This article sheds light on the diversity of meanings and connotations that tend to be lost or hidden in translations between different conceptualizations of nature in East and South-East Asia. It reviews the idea of “nature” in Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Filipino, Tagalog, Cebuano, Lumad, Indonesian, Burmese, Nepali, Khmer, and Mongolian. It shows that the conceptual subtleties in the conceptualization of nature often hide wider and deeper cosmological mismatches. It concludes by suggesting that these diverse voices need to be represented in (...) global reports on sustainability, which can be fostered by the direct involvement of experts from diverse traditions of thought who have access and interpretative knowledge of sources in languages other than English. To take into consideration the diversity of conceptualizations of nature can lead to better decisions about sustainability and improve the acceptability and efficiency of environmental policies in each local context, as well as internationally. Solutions and policies on the ground must be designed based on the local conceptual and cultural frames. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the discussion of how religious perspectives can improve business ethics. Two such perspectives are in natural law of antiquity and recent Catholic social doctrine and teaching. This paper develops a conceptual framework from natural law and CSD/T that business leaders can adopt to build an ethos of humanistic management. This “Human Dignity-Centered” framework fills the gap between time-tested Christian norms and contemporary firm-leaders’ concrete needs. “Human dignity” is used as a rhetorical device to convey (...) the idea that firms are composed of dynamic social networks, with an ultimate purpose of serving human needs. Ultimately, the principles and virtues the framework employs have a logic that should inspire excellence, as ethical practices and concern for human welfare lay a foundation for long-term business prosperity. In a one-frame visual representation, this paper portrays: firm leadership challenges; a transforming ethical prism of principles and virtues; and results and feedback mechanisms. The accompanying narrative describes each element and how each affects humanistic management. Finally, illustrative company examples and questions are provided to illustrate how the framework can be used to benefit human flourishing. The framework provides an adjunct to current formulations of improving managerial excellence. (shrink)

Robotic systems consisting of a neuron culture grown on a multielectrode array which is connected to a virtual or mechanical robot have been studied for approximately 15 years. It is hoped that these MEA-based robots will be able to address the problem that robots based on conventional computer technology are not very good at adapting to surprising or unusual situations, at least not when compared to biological organisms. It is also hoped that insights gained from MEA-based robotics can have applications (...) within human enhancement and medicine. In this paper, I argue that researchers within this field risk overstating their results by not paying enough attention to fundamental challenges within the field. In particular, I investigate three problems: the coding problem, the embodiment problem and the training problem. I argue that none of these problems have been solved and that they are not likely to be solved within the field. After that, I discuss whether MEA-based robotics should be considered pop science. Finally, I investigate the ethical aspects of this research. (shrink)

A partir de la expresión Amado de mi alma, Guillermo de Saint Thierry subraya uno de los elementos principales de su doctrina espiritual. A partir de la Expositio in Canticum Canticorum, nuestro autor comenta cómo la Esposa elogia al Esposo a través de esta fórmula, confiriéndole en ello, un sentido particular en la relación de los amados; pues este amor tiene un cierto gusto de aquel a quien busca: sensum quemdam. Amor que es comunicado al hombre para que él ame (...) a Dios, como Dios se ama. Por ello, la Esposa dice a los centinelas: "¿Habéis visto al amado de mi alma?". Estas palabras no solo denotan su afecto, sino permiten considerar que el alma misma experimenta la presencia de Dios. Guillermo de Saint Thierry ofrece una analogía en la que intenta transmitir que en esta comprensión del amor, el amante se transforma en el amado. From the expression Beloved of my soul, William of Saint-Thierry highlights one of the main elements of his spiritual doctrine. From Expositio in Canticum Canticorum, the author comments how the Bride praises the Bridegroom through this formula, thus giving it a particular sense in relation to the beloved ones because this love somehow likes the one he looks for: sensum quemdam; love that is communicated to man so that he can love God, as God loves himself. For this, the Bride says to the sentinels: "Have you seen the beloved of my soul"? These words do not only reveal her affection, but also allow considering that the soul itself experiences the presence of God. William of Saint-Thierry offers and analogy to transmit that, in this comprehension of love, the lover becomes the beloved one. (shrink)

Mea culpa. In 1981 the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, of which I was the Executive Director, recommended to the President and Congress that all federal departments and agencies that conduct or support human subjects research adopt “as a common core” the HHS regulations, “while permitting additions needed by any department or agency that are not inconsistent with these core provisions.” The commission believed—rightly, I still think—that having uniformity would ease (...) administration, reduce regulatory burdens, simplify oversight, and make research more efficient. Yet our naïve expectation the task could be accomplished in 180 days meant that we failed to anticipate that if it took much longer—namely, the 10 years that passed before the Common Rule was issued—federal officials would thereafter be reluctant to change the regulations and that when they tried to do so twenty years later, with the issuance of the ANPRM in 2011, they would propose comprehensive revisions. I argue that was the wrong conclusion to draw from the difficulties in issuing the first Common Rule, and that the process of producing the new “final rule” on January 19, 2017—during which many of the proposed changes were either dumped or promulgated without being adequately vetted—reinforces the conclusion that a more incremental process, with ongoing involvement of the public through an advisory body like the President's Commission, would be a much better way to proceed. (shrink)

Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa : phraséologie liturgique ou expression d'un sentiment de culpabilité qui taraude l'espèce humaine depuis la nuit des temps? La faute est inscrite dans le parcours de l'homme et soulève maintes questions sur sa responsabilité, son rapport au monde, sa subordination à Dieu ou à Satan. A chaque époque sa réponse. Pour la période comprise entre 1453 et 1715, ont été convoqués les courants philosophiques et religieux, les écrits polémiques ou techniques pour affiner le (...) concept de faute en l'opposant le cas échéant à l'erreur et au péché. Ce premier tome analyse l'erreur technique en montrant comment l'établissement de la norme incline à sa transgression et suscite un débat moral qui aboutit à une définition plurielle de la faute. (shrink)

‘Ivravit in mea uerba tota Italia sponte sua et me belli quo uici ad Actium ducem depoposcit.’ In these words the Emperor Augustus clearly meant to suggest that the war in which he got rid of Mark Antony was none of his making, but was imposed upon him by the free and self-determined action of the Italian nation. Modern historians have unanimously refused to regard Augustus as a passive instrument in the hands of the Roman people at large; yet they (...) have generally accepted his account of the oath-taking of 32 B.C. as the outcome of a spontaneous burst of enthusiasm in his behalf, which they interpret as the reflex result of the nation's resentment against Antony's un-Roman and treasonable behaviour. (shrink)

This article provides empirical results indicating that acting in a socially respon- sible and lawful manner is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for increasing shareholder wealth. It meta-analyzes 27 event studies that have mea- sured the stock market's reaction to incidences of socially irresponsible and illicit behavior. It finds that for firms engaging in socially irresponsible and illicit behavior, the effect on shareholder wealth is negative (wealth decreases), statisti- cally significant (p <.001), and so substantial in size (D = (...) -.932) that the distribution of abnormal returns is shifted nearly a full standard deviation to the left (i.e., negatively) from their expected standard normal distribution. This result gives rationally self-interested firms a self-interested reason to act in a socially responsible and law-abiding manner. It also provides support for a moral position called enlightened self-interest, which prescribes that firms should act in a socially responsible manner to promote the shareholders' interests. (shrink)

The Herald of Free Enterprise, a ferry operating in the English Channel, sank on March 6, 1987, drowning nearly two hundred people. The official inquiry found that the company running the ferry was extremely sloppy, with poor routines of checking and management. “From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness.”1 But the courts did not penalize anyone in what might seem to be an appropriate measure, failing to identify individuals in the company or on (...) the ship itself who were seriously enough at fault. As one commentator put it, “The primary requirement of finding an individual who was liable . . . stood in the way of attaching any significance to the organizational sloppiness that had been found by the official inquiry.”2 In a case like this it can make good sense to hold that while the individuals involved may not bear a high degree of personal responsibility, together as a corporate enterprise they should carry full responsibility for what occurred. Although the members may not fully satisfy the conditions for being held personally responsible—although there are mitigating circumstances that excuse them in some mea-. (shrink)

In a challenge trial, research subjects are purposefully exposed to some pathogen in a controlled setting, in order to test the efficacy of a vaccine or other experimental treatment. This is an example of medical effective altruism (MEA), where individuals volunteer to risk harms for the public good. Many bioethicists rejected challenge trials in the context of Covid‐19 vaccine research on ethical grounds. After considering various grounds of this objection, I conclude that the crucial question is how much harm research (...) subjects can permissibly risk. But we lack a satisfying way of making this judgment that does not appeal simply to the intuitions of doctors or bioethicists. I consider one recent and structurally plausible approach to critically evaluating the harm question. Alex London defends a social consistency test for research risks: we should compare the risks undertaken by research subjects to relevantly similar risks which are accepted in other spheres of society. I argue there is no good reason not to consider volunteer military service as a relevant social comparison. This implies there is essentially no cap on acceptable risks on the social consistency rationale. In short, if soldiers can be heroes, why can't research volunteers? (shrink)

Mark Johnston has recently attacked various versions of subjectivism and anti-realism, using what he calls the “missing-explanation argument”. In this paper I shall outline the MEA, and show how Johnston takes it to demolish some anti-realist views, both historical and contemporary. In particular, I shall outline how the argument would apply to the view about the origin of piety espoused by Euthyphro in Plato’s dialogue of that name, to the judgement-dependent conception of intentional states recently sketched by Crispin Wright, to (...) the “internal realism” that has been espoused by Hilary Putnam, and to the perceptual model of value that has been advocated by John McDowell. I shall then attempt to deflect the MEA by raising a set of nested dilemmas for the argument. The conclusion I hope to establish is that Johnston is still some distance from establishing the falsity of the versions of anti-realism that he considers. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente estudo investiga de modo introdutório como se articulam as noções de feminino, sexualidade e intelecção em Tomás de Aquino e Christine de Pizan. Buscamos entender, aqui, se, para os autores, a sexualidade humana possui alguma função na operação que apreende o inteligível, quer dizer, investigamos se a característica normal, material e natural de determinado corpo humano em possuir estes ou aqueles órgãos naturais têm influência na operação intelectual. Nesta investigação, ademais, nos concentramos na tese afirmada por Tomás (...) segundo a qual a potência intelectual humana do animal fêmea é inferior à potência intelectual do animal macho e, isso, simplesmente porque o animal fêmea é fêmea, uma tese totalmente arbitrária e inconsistente, se lida a partir de noção de feminino de Christine. Para cumprir com o objetivo, o texto possui três seções. Na primeira, apresentamos a tese de Christine segundo a qual a fêmea humana é perfeita por natureza. Na segunda, por sua vez, analisamos a tese tomista segundo a qual não há uma mecânica própria para a geração da fêmea vivípara. Na terceira, enfim, investigamos os fundamentos da asserção tomista sobre a deficiência da intelecção feminina. (shrink)

Excerpt from M. Tulli Ciceronis De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum Libri Quinque Duo sunt, opinor, quae lectures a me hoc loco requi rent aut, si non requirent ipsi, rogandi mihi sunt, ut beneuolo animo et adtento accipiaut. Nam primum di ccudam st de horum librorum, quos Cicero de finibus honorum et maiorum scripsit, emendatiolle et enarratione et nninersae opera a me in iis positm ratio sic expli canda, ut, qua in commentariis disperse posita sunt, ea ad suas canssas generation reuocata (...) et intellegi plenius et indicari rectius possint. Quo loco etiam illud ecli cere conabor, ut libertas quaedam et simplicitas indici et orationis, a qua ne hic quidem discedam, merito et necessario adhibita esse uideatur. Deiude, qum de Cice roniani operis forma atque descriptione ncitu digna ui debuntur neque in commentariis aut per excursus carpo sita, conprehendam et ab iis ad ipsos libros lectores nittam. Sed prior illa disputatio, cuius magna pars ad paratns critici ex;>licatione continebitur, quem sua na tura maiorem necessitatem habent quam delectationem in rebus minutis per ambages persequendis, tum molestior fit, quod plus uerhorum consumendum et in eorum co dicum conmemoratione, quos parum nouimus, quam in eorum, quorum plenus asus concessus est. Itaque de precor, ne mea existumetur culpa, qua superiorum st. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

nil nisi lasciui per me discuntur amores:femina praecipiam quo sit amanda modo.femina nec flammas nec saeuos discutit arcus;parcius haec uideo tela nocere uiris.It was pointed out in 1992 by E.J. Kenney that femina in line 28 ‘sabotages the poet's … disclaimer’ that it is not women generally but ‘only those not ruled out of bounds by stola and uittae’ who are to benefit from his instruction. He suggests instead that, since what is wanted is a variation on the previous line, (...) one should read nec proba, or, as a better possibility, non proba. Kenney's objection to femina is accepted by Roland Mayer, in a note published the following year. After observing, however, that, ‘when a word has intruded itself from a nearby line and expelled the authentic reading, the ductus litterarum is no guide to emendation’, and that bold measures are therefore admissible, Mayer proposes Thais, comparing Rem. am. 385–6 Thais in arte mea est: lasciuia libera nostra est; | nil mihi cum uitta; Thais in arte mea est. Later, W.S. Watt suggested talis, viz. lasciua, noting talis at 142 and talem at 157. None of these suggestions is entirely compelling, however, and Gibson is therefore right just to obelize femina in his edition; but he also points out in the commentary ad loc. the ‘greater oddity’ relating to amanda, asking ‘Should Ovid not be declaring his intention to teach women how to love, rather than declaring that he will teach how they should be loved?’ and even going so far as to suggest that the whole pentameter is fundamentally corrupt and should be obelized. (shrink)

Ce texte a paru pour la première fois dans Parade sauvage, n° 14, Classiques Garnier, 1997. Nous remercions Yves Letournel de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Premiere section – Le dégagement des formes anciennes Ipse ego cana legam tenera lanugine mala, castaneasque nuces, mea quas Amaryllis amabat ; addam cerea pruna ; […] et vos, o lauri, carpam, et te, proxima myrte, sic positae quoniam suauis miscetis odores Ta mémoire et tes sens ne seront que - Poétique et (...) Études littéraires – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Many philosophers invoke the "wisdom of nature" in arguing for varying degrees of caution in the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies. Because they view natural selection as akin to a master engineer that creates functionally and morally optimal design, these authors tend to regard genetic intervention with suspicion. In Part II, we examine and ultimately reject the evolutionary assumptions that underlie the master engineer analogy (MEA). By highlighting the constraints on ordinary unassisted evolution, we show how intentional genetic (...) modification can overcome many of the natural impediments to the human good. Our contention is that genetic engineering offers a solution that is more eff icient, reliable, versatile, and morally palatable than the lumbering juggernaut of Darwinian evolution. In Part III, we evaluate a recent attempt to ground precautionary enhancement heuristics in adaptive etiology. Our problem with this approach is two-fold: first, it is based on the same "strong adaptationist" interpretation of evolution that motivates the flawed MEA, and second, the etiological concept of function on which it relies provides indirect and potentially misleading information about the likely consequences of genetic intervention. We offer instead enhancement criteria based on causal relationships in ontogeny. We conclude that rather than grounding a presumption against deliberate genetic modification, the causal structure of the living world gives us good moral reason to pursue it. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJacques Rohault is often considered to be one of the most meticulous followers of Descartes. Despite this, Rohault’s natural philosophy lacks much of the metaphysical bulwark that typifies Cartesian treatises of the seventeenth century. Instead, Rohault’s work, as well as his popular weekly meetings, strongly emphasized rigorous observation and experimentation. Traditionally, this emphasis on experiment over metaphysics is seen as a pragmatic omission to avoid the perils associated with censorship and Cartesian metaphysics. However, I find that the lack of explicit (...) metaphysics has real consequences that play out in the role Rohault assigns to experimentation. To show this, I highlight several areas where he adopts a broad experimental methodology even though Descartes explicitly rejects the relevancy of experiment on metaphysical topics. I place special emphasis Rohault’s extensive experiment on the void. In short, Rohault’s experimentation was designed to prove, through experimental mea... (shrink)

The subject of this article is Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA), a theory introduced by Horsten to interpret Epistemic Arithmetic (EA), which in turn was introduced by Shapiro to interpret Heyting Arithmetic. I will show how to interpret MEA in EA such that one can prove that the interpretation of EA is MEA is faithful. Moreover, I will show that one can get rid of a particular Platonist assumption. Then I will discuss models for MEA in light of the problems of logical (...) omniscience and logical competence. Awareness models, impossible worlds models and syntactical models have been introduced to deal with the first problem. Certain conditions on the accessibility relations are needed to deal with the second problem. I go on to argue that those models are subject to the problem of quantifying in, for which I will provide a solution. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Su irez NORMAN j. WELLS IT HAS LONG BEEN ACKNOWLEDGEDthat Francisco Sufirez's distinction between a formal and an objective concept exercised some influence upon Descartes's teaching on 'idea'.' It would appear, however, that not enough attention has been given to that distinction of Sufirez (and especially to another to be mentioned shordy) to aid in dispelling what I take to be (...) a widespread confusion and misunderstanding with regard to 'idea' in Descartes, especially with respect to 'idea' taken 'objectively'. Much, if not all, of the confusion in question has to do with Descartes's admittedly equivocal use of the term 'idea'. For he had allowed that 'idea' could be taken 'materially' (materialiter), on the one hand, for the knowing activity of the intellect. On the other hand, it could be taken 'objectively' (objective) for the thing (res) represented by that knowing activity.' At this point, the contemporary reader can only be brought up short, See E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cart~sien (New York: Burt Franklin Reprint, 1912), 48-49; Discours de la m~thode: Texte et commentazre (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), 321; G. Rodis-Lewisin her edition of Meditationes de Prima PhRosoph.m (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 41 n. 1; L'oeuure de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971), 53~ n. 8; J. Collins, Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 165;T.J. Cronin, S.J., Objecttve Being m Descartes and SuArez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); "Objective Reality of Ideas in Human Thought: Descartes and Su~rez," Wisdom in Depth: Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, SJ., eds. V. F. Daues, S.J., M. R. Holloway, S.J., L. Sweeney, S.J. (Milwaukee : Bruce, 1966), 68-79; L. Gilen, S.J., "Uber die Beziehungen Descartes zur zeitgenossischen Scholastik," Scholastik 32 (1957): 41-66; R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la th~orie cart6sienne de l'&re objectif," Revue d'histoire de la philosophic 3 (1929): 464-72;J. Owens, C.S.S.R., in The Cambridge HtstoU of Later Medu,val Philosophy, eds. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 459; G. Nuchelmans,Judgment and Propositwnfrom Descartesto Kant (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1983), 36-54. " Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1897-19o9; hereafter cited according to volume, page and line), Praefatio ad Lectorem, 7: 8. 19-251 "Sed respondeo hic subesse aequivocationem in voce ideae: sumi enim potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectus, quo sensu me perfectior dici nequit, vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentata, quae res, etsi non supponatur extra intellectum existere, potest tamen me esse perfectior ratione suae essentiae." It is clear that two realities are to be causally accounted for. The [33] 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 1990 conditioned as we are by an appreciation of 'objectivity' altogether extramental! It makes for a considerable wrench of perspective to do justice to Descartes's acknowledged doctrine of intramental objectivity and an intramental 'thing represented' (resrepraesentata). 'Idea', then, in traditional Cartesian fashion, designates the act of representing as well as the 'thing represented '. S Yet, for all this, and despite repeated expressions of the same doctrine, there is a persistent tendency in the history of Cartesianism and its scholarship to interpret 'idea' taken 'objectively' as in some way representative. Contrary to what I take to be Descartes's constant position, such a rendering unwittingly transfers that function which is proper to the cognitive activity, mind is the efficient cause of its cognitive activity. With respect to ideas taken 'objectively', such as the ideas of God and the triangle on the levels of metaphysical and mathematical intelligibility, an efficient cause, extrinsic to the mind, is certainly at issue. For here we are in the presence of what is independent of the mind, however intramental it may be. On the triangle, see Medit. 5; 7: 64. ]4s7 : "...est tamen profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, sire essentia, sive forma, immutabUis et aeterna, quae a me non efficta est, nec a mente mea dependet." For the idea of God, see Medit. 5; 7: 68. l o-12: "Nam sane multis modis inteUigo illam [ideam... (shrink)

After nearly fifty years of mea culpas and explanatory additions, the biopsychosocial model is no closer to a life of its own. Bolton and Gillett give it a strong philosophical boost in The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, but they overlook the model’s deeply inconsistent position on dualism. Moreover, because metaphysical confusion has clinical ramifications in medicine, their solution sidesteps the model’s most pressing clinical faults. But the news is not all bad. We can maintain the merits of holism (...) as we let go of the inchoate bag of platitudes that is the biopsychosocial model. We can accept holism as the metaphysical open door that it is, just a willingness to recognize the reality of human experience, and the sense in which that reality forces medicine to address biological, psychological, and social aspects of health. This allows us to finally characterize Engel’s driving idea in accurate philosophical terms, as acceptance of consciousness in the context of medical science. This will not entirely pin down medicine’s stance on dualism, but it will position it clearly enough to readily improve patient care. (shrink)

In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten defends his Modal-Epistemic Argument (MEA) for the existence of God against various objections that I raised against it. In this article, I observe that Rutten’s defence fails for various reasons. Most notably though, the defence is self-undermining: the very claims that Rutten argues for in his defence yield novel counterexamples to the first premise of the MEA.

This narrative ethics exploration stems from my happy prostate-specific antigen story, though it should not have been, as I annually refuse my family physician’s recommendation to purchase PSA screening. The reason for my refusal is I teach ethics to medical students and of course must walk the talk, and PSA screening is not publicly funded in the province of Ontario, Canada. In addition, I might have taken false comfort in ‘but all you need is a good index finger’ to detect (...) prostate cancer, expounded by a senior physician at a national medical conference in 2010, and applauded by the large audience of physicians. I was compelled to begin this exploration out of survivor guilt, although I will not be a survivor for long, and as a mea culpa to the men similarly situated to me in having late diagnosis of prostate cancer, aggressive tumours and multiple metastases, but who unlike me are dead because they did not experience the physician–educator-based exceptionisms and coincidences that permit me to still be alive. Although my PSA story will always be a happy story, even when my life ends in a few years, the initiation of public funding of PSA screening for all men over 50 would make my PSA story an even happier story. (shrink)

This narrative ethics exploration stems from my happy prostate-specific antigen story, though it should not have been, as I annually refuse my family physician’s recommendation to purchase PSA screening. The reason for my refusal is I teach ethics to medical students and of course must walk the talk, and PSA screening is not publicly funded in the province of Ontario, Canada. In addition, I might have taken false comfort in ‘but all you need is a good index finger’ to detect (...) prostate cancer, expounded by a senior physician at a national medical conference in 2010, and applauded by the large audience of physicians. I was compelled to begin this exploration out of survivor guilt, although I will not be a survivor for long, and as a mea culpa to the men similarly situated to me in having late diagnosis of prostate cancer, aggressive tumours and multiple metastases, but who unlike me are dead because they did not experience the physician–educator-based exceptionisms and coincidences that permit me to still be alive. Although my PSA story will always be a happy story, even when my life ends in a few years, the initiation of public funding of PSA screening for all men over 50 would make my PSA story an even happier story. (shrink)

This article starts by defining instrumentalized knowledge (IK) as the practice of selectively valuing some set of reliable beliefs for the promotion of a more generally false or unreliable worldview. IK is typically exploited by conspiratorial echo chambers, which display systematic distrust and opposition towards mainstream epistemic authorities. We argue that IK is problematic in that it violates core epistemic virtues, and this gives rise to clear and present harms when abused by said echo chambers. Yet, we contend, mainstream epistemic (...) authorities (MEAs) are also complicit in practices resembling IK; we refer to these practices as instrumentalized knowledge* (IK*). IK* differs from IK in that the selective valuing of beliefs corresponds to a ”reliable” worldview, namely, one independently verified by the relevant epistemic experts. We argue that IK*, despite its apparent veracity, is also problematic, as it violates the same epistemic virtues as IK despite its aim of promoting true beliefs. This, we argue, leads it to being counterproductive in its goal of producing knowledge for the sake of the pursuit of truth, thereby raising the question of what distinguishes virtuous from nonvirtuous practices of instrumentalized knowledge. In an attempt to avoid this violation and to distinguish IK* from IK, we investigate whether and how IK* could still be epistemically virtuous. We conclude that IK* can be virtuous if its goal is to produce understanding as opposed to mere knowledge. (shrink)

Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979) have made a convincing case that neither mea- nings nor beliefs are in the head. Most philosophers, it seems, have accepted their argument. Putnam explained that a subject.

Philosophers have committed sins while studying science, it is said – philosophy of science focused on physics to the detriment of biology, reconstructed idealizations of scientific episodes rather than attending to historical details, and focused on theories and concepts to the detriment of experiments. Recent generations of philosophers of science have tried to atone for these sins, and by the 1980s the exculpation was in full swing. Marcel Weber’s Philosophy of Experimental Biology is a zenith mea culpa for philosophy of (...) science: it carefully describes several historical examples from twentieth century biology to address both ‘old’ philosophical topics, like reductionism, inference, and realism, and ‘new’ topics, like discovery, models, and norms. Biology, experiments, history – at last, philosophy of science, free of sin. (shrink)

De fato 35 is part of Cicero's argument against the Stoic theory of causation. He claims in general that the Stoic chain of causes consists of antecedent but not efficient causes. To the examples cited in the previous chapter he adds verses from the opening of Ennius’ Medea exul (lines 208–11 Jocelyn = FRL 2 and TRF 89.1–4) containing the Nurse's lamentation over the origins of the Argonautic expedition that led, ultimately, to Medea's current mental distress. Then follows the question (...) quorsum haec praeterita? and the answer quia sequitur illud, ‘nam numquam era errans mea domo ecferret pedem | Medea, animo aegro, amore saeuo saucia’, non ut eae res causam adferrent amoris, citing Ennius, Medea exul 215–16 Jocelyn = FRL 2 and TRF 89.8–9. Editors and commentators have struggled to explain the relation of the answer to the question. Here it is argued that the relation becomes clear if one adopts non for non and punctuates with a query after amoris. The sense will be: ‘Why have these past events been cited? In view of the sequel … was it not so that they bring on the cause of love?’ In other words, the Nurse, like the Stoics in Cicero's view, cites antecedent events as if they were efficient causes. (shrink)

Scholars have recently noted the interest of Guibert of Tournai’s sermons on Francis of Assisi. Nicole Bériou partially edited Guibert’s sermon Surrexit Helyas, focusing on the theme of prophecy, in 1994,1 and Sean Field edited two more, Inflammatum est cor meum and Veni columba mea, highlighting the theme of Francis as a perfected soul through annihilation, in 1999.2 The two yet unexamined works in Guibert’s corpus of sermons discussing Francis hold their own interest, as they discuss an important topos in (...) Franciscan literature of the mid-thirteenth century. The present article edits and analyzes these two previously unedited sermons for the first time.3 This topos is the Biblical quotation Vidi .. (shrink)

Two Short Communications:R. A. Markus, Gregory the Great and In I Regum, by Francis ClarkAquinas's Claim ‘Anima Mea Non Est Ego’, by Stephen Priest.

Che cosa vuol dire tradurre? Con questa interessante domanda, Umberto Eco inizia la sua riflessione sulla traduzione. Quando si traduce, in gioco non c'è solamente il testo ma un intero mondo possibile; il compito del traduttore è fare un'ipotesi su questo mondo possibile e la traduzione funzionerà meglio tanto più l’ipotesi risulterà plausibile. Per quanto la traduzione sia ben riuscita, non si arriva mai a dire la stessa cosa, si può solo dire quasi la stessa cosa. Tradurre un capolavoro di (...) un’epoca lontana, tenendo presente la filosofia contemporanea, è un modo di rapportarsi alla tradizione, farla propria e rinnovarla. Si possono confrontare alcune traduzioni e discuterne la correttezza filologica e le implicazioni teoriche, prendendo come esempio un brevissimo passo delle Confessioni di Agostino, particolarmente importante e ricco di significati: interrogatio mea intentio mea et responsio eorum species eorum. È significativo non solo il confronto tra diverse traduzioni italiane, ma anche tra alcune traduzioni in lingue diverse dall’italiano. In alcuni casi le traduzioni un po’più libere e audaci, risultano più efficaci rispetto a quelle più semplici e letterali. What does to translate means? With this interesting question, Umberto Eco begins his consideration about the translation. When translating, at stake it is not only the text but an entire possible world; the translator's task is make a hypothesis about this possible world, and if the hypothesis is credible the translation will work well. Although the translation is successful, you never manage to say the same thing, you can only say almost the same thing. Translating a masterpiece of bygone age, keeping in mind the contemporary philosophy, is a way of relating to tradition, make it own and renew it. You can compare a few translations and discuss the correct philological and theoretical implications, taking as an example a very short passage from the Confessions of Augustine, which is particularly important and meaningful: interrogatio mea intentio mea et responsio eorum species eorum. It is significant not only comparing different Italian translations, but also comparing some translations in other languages. Sometimes the translations a bit more free and brave are more effective than the most simple and literal. (shrink)

To what extent do differences in who we are predict differences in courage? We propose to de-velop a measure of the virtue-relevant self, which is composed of self-conception, social roles, virtue-relevant values, and personality traits. We will then conduct three studies using this meas-ure to determine the extent to which these various components of the virtue-relevant self pre-dict the types of acts people consider courageous as well as the willingness of people to engage in courageous acts themselves. We believe (...) that individual differences in each of these compo-nents – that is, the content of the virtue-relevant self – will correlate with differences in first, how people rate actions that they themselves have undertaken in the past; second, how people rate actions that other people have taken; and third, the willingness of people to take certain kinds of courageous action. If found, these relations will have broader implications for the self and virtues by indicating that traits of the self beyond character traits affect both the conception of virtuous behavior and virtuous behavior itself. (shrink)

Agr. 2.53. ‘Te volo curare ut mihi Sinopae praesto sis auxiliumque adducas, dum eos agros quos tuo labore cepisti ego mea lege vendam.’ an Pompeium non adhibebit? in eius provincia vendet manubias imperatoris?

Agr. 2.53. ‘Te volo curare ut mihi Sinopae praesto sis auxiliumque adducas, dum eos agros quos tuo labore cepisti ego mea lege vendam.’ an Pompeium non adhibebit? in eius provincia vendet manubias imperatoris?