In this paper I would like to propose the notion of “affective artifact”, building on an analogy with theories of cognitive artifacts and referring to the development of a situated affective science. Affective artifacts are tentatively defined as objects that have the capacity to alter the affective condition of an agent, and that in some cases play an important role in defining that agent’s self. The notion of affective artifacts will be presented by means of examples supported by empirical findings, (...) by discussing a tentative definition and classification, and by considering several related but differing notions. Within the framework of situated affectivity, the notion of affective artifacts will represent a further step in the enterprise of understanding how the environment helps us scaffold our affective processes. I will conclude that affective artifacts play a key role in the philosophy of cognitive science, the philosophy of technology and in the debate about the self. (shrink)

Starting from the discussion on the original set of criteria advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998) meant to avoid the overextension of the mind, or the so-called “cognitive bloat”, we will sketch our solution to the problem of criteria evaluation, by connecting it to the search for a mark of the mental. Our proposal is to argue for a “weak conscientialist” mark of the mental based on transparent access, which vindicates the role of consciousness in defining what is mental without, (...) however, identifying the mental with the conscious. This renovated link between mind and consciousness, spelled out through the concept of transparency, further develops some of our previous work on the topic (Di Francesco 2007; Di Francesco and Piredda 2012) and is partially inspired by Horgan and Kriegel (2008). (shrink)

In this paper we suggest an understanding of the self within the conceptual framework of situated affectivity, proposing the notion of an affectively extended self and arguing that the construction, diachronic re-shaping and maintenance of the self is mediated first by affective interactions. We initially consider the different variations on the conception of the extended self that have been already proposed in the literature. We then propose our alternative, contextualising it within the current debate on situated affectivity. While the idea (...) that we exploit the external environment in order to manage our affective life is now rather widespread among philosophers, its potential consequences for and connections with the debate on the self remain underexplored. Drawing on James’ intuition of the “material self”, which clearly connects the self and the emotions in agency, and broadly envisioning an extension of the self beyond its organismic boundaries, we propose our pragmatist conception of the self: an affectively extended self that relies on affective artifacts and practices to construct its identity extended beyond skin and skull. (shrink)

In connecting embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive (4E) cognition with affectivity and emotions, the framework of “situated affectivity” has recently emerged. This framework emphasizes the interactions between the emoter and the environment in the unfolding of our affective lives (Colombetti and Krueger 2015; Griffiths and Scarantino 2009; Piredda 2022; Stephan and Walter 2020). In the last decades, there has also been a growing interest in the philosophical analysis of technology and artifacts (Houkes and Vermaas 2010; Margolis and Laurence 2007; Preston (...) 2022). The aim of this special issue is to foster the interaction between philosophical reflections on affectivity and those on technology, further developing this fruitful borderland (Clowes et al. 2021; Colombetti 2020; Fasoli 2018; Krueger and Osler 2019; Heersmink 2018; Piredda and Candiotto 2019; Piredda 2020; Viola 2021). -/- . (shrink)

Riassunto : Tra le più recenti riflessioni sulla mente umana, il quadro teorico della “mente estesa” ci dipinge come dei cyborg naturali provvisti di menti “superdotate”, ottenute grazie alla capacità di sfruttare le risorse tecnologiche e ambientali in modo integrato a nostro vantaggio. In questo articolo si ripercorre la genesi teorica di questo modello a partire dalle critiche alla scienza cognitiva classica, basata sul modello delle computazioni su rappresentazioni, e in particolare all’individualismo metodologico. Successivamente, si analizza il principale argomento filosofico (...) fornito a sostegno della mente estesa, fondato sulla plausibilità del concetto di “credenza disposizionale estesa”. Vengono poi discussi i principali aspetti problematici rilevati nel modello e proposte alcune repliche. Si conclude evidenziando che il principale merito del modello consiste nella proposta di una visione integrata della mente umana, tra biologia, cultura e tecnologia. Parole chiave : Mente estesa; Fallacia causale-costitutiva; Criterio del cognitivo; Cyborg naturale; Credenza disposizionale The Extended Mind Hypothesis: An Anthropology of Natural Cyborgs: The “extended mind” framework depicts humans as natural-born cyborgs equipped with supersized minds, thanks to their ability to exploit technological and environmental resources in special and integrated ways. In this paper, the historical background of the extended mind model will be outlined – starting with the criticisms to classical cognitive science, particularly to methodological individualism. Then, the main philosophical argument given in favour of extended mind, based on the plausibility of the notion of extended dispositional belief, will be presented and thoroughly discussed. Many of the problematic aspects of the extended mind model – namely the problem of criteria, the causal-constitution fallacy and the mark of the cognitive – will be considered. Our conclusion is that, despite its several theoretical difficulties, the model has the main advantage of proposing a vision of the human mind in which biology, culture and technology are integrated. Keywords : Extended Mind; Causal-constitution Fallacy; Mark of the Cognitive; Natural Cyborg; Dispositional Belief. (shrink)