Anti-materialist thought experiments as, e.g., zombie arguments, have posed some of the most vexing problems for materialist accounts of phenomenal consciousness. I doubt, however, that arguments of this kind can refute the core thesis of materialism. Although I do not question that there is something very special about an adequate explanation of phenomenal consciousness, and although I accept the epistemic irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness, I deny that modal arguments reach far enough to establish essentialism about consciousness. I will draw upon (...) a relativistic conception of modal space and suggest to strictly separate between varieties of metaphysical possibility - depending on which world is considered as actual, and depending on accessibility relations. It is shown that the modal argument cannot endanger the reductive explanation of the mind-brain relation if one distinguishes carefully between possibility according to primary intensions and possibility according to secondary intensions . Modal arguments are strong enough to make an epistemological point but not an ontological one. (shrink)

In Willensfreiheit Geert Keil seeks a better explanation of freedom of the will by investigating the connections between free will and determinism vs. indeterminism. Keil thinks that there is no freedom of the will without declaring determinism untrue. So, on the one hand freedom of the will seems to require indeterminism, but on the other hand, freely willed choices and decisions must be different from pure chance. The key, Keil thinks, is global indeterminism without local indeterminism — I doubt this.