Abstract

This article considers Edmund Husserl’s description of image consciousness from the viewpoint of the role played by attentive meaning (meinen) in the intention of the image subject. We argue that the intention of the image subject has to be interpreted in the sense of the attentive meaning as presented in the second part of Husserl’s 1904/5 lecture on Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge. Attentive meaning performs 1) the segregation of a specific apprehension along with the attentive articulation of experience, and 2), as a formative and preferential function, it introduces a difference in the objective consideration. First, we explain the connection between apprehension, attentive meaning, and object; then, we clarify the relationship between apprehension and attentive meaning in image consciousness in the 1898 manuscripts and the 1904 lecture; finally, we set forth the motivation for the intending of the image subject on the basis of the image apprehension.