Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond to excellent (...) character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a-moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action. (shrink)

Michel Serres a été l’un des premiers philosophes à reconnaître, dès les années 1990, l’enjeu planétaire des crises écologiques et la rupture anthropologique que constitue ce que l’on nomme aujourd’hui l’Anthropocène. Sa philosophie offre des ressources précieuses non seulement pour penser mais aussi pour imaginer cette nouvelle condition terrestre. Cet article s’attache précisément aux dimensions imaginantes des crises écologiques, aux niveaux phénoménologique, épistémique et pragmatique. Suivant Serres, l’article montre que la philosophie ne peut plus négliger le monde et qu’elle doit (...) contribuer à inventer de nouvelles relations avec la nature-Biogée, notamment en déployant les puissances critiques et créatives de l’imagination. (shrink)