective.