Tekste nagrinėjama vėlyvojo Schellingo Berlyno paskaitose formuluojama patyrimo samprata ir jos reikšmė svarstant mąstymo ir tikrovės santykį. Keliamas klausimas, kokiu mastu jo siūloma moderniosios patyrimo sampratos transformacija gali būti reikšminga užklausiant nūdienos filosofinio diskurso ateities perspektyvą Benjamino ir Agambeno įvardyto „patirties neprieinamumo“ kontekste. Mėginama parodyti, jog, užuot ieškojus patyrimo galimybės pagrindo imanentinėse ar transcendentalinėse subjekto apibrėžtyse, šelingiškoji alternatyva leidžia permąstyti patyrimą iš radikalios ateities perspektyvos. Atskleidžiant ontologinį patyrimo matmenį, jo sąsajas su laisvės klausimu ir paties mąstymo faktiškumo problema, atsiveria galimybė (...) ieškoti patyrimo vietos anapus subjekto–objekto perskyros, anapus betarpiškumo ar juslinio ir objektiško pažinimo. Tai leidžia persvarstyti patyrimo reikšmę metafizikai tiek pokantinės, tiek postidealistinės savimonės perspektyvoje. (shrink)

The text approaches the Hegelian dynamic between truth and certainty as it appear in the beginning of the Phenomenology as a question of truth and the sense of truth. Since this difference exceeds a merely epistemic stance and cannot be captured in terms of conceptual content, it leads to another mode of inquiry, namely, to that of a different relatedness to knowledge. Hegel’s emphasis, as I will attempt to show, on thinking the question of self-relatedness of thought in terms of (...) experience (which is always negative) in the first place, may provide a means to identify such a mode of self-relatedness that precedes the “self” of consciousness. Such an approach would put the question of the self both against its rigid modern critiques on the one hand, and its contemporary dissolution into naturalistic objectified oblivion on the other. In this way, the essay also challenges Heidegger’s critical stance towards the Hegelian notion of “the experience of consciousness” by presenting it rather as a “consciousness of experience.” For here this double genitive expresses a repetition or return that appears as a kind of afterimage of a still-life. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to show how two different paths of elaborating the negativity of self-consciousness in Schelling and Hegel create a particular mirror effect that can no longer be understood within the realm of dialectics or any conceptual image, but rather can be resolved through what I will characterize as the image of self-consciousness. I argue that these two different perspectives, despite exhausting dialectics and negativity, can be brought together, each in its own way, through the (...) images of reflection, desire, and death as presented in the mythic narratives of Narcissus and Orpheus. I attempt to show that the death of Narcissus and the loss of Eurydice can lay equal claims to being about the birth of self-consciousness. (shrink)