O preconceito e a intolerância com as religiões de matriz africana foram construídos no contexto da colonização e atualizam-se cotidianamente por meio da colonialidade. O artigo objetiva analisar o que professores negros têm feito para superar essa realidade. Para tanto, foram realizadas entrevistas semiestruturadas com professores negros, militantes da causa negra, que atuam em escolas públicas. A análise mostrou que esses professores desenvolvem várias estratégias com vistas à desconstrução do preconceito e da intolerância.

Gilles Deleuze se apropria do conceito nietzschiano de dívida, ou, em alemão, Schuld, em sua dupla dimensão de promessa e culpa, para criar uma filosofia da potência, da pluralidade e dos agenciamentos. Aqui, não apenas o universo conceitual deleuziano é marcado pela demanda de emancipação da dívida, com noções como rizoma, desterritorialização ou corpo sem órgãos: a própria irreverência dessa filosofia investe na descontinuidade e no devir.

Este artículo trata del cuerpo humano descrito en la fenomenología de Heidegger. Inicialmente, exponemos el cuerpo visto por las ciencias naturales, que en alemán es expresado por el término Körper, y discutimos la incapacidad de las ciencias naturales para analizar el cuerpo como fenómeno. Luego presentamos el cuerpo humano como fenómeno, que en alemán se denomina Leib, explicamos el gesto como movimiento del cuerpo y explicamos la capacidad de percepción del cuerpo.

This book claims that Aristotle followed an aspect theory of predication.

Teaching ethics in public health programmes is not routine everywhere – at least not in most schools of public health in the European region. Yet empirical evidence shows that schools of public health are more and more interested in the integration of ethics in their curricula, since public health professionals often have to face difficult ethical decisions.

Livro-texto de introdução à lógica, com (mais do que) pitadas de filosofia da lógica, produzido como uma versão revista e ampliada do livro Forallx: Calgary. Trata-se da versão de 13 de outubro de 2022. Comentários, críticas, correções e sugestões são muito bem-vindos.

The primary aim of this paper is to defend the Lockean View—the view that a belief is epistemically justified iff it is highly probable—against a new family of objections. According to these objections, broadly speaking, the Lockean View ought to be abandoned because it is incompatible with, or difficult to square with, our judgments surrounding certain legal cases. I distinguish and explore three different versions of these objections—The Conviction Argument, the Argument from Assertion and Practical Reasoning, and the Comparative Probabilities (...) Argument—but argue that none of them are successful. I also present some very general reasons for being pessimistic about the overall strategy of using legal considerations to evaluate epistemic theories; as we will see, there are good reasons to think that many of the considerations relevant to legal theorizing are ultimately irrelevant to epistemic theorizing. (shrink)

In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism. We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual practice” and the “moral intuition practice”, which we take to raise some difficult (...) normative and meta‐normative questions for theorists of all stripes. (shrink)

The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. (...) Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity. (shrink)

Recent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on (...) Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat. (shrink)

Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one's times and at (...) best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In From Puzzles to Principles? May Sim gathers experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretive possibilities. The contributors' thoughtful reflections on the nature and limits of dialectic should play a crucial role in Aristotelian scholarship. (shrink)

One of the core doctrines of Mozi 墨子 is his teaching on jian'ai 兼愛, and this is discussed primarily in the three chapters bearing this term in their title.1 The term "jian'ai" and its theme also appear scattered throughout the Mozi, such as in chapters like "Standards and Rules" and the "Intention of Tian." Jian'ai has been translated into English as "Universal Love," "Inclusive Care," "Impartial Care," and other similar phrases. As these various translations suggest, there is not yet a (...) prevailing consensus on the exact meaning of jian'ai.2Despite his renowned clarity and simplicity and his skill at argumentation, those who try to pin down Mozi's teaching on jian'ai soon encounter difficulties. I think there are... (shrink)

This paper examines the Confucian concept of tian, conventionally translated into English as “Heaven.‘ The secondary literature on tian has primarily focused on the question of what tian is: e.g., whether tian is an anthropomorphic deity or a naturalistic force, or whether tian is transcendent or immanent. Instead, this paper locates tian with respect to the ethical life of human beings, and argues that the two conflicting concepts of “moral economy‘ and “contingency‘ are main characteristics of tian. This paper further (...) investigates these characteristics in Kongzi’s and Mengzi’s ethical thought: how they conceptualized moral economy and contingency, and how their different conceptualizations shaped their respective ethical programs: Kongzi’s ethics of faith and Mengzi’s ethics of confidence. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self-sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged (...) and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non-moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non-moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non-moral goods in human life. (shrink)

This essay intends to criticize Hans-Georg Gadamer’s conception of language on the basis of which he justifies the proposition that learning is only possible through conversation. Although he understands as language non-verbal forms of communication such as gestures, physiognomic expressions, looks, Gadamer conceives language as word. However, I believe, and no one would deny it, language needs to be understood and, above all, learned. So here is the motivating problem of this essay: if language has to be understood as word, (...) how is it possible to learn it before mastering the word during childhood? To answer this problem, first, I clarify what I understand as philosophical conception of education. Then I demonstrate, in a broad examination of Gadamer’s essays written over five decades, the absence of a pre-predicative conception of language. Finally, I outline a pre-predicative conception of language by which I intend to show how it is possible to learn language before mastering the word. (shrink)

O desenvolvimento das TDVs possibilita a ampliação dos espaços de relação e interação entre os seres humanos, modificando, assim, a forma de viver e conviver em espaços digitais virtuais, fazendo emergir outra cultura. A cultura emergente é construída por homens e mulheres que configuram o pensar, as ações e reflexões das novas gerações. Nesse sentido, a educação tem como comprometimento qualificar o processo de reflexão, a fim de que as novas gerações tenham consciência sobre o seu pensar e o seu (...) agir, nos espaços digitais virtuais. O MDV3D é uma das TDVs mais significativas para propiciar os processos de interação e relação na construção do conhecimento, potencializando o ensinar e o aprender. O viver e o conviver implicam o fato de seres humanos estarem em congruência com o meio; neste sentido, é fundamental compreender as possibilidades e limitações do MDV3D para a construção da cultura emergente. (shrink)

A argumentação desenvolvida no presente artigo se propõe a defender a interpretação austera do construtivismo em Kant das objeções a ela levantadas por Jeremy Schwartz (2017) em seu artigo _Was Kant a ‘Kantian Constructivist’?_. Tendo isso em vista, primeiramente, procede-se à reconstrução da interpretação de Schwartz para a distinção analítico-sintética na esfera prática a partir da caracterização por contradição e à indicação de objeções para sua aceitação. Na sequência, apresenta-se a caracterização de analiticidade por continência e como esta pode ser (...) transposta para o caso dos imperativos sem resultar em conflitos com a interpretação austera do construtivismo. Por fim, delineiam-se considerações quanto à formalidade dos princípios constitutivos da razão prática e seu escopo, chegando à conclusão de que não se pode estabelecer uma identidade entre construtivismo austero e logicismo prático. (shrink)

With contributions by some of the best and most significant contemporary Korean philosophers, this important volume provides an overview of the different debates, problems, figures and periods that make up traditional Korean Buddhist and Confucian thought. The book highlights the richness and diversity of Korean philosophy as a vital and ongoing philosophical endeavour.

This paper examines the thoughts of two prominent Korean Confucians of the late Goryeo 高麗period, Yi Saek 李穡 and Jeong Do-jeon 鄭道傳. Although they were both renowned as followers of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism, they held differing views on several important issues. One of these issues was the royal successions of King U 禑王 and King Chang 昌王. Yi Saek considered them to be legitimate rulers of Goryeo, while Jeong Do-jeon denied their legitimacy and accused those involved in their enthronements of (...) treason. In order to conceptualize their differences, I first explain the distinction between the ownership conception and the service conception of political authority introduced by Joseph Chan. Based on this philosophical framework, I analyze and compare the thoughts of Yi Saek and Jeong Do-jeon. My conclusion is that they based political legitimacy on different grounds: for Yi Saek, legitimacy is based on the founder’s achievements in setting up the cultural and political foundation of Goryeo, whereas for Jeong Do-jeon, it is based on the founding king himself, who established the dynasty in 918. Accordingly, I call their views the “founding service” conception and the “founder’s ownership” conception of political authority, respectively. I hope this analysis and comparison of their differing conceptions of political authority can contribute to a better understanding of their political thoughts and the development of the concept of political legitimacy in Korean history. (shrink)

I offer truth conditions for propositions about being qua being in Aristotle's philosophy. I show that in general Aristotle views expressions of the form "qua S" in "S qua S is P" (or "S is P qua S") as making a claim not about the subject "S", but about the predication of "P" of "S". I develop necessary and sufficient truth conditions for propositions of the form "S qua S is P". Finally, I show how this analysis satisfactorily covers what (...) Aristotle says about being qua being in the Metaphysics. (shrink)