This book offers a broad reconstruction of the modern notion of sovereignty, a comprehensive critique of state-inflicted violence, and a concept of non-coercive law for our contemporary world society.

The article starts with the observation of an ambivalence inherent to the politics of juridification. On the one hand, some spheres of the life-world such as the family and the school are often places of exploitation, degradation and humiliation and therefore seem to require the implementation of legal protection for their members. At the same time, the demand for rights seems somehow to grasp too little, would be inadequate or even counterproductive. How can this ambivalence be politically dealt with? I (...) first briefly reconstruct Jürgen Habermas' concept of juridification. I believe that Habermas works with an image of the family and the school as communicatively constituted and juristically uncompromised milieux, which proves to be highly questionable. In a second step I consider Axel Honneth's theory of the absolutization of legal freedom as offered in his recent work Freedom's Right. Honneth sidesteps several problematic implications of the Habermasian thesis of colonization, but still tends to underestimate the dominant patriarchal power relations in the spheres of the family and the school. Finally, I pursue Honneth's own suggestion that a new notion of politics is required for understanding contemporary struggles for recognition, which overcomes the statist tendencies of liberalism. I therefore propose to shift the perspective on the phenomenon of juridification, viewing it instead from the standpoint of the agents themselves, by turning to Wendy Brown's feminist theory on the paradoxes of rights. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHow can we deal with the apparent contradiction between the normative ideals of critical theory and the practice of the current university system? To answer this question, I consult three classical criticisms of the university system: At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the French educator Joseph Jacotot formulated a pedagogical critique of the disciplinary effects of the educational system; at the beginning of the twentieth century, German historian Franz Rosenzweig articulated an ethical critique of the hegemonic educational system’s distance (...) from life; and at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, British feminist Sara Ahmed proposed a political critique of the oppressing functions of academic institutions. Taken together, these critiques can serve as an orientation for critical intellectual practice even within the academic system. Finally, I try to describe the relation between critical theory and the university thus evolving by utilising Stefano Harney’s and Fred Moten’s concept o... (shrink)

Epistemic standpoint theories have elaborated the effects of social situatedness on epistemic competence: Dominant groups are regularly subject to epistemic blockages that limit the possibility of cognition and knowledge production. Oppressed groups, on the other hand, have access to perceptions and insights that dominant groups lack. This diagnosis can be generalized: Not only our epistemic, but also our normative relation to the world is socially situated, that is, our values, virtues, moral sentiments are shaped by relations of domination. In this (...) article, my goal is to sketch the general outlines of a standpoint theory of normativity. I do so by engaging with two lines of tradition. First, I review conceptions of fugitive freedom in the Black Radical Tradition, before I recapitulate the feminist debate around the concept of care work. The counter-hegemonic norms theorized in these traditions can be brought into dialogue because they are both based on similar presuppositions, namely, political struggle provoked by social contradictions. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for the existence of pathologies of juridicism. I attempt to show that the Western regime of right tends to colonize our intersubjective relations, resulting in the formation of affective and habitual dispositions that actually hinder participation in social life. Speaking of pathologies of juridicism is to claim that the legal form fundamentally contaminates the way in which we relate to ourselves, to others, and to the world, resulting in an ethically deformed, distorted or deficient form (...) of subjectivity. To support my thesis I consult a philosopher, whose work still provides a powerful analysis and critique of juridicism, namely, Hegel. Hegel provides an historic and a systematic theory of the pathologies of juridicism. His historical theory locates the origin of the abstract subjectivity of right in Roman antiquity. His systematic theory understands the negative effects of an absolutization of the legal domain as a persistent threat to social integration and an individual’s pursuit of the good life. I clarify these argumentative dimensions in two steps, beginning with Hegel’s historical analysis of right in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History. I then reconstruct Hegel’s critique of the subjectivity of right in the short chapter on the ‘Condition of Right’ in his Phenomenology of Spirit. In conclusion, I argue that, although Hegel’s diagnosis is correct, his prescribed therapy must fail: instead of radically altering abstract right in terms of content and form, it only recommends its complementation through other ethical spheres. (shrink)

In bourgeois societies, the dominant dispositif that regulates how past wrongs are dealt with is juridical. Can or should radical political movements in general and critical artistic interventions in particular also make use of that form of court? I discuss this question in light of an argument between Michel Foucault and two Maoist comrades on the question of popular justice. I present the German NSU tribunals as best practice examples: They show how the form and content of tribunals can be (...) put into tension in such a way that makes them re-usable as an aesthetic medium of transformative politics. (shrink)

This essay explores Walter Benjamin’s critique of the concept of guilt as it underlies the occidental notion of “connective justice”. It describes both the political-moral and the psychological-ethical effects of guilt and reconstructs Benjamin’s idea of ‘Entsühnung’, understood as a rigorous termination of the circle between act and consequence. Finally, possible political, ethical and historical alternatives are discussed.

Bringing together leading scholars in contemporary social and political philosophy, this volume takes up the central themes of Axel Honneth’s work as a starting point for debating the present and future of critical theory, as a form of socially grounded philosophy for analyzing and critiquing society today.

In this essay I explore competing senses and tensions of the relation between the etymology of ta pragmata and praxis, with specific attention paid to Heidegger’s theorization of modernity. In so doing I question the relation between rights and persons, and whether there might not be a new way of thinking about rights that does not presuppose or privilege the agency of personhood. Pragmatic rights would not assume the liberal values of self-determination that underpin personhood, and would enable a notion (...) of rights beyond liberal humanism more appropriate for twenty-first century political concerns and problems. (shrink)

The great work of the psychotic judge Daniel Paul Schreber, namely Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, has received predictable and rather unimaginative interpretations as the discourse of a lunatic. The work has not been studied as a theory of law. Schreber, it is argued here, was an extreme lawyer, a radical melancholegalist, a black letter theorist, a critic avant la lettre, and a radical theorist of an impure jurisprudence.

Beliefs once limited to the extremes of the North American gun culture have become mainstream, while the US Supreme Court’s ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller and a spate of right-to-carry laws have contributed to the proliferation of guns in public life. These changes in political discourses, legislative agendas, and social practices are indicative of an emergent and pernicious form of subjectivity, which is here defined as self-defensive. Such subjectivity is characterized by a pathological identification with the right of (...) self-defense, which undermines the social conditions of individual freedom and renders subjects unable to comprehend the function of abstract rights within an informal normative order. Practically speaking, this raced and gendered subjectivity relies on extra-legal relations of domination for its reproduction. The rapid expansion of gun rights and the recent loosening of restrictions on self-defensive violence are argued to be responses to a perceived threat to these identity-constituting relations, rather than to the threat of violent crime, which has long been on the decline. (shrink)

Dans le contexte des révoltes de Mai 68, certains groupes politiques ont développé des techniques collectives de transformation de soi. On en explore ici deux versions : « l’analyse de groupe », inspirée par la psychanalyse et pratiquée dans le mouvement étudiant ouest-allemand, et le consciousness-raising, utilisé par les féministes radicales étasuniennes. En comparant ces pratiques, on montre que le problème qu’elles posent a concerné un mauvais choix de méthode et non la discussion collective des affects individuels, désormais incriminée par (...) certains récits rétrospectifs sur Mai 68 et critiques libérales. Contre ces dernières, on conclut par une brève défense de la politisation des formes de vie. (shrink)

Hegel is one of the few philosophers to devote systematic attention to phenomena that can be called pathologies of juridicism. Hegel claims that the law fundamentally contaminates the way in which we relate to ourselves, to others and to the world so that our (inter-) subjectivity becomes ethically deformed, distorted, or deficient. I outline this notion and reconstruct its development in the work of the young Hegel. I reconstruct Hegel’s critique of juridical forms of normativity as developed in his Spirit (...) of Christianity with reference to the example of Judaism and sketch his idea of a non-juridical intersubjectivity. I will make apparent the considerable problems lurking in Hegel’s account of love, which turns out to be a form of social integration potentially just as violent as the law. I argue that Hegel himself became aware of this problem and modified his original model by assigning to both love and law a legitimate place within an overarching system of Sittlichkeit, as I demonstrate with reference to Hegel’s Jena article ‘Natural Law ’. In the end I briefly explain why I still find this strategy unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Recent thinking on human rights, at least among the left, has divided along lines that have become familiar from other contemporary political debates. There are those who ground the discourse of rights in an ethical responsibility to fellow human beings in situations of suffering and oppression; for others, suspicion with respect to just such an ethical stance is their point of departure. They see in the ethical perspective at best a radical depoliticization of the struggle for human rights—its biopolitical reduction (...) to humanitarian aid to suffering others who are thereby accorded the status of ‘bare life’—and at worst a cover for a quasi-imperialist imposition of neo-liberal values according to which what ultimately deserves political protection and preservation is the right to entrepreneurial initiative and aspiration. Yet another form of leftist critique of the ostensibly post-political, ethical inflection of rights discourse takes aim at a line of thought most often linked to a series of mostly French philosophers—above all Emmanuel Levinas, but also Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, and more recently Judith Butler—who in various ways have sought to ground philosophy in an ‘ethics of the Other’. The essay explores these positions and proposes a new thinking about human rights oriented by what Hannah Arendt referred to as the ‘dark background’ of human life. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 6 Seiten: 870-881.