This essay takes the position, consistent with Ayer’s own retrospective judgments, that the philosophical significance of Language, Truth and Logic (LTL) was minimal at best, and that its real significance was socio-historical. LTL stands as one of the most influential expressions of an overzealous and simplistic scientism that swept through Western culture in the first half of the twentieth century. This scientism played a crucial role in problematizing the West’s relationship to truth in ways that contributed to the eventual emergence (...) of “post-truth” culture, with its “post-truth politics.” This in turn made possible the disastrous results of recent votes and elections in Britain and, above all, in the United States. In short, LTL’s real significance resides in the role it played as a sophisticated and successful bit of propaganda for an ideology that played a crucial role in loosing Western culture from its moral and epistemic moorings. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A growing body of research suggests that political polarization in the United States is at a forty-year high, and that it is rooted less in disagreements over policy than in hostile attitudes toward political opponents. Such attitudes explain the manifest increase of intolerant behavior in American culture and politics in recent years. But what explains the attitudes themselves? One significant contributor may have been the rise of scientism in the early twentieth century, which undermined the metaphysical, epistemic, and institutional (...) foundations of the type of morality required to transcend our instinctual tribalism. (shrink)

Based on an unfinished manuscript by the late philosopher Dallas Willard, this book makes the case that the 20th century saw a massive shift in Western beliefs and attitudes concerning the possibility of moral knowledge, such that knowledge of the moral life and of its conduct is no longer routinely available from the social institutions long thought to be responsible for it. In this sense, moral knowledge--as a publicly available resource for living--has disappeared. Via a detailed survey of main developments (...) in ethical theory from the late 19th through the late 20th centuries, Willard explains philosophy's role in this shift. In pointing out the shortcomings of these developments, he shows that the shift was not the result of rational argument or discovery, but largely of arational social forces--in other words, there was no good reason for moral knowledge to have disappeared. The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge is a unique contribution to the literature on the history of ethics and social morality. Its review of historical work on moral knowledge covers a wide range of thinkers including T.H Green, G.E Moore, Charles L. Stevenson, John Rawls, and Alasdair MacIntyre. But, most importantly, it concludes with a novel proposal for how we might reclaim moral knowledge that is inspired by the phenomenological approach of Knud Logstrup and Emmanuel Levinas. Edited and eventually completed by three of Willard's former graduate students, this book marks the culmination of Willard's project to find a secure basis in knowledge for the moral life. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a puzzle that emerges from what J. P. Moreland has called the traditional realist view of quality instances. Briefly put, the puzzle is to figure out how quality instances fit into the overall structure of a concrete particular, given that the traditional realist view of quality instances prima facie seems incompatible with what might be called the traditional realist view of concrete particulars. After having discussed the traditional realist views involved and the puzzle that emerges (...) from their juxtaposition, I propose an alternative realist view of quality instances which resolves the puzzle. In short, the puzzle is solved by treating the distinction between a concrete particular and its quality instances as a distinction of reason, and by adopting the view that the individuating element of a concrete particular must also serve as its unifying element – a view which Moreland, one of traditional realism’s most stalwart contemporary defenders, rejects. (shrink)

This chapter surveys the respective influences of Personalism and of analytic philosophy on twentieth-century thought about persons. It shows that personalism promoted a concept of personhood that is supportive of human dignity and conducive to positive moral and social engagement, as exemplified in Personalism’s best-known representative, Martin Luther King, Jr. By contrast, the analytic tradition has exhibited a persistent tendency to undermine personhood as King and the Personalists understood it, while failing to supply a metaphysically and morally adequate alternative. This (...) unfortunate legacy is worth reversing if possible. With this in mind, I suggest that contemporary analytic philosophy has something important to learn from personalism concerning what counts as an adequate metaphysical basis for human dignity and the moral life. (shrink)

The Problem with (i) -- Illustration -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index.

The first of the two epigraphs selected for this paper comes from G. J. Warnock’s book, English Philosophy Since 1900. As one might expect given the title, Warnock’s subject is what has come to be known as analytic philosophy, and the hostility to metaphysics he mentions is that peculiar hostility which, for a time at least, seemed to be part and parcel of the analytic movement. What is important about this quotation in the present context is the pregnant suggestion that (...) what was for a long time thought to be one of analytic philosophy’s defining features might have been a matter of mere fashion rather than the result of sufficiently well formulated arguments and views. My primary aim in this paper will be to develop this suggestion vis-à-vis the phenomenon of conformism and to show that, thus construed, there are good grounds for thinking it true. Specifically, I shall argue for what I call the conformist hypothesis: the view that it is a mistake to regard analytic philosophy as a philosophical school, movement, or tradition, and that, instead, it is a purely social entity unified by what are called interactional memes, maintained at high frequency by conformist transmission. My secondary aim will be to make a case for the claim that, if Warnock was right, then something was terribly wrong about the way analytic philosophy came not only to exist, but to dominate the social world of academic philosophy in certain geographical regions during the twentieth century. (shrink)

The careful historical and metaphilosophical attention recently bestowed upon analytic philosophy has revealed that traditional ways of defining it are inadequate. In the face of this inadequacy, contemporary authors have proposed new definitions that detach analytic philosophy from its turn of the twentieth century origins. I argue that this contemporary trend in defining analytic philosophy is misguided, and that it diminishes the likelihood of our coming to an accurate historical and metaphilosophical understanding of it. This is especially unsatisfactory since such (...) understanding is essential to finding an adequate remedy for the widely perceived ills of contemporary analytic philosophy. I suggest that a more fruitful approach to developing such understanding might begin with treating the unity of analytic philosophy as illusory. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Hume’s argument against the knowledge/existence of substantival mind. This denial is rooted in his epistemology which includes a theory of how complex ideas which lack corresponding impressions are manufactured by the imagination, in conjunction with the memory, on the basis of three relations among impressions: resemblance, continuity and constant conjunction. The crux of my critique consists in pointing out that these relations are such that only an enduring, unified agent could interact with them in the way (...) Hume describes. I note that Hume attempts to provide such an agent by invoking the activities of imagination and memory, but that it is unclear where these belong in his system. After discussing the relevant possibilities, I conclude that there is no category within the limits of his system that can accommodate the faculties and allow them to do the work Hume assigned to them. I then note that Hume’s rejection of substantival mind rests upon the assumption that something like substantival mind exists; for the action of the latter is required for the proper functioning of the process of fabrication which creates the fictitious notion of substantival mind. My concluding argument is that if the existence of substantival mind is implicit in Hume’s argument against substantival mind, then his argument resembles an indirect proof, and ought to be considered as evidence for, rather than against, the existence of substantival mind. (shrink)

This chapter aims to give a thematically organized survey of significant criticisms of analytic philosophy that have come from outside the analytic tradition. However, it is not always clear which critics and criticisms should count as “external” to the analytic tradition, nor is it clear how to gauge the significance of such criticisms. Consequently, the survey is prefaced by a discussion of these methodological challenges which, I show, are deeply connected to features of the analytic tradition that have regularly been (...) subjected to criticism from the outside. (shrink)

The aim of this volume is to consider connections among issues in metaphilosophy, historiographical method, and the formation of philosophical canons. Here I consider an ancient metaphilosophical position very different from anything accepted in mainstream academic philosophy today, but which, I believe, merits revival in a form appropriate to our era. I call this position “metaphilosophical eudaimonism” because it takes human flourishing to be the ultimate goal of philosophy. I first explain the position before considering its implications for philosophy’s relationship (...) to its history, for the historiography of philosophy, and for the role of canons in philosophy. Along the way, I develop a perspective on the possibility of trans-historical knowledge grounded in a Husserlian analysis of the act of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of Dallas Willard's views on the relation of morality to spirituality by way of a critique of a recent article by John Coe–-or perhaps a critique of Coe by way of an interpretation of Willard. Coe has argued that a certain erroneous view of the relationship between moral and spiritual formation poses a serious threat to the latter by encouraging believers to hide spiritual and moral failures behind their moral successes. In this he is correct, (...) but his own approach to the matter poses an equally serious threat by obscuring the fact that moral formation is integral to spiritual formation. In order to address the matter successfully, we need an adequate view of the positive relationship between moral and spiritual formation. Such a view is implicit in the work of Dallas Willard. My aim is to make this view explicit. (shrink)

I argue that our present crisis of meaning is grounded in what Dallas Willard called "the disappearance of moral knowledge," and in institutional changes related to this disappearance. Following Frankl, I argue that meaning requires self-transcendence via commitment to "higher" values, but the disappearance of moral knowledge has obscured the reality of such values, and hence has obscured the path to meaningful self-transcendence.

For most of the 20th century, analytic epistemology has been narrowly focused on the concept of knowledge and on closely-related issues like justification. But decades of work on Gettier problems, lottery paradoxes, and the like, have given mainstream analytic epistemology the appearance of a degenerating research program. In response, some analytic epistemologists have begun to investigate other cognitive states, like wisdom and understanding, that many pre-analytic philosophers valued as much or more than knowledge. In fact, Linda Zagzebski has argued that (...) Western philosophy exhibits the following historical pattern: in eras given to skeptical worries, philosophers have focused on certainty and justification; in eras less exercised by skepticism, philosophers have focused on understanding and the related issue of explanation. My aims are two-fold. First, I add to Zagzebski’s picture by showing that metaphysical and metaphilosophical issues have also contributed to this historical pattern. Second, I use the expanded picture to explain (i) the 19th century advent of verstehen as a term of art, (ii) the analytic tradition’s lack of interest in understanding, and (iii) the revival of interest in understanding in recent analytic epistemology. I conclude that the pro-verstehen movement of the 19th century and the pro-understanding movement of the 21st were motivated by similar concerns pertaining to the epistemic strictures of scientism, strictures which bear a complex relationship to skepticism. (shrink)