Quiddistic Knowledge

Philosophical Studies 123 (1):1-32 (2005)
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Abstract

Is the relation between properties and the causal powers they confer necessary, or contingent? Necessary, says Sydney Shoemaker, on pain of skepticism about the properties. Contingent, says David Lewis, swallowing the skeptical conclusion. I shall argue that Lewis is right about the metaphysics, but that Shoemaker and Lewis are wrong about the epistemology. Properties have intrinsic natures (quiddities), which we can know.

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10.1007/s11098-004-5221-2

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Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

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What is Hume's Dictum, and why believe it?Jessica Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The metaphysics of natural kinds.Alexander Bird - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1397-1426.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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