We show that for any real number, the class of real numbers less random than it, in the sense of rK-reducibility, forms a countable real closed subfield of the real ordered field. This generalizes the well-known fact that the computable reals form a real closed field. With the same technique we show that the class of differences of computably enumerable reals (d.c.e. reals) and the class of computably approximable reals (c.a. reals) form real closed fields. The d.c.e. result was also (...) proved nearly simultaneously and independently by Ng (Keng Meng Ng. Master's Thesis. National University of Singapore, in preparation). Lastly, we show that the class of d.c.e. reals is properly contained in the class or reals less random than Ω (the halting probability), which in turn is properly contained in the class of c.a. reals, and that neither the first nor last class is a randomness class (as captured by rK-reducibility). (shrink)

This book, a history of a religious category of ancient philosophy, is the first synthesis on the notion of daimōn in the Platonic tradition. It focuses on the relationship between demonology and, respectively, cosmology, the philosophical hermeneutics of religion and theories of the soul. Histoire d’une catégorie religieuse de la philosophie ancienne, ce livre représente la première synthèse sur la notion de daimōn dans la tradition platonicienne. Il étudie les relations de la démonologie avec la cosmologie, l’herméneutique philosophique de la (...) religion et les théories de l’âme. (shrink)

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence (...) levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. (shrink)

We propose that human reasoning relies on an inherence heuristic, an implicit cognitive process that leads people to explain observed patterns (e.g., girls wear pink) in terms of the inherent features of their constituents (e.g., pink is an inherently feminine color). We then demonstrate how this proposed heuristic can provide a unified account for a broad set of findings spanning areas of research that might at first appear unrelated (e.g., system justification, nominal realism, is–ought errors in moral reasoning). By revealing (...) the deep commonalities among the diverse phenomena that fall under its scope, our account is able to generate new insights into these phenomena, as well as new empirical predictions. A second main goal of this paper, aside from introducing the inherence heuristic, is to articulate the proposal that the heuristic serves as a foundation for the development of psychological essentialism. More specifically, we propose that essentialism—which is the common belief that natural and social categories are underlain by hidden, causally powerful “essences”—emerges over the first few years of life as an elaboration of the earlier, and more open-ended, intuitions supplied by the inherence heuristic. In the final part of the paper, we distinguish our proposal from competing accounts (e.g., Strevens' K-laws) and clarify the relationship between the inherence heuristic and related cognitive tendencies (e.g., the correspondence bias). In sum, this paper illuminates a basic cognitive process that emerges early in life and is likely to have profound effects on many aspects of human psychology. (shrink)

It has become increasingly popular to argue that legal positivism is actually a normative theory, and that it cannot be purely descriptive and morally neutral as H.L.A. Hart has suggested. This article purports to disprove this line of thought. It argues that legal positivism is best understood as a descriptive, morally neutral, theory about the nature of law. The article distinguishes between five possible views about the relations between normative claims and legal positivism, arguing that some of them are not (...) at odds with Hart’s thesis about the nature of jurisprudence, while the others are wrong, both as expositions of legal positivism or as critiques of it. Legal positivism does not necessarily purport to justify any aspect of its subject matter, nor is it committed to any particular moral or political evaluations. (shrink)

According to traditional Judeo-Christian-Islamic theism, God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect agent. This volume shows that philosophy of religion needs to take seriously alternative concepts of the divine, and demonstrates the considerable philosophical interest that they hold.

This article discusses the poem written by Joseph Brodsky shortly after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in the early 1990s. It compares this poem with other pieces by the same author that deal with the paradigm of “independence vs. imperial unity.” These poems present a difference, which is striking at first glance: Brodsky welcomes Lithuanian independence, while simultaneously denying the same rights to Ukrainians and Aztecs. As for Afghanis … his disdain is even more palpable. The proposed explanation is the (...) concept of “Cultural Empire,” which the poet considers to be the ultimate good. This article briefly mentions the general problem of de-imperializing classical Russian literature in the context of post-colonial studies. (shrink)

Cultural schemas are a central cognitive mechanism through which culture affects action. In this article, we develop a theoretical model of cultural schemas that is better able to support empirical work, including inferential, sensitizing, and operational uses. We propose a multilevel framework centered on a high-level definition of cultural schemas that is sufficiently broad to capture its major sociological applications but still sufficiently narrow to identify a set of cognitive phenomena with key functional properties in common: cultural schemas are socially (...) shared representations deployable in automatic cognition. We use this conception to elaborate the main theoretical properties of cultural schemas, and to provide clear criteria that distinguish them from other cultural or cognitive elements. We then propose a series of concrete tests empirical scholarship can use to determine if these properties apply. We also demonstrate how this approach can identify potentially faulty theoretical inferences present in existing work. Moving to a lower level of analysis, we elaborate how cultural schemas can be algorithmically conceptualized in terms of their building blocks. This leads us to recommend improvements to methods for measuring cultural schemas. We conclude by outlining questions for a broader research program. (shrink)

Mainstream political liberals hold that state coercion is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that all may reasonably be expected to accept. Critics argue that this public justification principle is self-defeating, because it depends on moral justifications that not all may reasonably be expected to accept. To rebut the self-defeat objection, I elaborate on the following disjunction: one either agrees or disagrees that it is wrong to impose one’s morality on others by the coercive power (...) of the state. Those who disagree reject PJP, they understand politics as war. Those who agree accept PJP, they understand politics as competition. Political competitors abide by PJP to avoid politics as war, by enforcing PJP on political combatants they engage in a war that is unavoidable. In both cases their exercise of political power has a justification that is reasonably acceptable to all. (shrink)

The article analyzes the possibilities and limitations of artificial intelligence. The article considers the subjectivity of artificial intelligence, determines its necessity for solving intellectual problems depending on the possibility of representing the real world as a deterministic system. Methodological limitations of artificial intelligence, which is based on the use of big data technologies, are stated. These limitations cause the impossibility of forming a holistic representation of the objects of cognition and the world as a whole. As a tool for deterministic (...) description of the universe it is proposed to use empirical-metaphysical general theory of systems, which is an extension of existing general theories of systems due to ontological justification of the phenomenon of isomorphism and definition of a limited set of laws, rules, patterns and primitives of forms and relations of objects in the universe. The distinction of natural (human) and artificial intelligence is considered, including the realization of multisystem integration of intelligence in physical, biological, social and spiritual systems. A philosophically grounded approach to ensuring the evolutionary properties of artificial intelligence is formulated, based on the inclusion of non-equilibrium mechanisms through which stability is realized. (shrink)

This Element focuses on some core conceptual and ontological issues related to pantheistic conceptions of God by engaging with recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on this topic. The conceptual and ontological commitments of pantheism are contrasted with those of other conceptions of God. The concept of God assumed by pantheism is clarified and the question about what type of unity the universe must exhibit in order to be identical with God receives the most attention. It is argued that (...) the sort of unity the universe must display is the sort of unity characteristic of conscious cognitive systems. Some alternative ontological frameworks for grounding such cognitive unity are considered. Further, the question of whether God can be understood as personal on pantheism is explored. (shrink)

In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance causation. In this paper, assuming that causation is a generative or productive relation, I argue that Whittle’s argument is not successful. While substances are causally relevant in causal processes owing to outcomes being counterfactually dependent upon their role in such occurrences, the real productive work in causal processes is accomplished by the causal powers of substances.

Social conventions are those arbitrary rules and norms governing the countless behaviors all of us engage in every day without necessarily thinking about them, from shaking hands when greeting someone to driving on the right side of the road. In this book, Andrei Marmor offers a pathbreaking and comprehensive philosophical analysis of conventions and the roles they play in social life and practical reason, and in doing so challenges the dominant view of social conventions first laid out by David Lewis. (...) Marmor begins by giving a general account of the nature of conventions, explaining the differences between coordinative and constitutive conventions and between deep and surface conventions. He then applies this analysis to explain how conventions work in language, morality, and law. Marmor clearly demonstrates that many important semantic and pragmatic aspects of language assumed by many theorists to be conventional are in fact not, and that the role of conventions in the moral domain is surprisingly complex, playing mostly an auxiliary and supportive role. Importantly, he casts new light on the conventional foundations of law, arguing that the distinction between deep and surface conventions can be used to answer the prevalent objections to legal conventionalism. Social Conventions is a much-needed reappraisal of the nature of the rules that regulate virtually every aspect of human conduct. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to present a collection of properties of the set of atoms and the set of finite injective tuples of atoms, as well as of the powersets of atoms in the framework of finitely supported structures. Some properties of atoms are obtained by translating classical Zermelo–Fraenkel results into the new framework, but several important properties are specific to finitely supported structures.

This article analyzes the present status, development trends, and problems in the ethics of nuclear technology in light of a possible revision of its conceptual foundations. First, to better recognize the current state of nuclear technology ethics and related problems, this article focuses on presenting a picture of the evolution of the concepts and recent achievements related to technoethics, based on the ethics of responsibility. The term ‘ethics of nuclear technology’ describes a multidisciplinary endeavor to examine the problems associated with (...) nuclear technology through ethical frameworks and paradigms. Second, to identify the reasons for the intensification of efforts to develop ethics in relation to nuclear technology, this article presents an analysis of the recent situation and future prospects of nuclear technology deployment. This includes contradictions that have aggravated nuclear dilemmas and debates stimulated by the shortcomings of nuclear technology, as well as the need for the further development of a nuclear culture paradigm that is able to provide a conceptual framework to overcome nuclear challenges. Third, efforts in the field of nuclear technology ethics are presented as a short overview of particular examples, and the major findings regarding obstacles to the development of nuclear technology ethics are also summarized. Finally, a potential methodological course is proposed to overcome inaction in this field; the proposed course provides for the further development of nuclear technology ethics, assuming the axiological multidisciplinary problematization of the main concepts in nuclear engineering through the basic ethical paradigms: analytical, hermeneutical, and poststructuralist. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Defending the distinction between believing and accepting a proposition, I argue that cases where agents allegedly exercise direct voluntary control over their beliefs are instances of agents exercising direct voluntary control over accepting a proposition. The upshot is that any decision to believe a proposition cannot result directly in one’s acquiring the belief. Accepting is an instrumental mental action the agent performs that may trigger belief. A model of the relationship between acceptance and belief is sketched and defended. The (...) consequences of the distinction between belief and acceptance, and the model of belief control sketched are then applied to the recent case made by Carl Ginet in defense of the conceptual and psychological possibility of agents exercising direct voluntary control over their beliefs. n. (shrink)

In some recent work on omissions, it has been argued that the causal theory of action cannot account for how agency is exercised in intentionally omitting to act in the same way it explains how agency is exercised in intentional action. Thus, causalism appears to provide us with an incomplete picture of intentional agency. I argue that causalists should distinguish causalism as a general theory of intentional agency from causalism as a theory of intentional action. Specifically, I argue that, while (...) intentional actions may best be understood as the causal products or outcomes of causings, we should identify exercises of intentional agency with causal processes. With a causalist account of intentional agency sketched, I respond to the challenge to causalism from omissions. I argue that when an agent intentionally omits there is a causal process that has a zero-sum outcome. But the causal process is sufficient to make it true that the agent exercises intentional agency in intentionally omitting. (shrink)

This paper examines the ability of countries in Central and Eastern Europe to ensure appropriate protection of research participants in the field of increasingly globalizing biomedical research. By applying an analytical framework for identifying gaps in policies and programs for human subjects protection to four countries of CEE—Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, substantial gaps in the scope and content of relevant policies and major impediments to program performance have been revealed. In these countries, public policies on the protection of research (...) participants lack consistency and reliable mechanisms for their implementation. Impediments to program performance most often relate to inadequacies in the national research ethics systems with regard to organizational structure, budgetary support, supervision, and training. The level of research ethics capacity varies from country to country and depends on socio-economic and political factors of post-communist transition. The breadth and depth of the problems identified suggest that the current level of protection for research participants in CEE might be inadequate to the challenges posed by the globalization of biomedical research. In CEE countries, there is a need for strengthening research ethics capacity through modification of relevant policies and improvement of program management. The differences among the countries call for further research on identifying the best approaches for filling the gaps in the policies and programs aimed at ensuring effective protection of research participants. (shrink)

Epicurus claimed that „all sensations are true”, and that the false is only in the opinions. This paradoxical theory, very much criticized both by ancient and modern commentators, for it seems counterfactual, draws on Aristotle’s theory of sensations. Aristotle holds that sensations and opinions must be distinguished. As long as sensations stick to their „proper domain”, they remain trustworthy and cannot refute each other, regardless of whether they are similar or different in kind. Yet they can fail to perceive the (...) truth, when they pass beyond their proper domain into what one can call their „improper domain”. At this moment sensations resemble opinions and become fallible. So, to a certain extent, the divide between sensations and opinions becomes blurred. Epicurus seems to have taken up much of this theory. Yet he submitted it to a radical simplification: now, there is no room for the „improper domain”, so that all one sensation seizes always belongs to its „proper domain”. Thus it can never be refuted neither by a similar, nor by a dissimilar sensation in kind; therefore it is always and in every circumstance trustworthy. One can add that, in reshaping Aristotle’s theory of senses by removing the „improper domain”, Epicurus purged the theory of senses of all elements that could involve uncertainty and imprecision – which is typical for his strenuous attempt to achieve calm and serenity. (shrink)

The ways in which we exercise intentional agency are varied. I take the domain of intentional agency to include all that we intentionally do versus what merely happens to us. So the scope of our intentional agency is not limited to intentional action. One can also exercise some intentional agency in omitting to act and, importantly, in producing the intentional outcome of an intentional action. So, for instance, when an agent is dieting, there is an exercise of agency both with (...) respect to the agent’s actions and omissions that constitute her dieting behavior and in achieving the intended outcome of losing weight. In our mental lives we exercise intentional agency both in performing mental actions and when we intentionally produce certain outcomes at which our mental actions are aimed. The nature and scope of our intentional agency in our mental lives with respect to controlling the acquisition of mental states such as belief, desire, and intention is a topic that is of interest in its own right. In this essay, I will focus solely on our control over coming to believe. Understanding what sort of control we have our beliefs has far-reaching implications. For instance, theorizing about self-deception and wishful thinking is aided by theorizing about what if any intentional agency we can exercise with respect to acquiring beliefs. Another often mentioned concern that motivates thinking about doxastic agency comes from religion (when conversion requires a change of belief). We also hold persons morally and epistemically responsible for beliefs they have or fail to have. Finally, some deontological theories of epistemic justification require that agents be able to exercise a robust form of doxastic control. Fruitful work on any of these problems requires that we have an account of our intentional agency in acquiring beliefs. There are at least three loci of doxastic control. The first is over acquiring beliefs. The second is over maintaining beliefs. The third is over how we use our beliefs. I am chiefly concerned with the first locus of doxastic control in this essay, but I will say something about the second locus along the way. Also, I will only consider one way we might exercise control over acquiring beliefs. Specifically, I will present an argument against direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV). By “DDV” I mean to refer to the thesis that it is conceptually possible for agents to consciously exercise the same sort of direct voluntary control over coming to acquire a doxastic attitude—such as belief, suspension of belief, and disbelief—that they exercise over uncontroversial basic actions. If DDV is correct, then coming to believe can be a basic action-type. DDV, or something very close to it, was Bernard Williams’ target in his 1973 paper, “Deciding to Believe.” Williams’s argument is widely regarded as having been a failure. But I think that Williams was on to something in his paper. Hence, in this paper, while I do not attempt to resurrect Williams’s argument, I develop and defend a revised argument for a thesis that is quite close to Williams’s. I will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss Bernard Williams’ (1973) failed attempt at showing that DDV is conceptually impossible. This will be followed by a discussion of some constraints on our belief-forming activities. I will then clarify my target a bit more than Williams does in his original paper. Finally, I will present my own argument against the conceptual possibility of DDV. (shrink)

This paper is focused on the ways of expressing trust and distrust in financial institutions represented in the language and speech culture of the population of the Lipetsk region. Based on 55 semi-structured interviews of three generations (centennials, millennials, elder generations) living in rural and urban settlements, issues of understanding and interpretation of financial institutions, features of trust, positive and negative experiences of interaction with various financial institutions were analyzed. The use of the constructivism made it possible to interpret trust (...) as an internal component of the practices of an agent involved in the current financial situation. The study showed that in regions with an average standard of living, an average level of financial culture and the dominance of a conservative model of financial behaviour, the difference between generations is less noticeable against the backdrop of a significant difference between residents of rural and urban settlements. The analysis of interviews with three generations of residents of the region showed that the conservative model of financial behaviour continues to be reproduced in the speech culture of the informants, where banks and insurance organizations remain the most trustworthy. The images of financial institutions, represented in the language of the interviews, revealed a high level of resentment associated with the experience of past events (the collapse of the USSR, privatization). The content analysis revealed the image of the state as a “collector of payments”, and to a lesser extent, a “helper” supporting a person in his relationship with financial institutions. (shrink)

Viebahn (2018) has recently argued that several tests for ambiguity, such as the conjunction-reduction test, are not reliable as tests for polysemy, but only as tests for homonymy. I look at the more fine-grained distinction between regular and irregular polysemy and I argue for a more nuanced conclusion: the tests under discussion provide systematic evidence for homonymy and irregular polysemy but need to be used with more care to test for regular polysemy. I put this conclusion at work in the (...) context of the debate over the alleged referential-attributive ambiguity of the definite article. In reply to various criticisms, defenders of the ambiguity view argue that this is a case of polysemy. But opponents object that the dual use of the definite article fails tests for ambiguity. The debate seems to have come to stalemate, unless the relevance of the tests is determined for cases of alleged polysemy. I conclude that the balance of considerations incline towards rejecting the ambiguity thesis. (shrink)

Humean compatibilism combines a Humean conception of laws of nature with a strong dual-ability condition for free will that requires that agents possess the ability to decide differently when they make a free decision. On the Humean view of laws of nature, laws of nature are taken to be contingent non-governing descriptions of significant regularities that obtain in the entire history of the universe. On Humean compatibilism, agents are taken to possess dual ability when making free decisions because what the (...) laws of nature will finally be is (at least partially) dependent upon how an agent decides. In this paper, I argue that the tenability of Humean compatibilism depends in part upon what theory of time is correct. More specifically, I argue that Humean compatibilism is untenable in a deterministic universe if eternalism is true. (shrink)

I review the present status of the problem of initial conditions for inflation and describe several ways to solve this problem for many popular inflationary models, including the recent generation of the models with plateau potentials favored by cosmological observations.

Research on the nature of dispositionality or causal power has flourished in recent years in metaphysics. This trend has slowly begun to influence debates in the philosophy of agency, especially in the literature on free will. Both sophisticated versions of agent-­‐causalism and the new varieties of dispositionalist compatibilism exploit recently developed accounts of dispositionality in their defense. In this paper, I examine recent work on agent-­‐causal power, focusing primarily on the account of agent-­‐causalism developed and defended by Timothy O’Connor’s in (...) his work on free will. Assuming the existence of irreducible causal powers, I offer an. (shrink)

The standard liberal egalitarian approach to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws implies that such exemptions may be necessary in the name of equal respect for each citizen’s conscience. In each particular case this approach requires balancing the claims of devout believers against the countervailing claims of other citizens. I contend, firstly, that under the conditions of deep moral and ideological disagreement the balancing procedure proves to be extremely inconclusive. It does not provide an unequivocal solution even in the imaginary (...) case based on the biblical story of Abraham’s sacrifice, not to speak of real-life cases that are far less suggestive. Secondly, I argue that it is possible to consider demands for religious exemptions respectfully, without even challenging the way they are justified, but still reject them for principled reasons—namely, because these demands cannot be met without arbitrarily bending popular sovereignty to the dictate of religious doctrines. (shrink)

Notre article analyse deux passages curieux du traité Sur les difficultés relatives à l’âme III. De la vision (Enn. IV.5,3 et 8), dans lesquels Plotin paraît concevoir la possibilité d’un autre univers, situé en dehors du nôtre. Or, cet autre univers doit rester inconnu pour nous à jamais, quand bien même il y aurait un « oeil placé sur le dos du Ciel » qui voudrait le voir. En outre, nous ne saurons même pas décider si cet univers existe ou (...) non. En effet, explique Plotin, plusieurs univers ne peuvent absolument pas communiquer entre eux, précisément parce qu’ils forment des univers différents. S’ils communiquaient, ils seraient autant de parties du même univers et non pas des univers séparés, parce que la communication (la sympathie dans les termes de Plotin) circule seulement à l’intérieur du même univers. Nous rapprochons cet intéressant argument de certaines idées astrophysiques modernes et de la philosophie « des mondes possible » de David Lewis, sans pour autant pratiquer une lecture « modernisante » de Plotin. (shrink)

The article calls in question the widely held opinion that Epicurus developed his concept of prolepsis as an empirical “alternative response” to the Platonic Forms. One tries to show that in fact the prolepsis and the Form produce two different types of knowledge and that their difference goes beyond the fact that the former is empirical while the latter is not: the prolepsis is based on recognition and strives to ascertain the identity of the perceived things, while the Form is (...) based on recollection and seeks to know what their essence or nature is. Recognition and recollection are phenomenologically quite different. However, it is still possible that the Epicurean prolepsis was indebted to Plato, but it was the Plato of the Theaetetus and Philebus rather than that of the Meno and Phaedo. So one holds that Epicurus developed a somehow marginal Platonic epistemology to which he assigned a central and basic role in his own epistemology (the Canon). (shrink)

The article calls in question the widely held opinion that Epicurus developed his concept of prolepsis as an empirical “alternative response” to the Platonic Forms. One tries to show that in fact the prolepsis and the Form produce two different types of knowledge and that their difference goes beyond the fact that the former is empirical while the latter is not: the prolepsis is based on recognition and strives to ascertain the identity of the perceived things, while the Form is (...) based on recollection and seeks to know what their essence or nature is. Recognition and recollection are phenomenologically quite different. However, it is still possible that the Epicurean prolepsis was indebted to Plato, but it was the Plato of the Theaetetus and Philebus rather than that of the Meno and Phaedo. So one holds that Epicurus developed a somehow marginal Platonic epistemology to which he assigned a central and basic role in his own epistemology (the Canon). (shrink)

Paradox of the Evil and "Family Ressemblances". The paper tackles the problem of Matter and evil in Plotinus. monistic metaphysics, especially in theperspective of the following aparent inconsistency: if there is no other principle but the Good, then the Good creates the Matter which is the absolute evil. Itfollows that the Good is bad, according to a certain axiom of Proclus, which states that the creator is to a higher degree all what the creature is. The authorshows that, despite what (...) Proclus and then many modern critics believed, Plotinus is consistent within his system. He relies on the axiom that the creature is not all what the creator is, i.e. that the creator also gives what he has not. Therefore, the One gives the Intellect multiplicity and thought which He is deprived of and also gives the Matter the evil which He is also deprived of. The paper also shows that Plotinus developed a logic of ontological procession which is not Aristotelian. This logic does not work by formind classes, but chains of partially intransitive ressemblances. So, the Intellect ressembles the One (the Good), the Soul ressembles the Intellect and the Matter ressembles the Soul; yet the Matter resembles the One no more. Yet, the unity of the world is assured, because of the continuity of the chain. The extreme terms are contrary, though not in the Aristotelian sense of sharing in the same genus. A certain similarty with Wittgenstein's logic of "family resemblances" is striking, which means that not only Wittgenstein, but Plotinus also went beyond the Platonic-Aristotelian Vulgata, even while he was sticking to its linguage. (shrink)

Paradox of the Evil and "Family Ressemblances". The paper tackles the problem of Matter and evil in Plotinus. monistic metaphysics, especially in theperspective of the following aparent inconsistency: if there is no other principle but the Good, then the Good creates the Matter which is the absolute evil. Itfollows that the Good is bad, according to a certain axiom of Proclus, which states that the creator is to a higher degree all what the creature is. The authorshows that, despite what (...) Proclus and then many modern critics believed, Plotinus is consistent within his system. He relies on the axiom that the creature is not all what the creator is, i.e. that the creator also gives what he has not. Therefore, the One gives the Intellect multiplicity and thought which He is deprived of and also gives the Matter the evil which He is also deprived of. The paper also shows that Plotinus developed a logic of ontological procession which is not Aristotelian. This logic does not work by formind classes, but chains of partially intransitive ressemblances. So, the Intellect ressembles the One (the Good), the Soul ressembles the Intellect and the Matter ressembles the Soul; yet the Matter resembles the One no more. Yet, the unity of the world is assured, because of the continuity of the chain. The extreme terms are contrary, though not in the Aristotelian sense of sharing in the same genus. A certain similarty with Wittgenstein's logic of "family resemblances" is striking, which means that not only Wittgenstein, but Plotinus also went beyond the Platonic-Aristotelian Vulgata, even while he was sticking to its linguage. (shrink)

My paper is a reply to Mr. Seungbae Park’s article, “Defence of Cultural Relativism” (Park, 2011), which holds that no culture is better than another. In response,my paper challenges the author’s method, fairly popular amongst some postmodern thinkers, that tends to equate cultural relativism and Einstein’s theory of relativity. Firstly, I question the general rationale of establishing an analogy between relativity and relativism. In my opinion, the analogy fails to take into accountthe very large generic distance between physics and ethics. (...) Secondly, I try to demonstrate that the analogy can be construed in two opposite ways, so that, on theone hand, it might support relativism, while on the other, it might reinforce cultural absolutism. Therefore, one would rather dispense with so equivocal an analogy. Finally, I suggest that besides cultural absolutism and cultural relativism there is also another way of assessing different cultures – I used to call it intrinsic comparison – which is based on the second options of groups and individuals rather than on their first options. The issue of how to successfully compare cultures by avoiding both absolutism and relativism was extensively dealt with by me elsewhere. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best (...) conceived of as a sub-doxastic venture that involves pragmatically assuming that God exists. (shrink)

The author of the article turns to the modern discourse about man and his place in the humanities system. A retrospective analysis of the modern discourse about man allows us to distinguish three stages in its development: anti-humanism, anti-anthropology and post-anthropology. Despite the fact that the main topics around which he is focused are concentrated on criticism of "anthropocentrism" and "eurocentrism", the author concludes that the anti-anthropological narrative retains all the features of cultural and epistemological "narcissism". The anti-anthropological narrative continues (...) to function as a system of "recognizing oneself", as a system of "differentiating oneself and the other" and as a system of "justifying oneself through the other". (shrink)