This book offers a critical and thought-provoking analysis of some of the fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of education. It includes ideas such as the demands of pluralism and the liberal fear of indoctrination.

This article, drawing on philosophical sources, proposes a certain way of seeing the nature and scope of values education: as a matter of ‘sustaining the ethical environment’. The idea is introduced that just as we live in a physical environment we also live in an ethical environment, ‘the surrounding climate of ideas about how to live’. It is argued that there are some illuminating analogies between our responsibility for the quality of the physical environment and our responsibility for the quality (...) of the ethical environment. Values education, in turn, can be seen as an important way in which we can collectively attend to the quality of the ethical environment; in doing so, we should put positive value on diversity within that environment. This way of seeing values education suggests a way in which teachers can realistically see their own responsibilities for values education. (shrink)

This article examines the work of R. S. Peters on moral development and moral education, as represented in his papers collected under that name, pointing out that these writings have been relatively neglected. It approaches these writings through the lens of the ‘familiar story’ that philosophical work on this topic switched during, roughly, the 1980s from an emphasis on rational principles to an emphasis on virtues and care. Starting from what Peters called ‘the paradox of moral education’—roughly, that a rational (...) morality must be developed in part through habit—the article discusses not only Peters' rational morality of principles and rules but also elements of his thought concerning virtues and care. Running through the discussion is the question of whether Peters, in drawing for instance on Aristotle as well as Kohlberg, is attempting to combine incompatible ideas. Against this, it is suggested that in reading Peters now we can learn from his explicit claim that we need a pluralistic, not a monolithic, approach to moral development and moral education. (shrink)

If there is to be a convergence in public understanding on a minimal conception of morality, morality(n), there has to be a way of talking about the content of that morality which can be both readily understood and widely adopted.

I have suggested that popular demands for moral education, and beliefs that it can be effective, for instance in reducing violence, presuppose some appropriate and shared conception of morality and moral education. But the existence, and even the possibility, of such a shared conception is often now called into question. The focus is very often on diversity within a plural society. And I have myself argued before that not only do we have differences of opinion over whether certain sorts of (...) conduct are morally right or wrong, we also have different conceptions of what it means to call something morally right or wrong, and even disagreement over whether such terminology has any useful role at all. (cf. Haydon, 1995; 1999c; 1997 Chapter 6; White, 1990, Chapter 3; Williams, 1985, Chapter 10.). (shrink)

I have suggested that in looking for shared values which were seen as having force for people's conduct, the SCAA Forum was in effect looking for a shared morality. This does not yet show that a shared understanding was achieved on what kind of thing morality is Ð no such agreement was explicitly aimed at — but it does point in the direction in which such an agreement might be found. The key is to be found, I think, in the (...) idea that morality has a social function, and in a certain understanding of what that function is. (shrink)

Graham Haydon; Autonomy as an Aim of Education and the Autonomy of Teachers, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 219–228.

Graham Haydon; Autonomy as an Aim of Education and the Autonomy of Teachers, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 219–228.

Current debates about whether schools which are not secular should be supported by the State within a society which is secular demand clarity about the distinction between the secular and the non-secular. It is argued that the notions of a secular society and of a secular polity help to illuminate the nature of a secular school. More substantively, it is suggested that we have reason to support a form of polity which allows both secular and non-secular contributions into the public, (...) forum, without privileging either; and that there is at least a case to be made that a non-secular school may more adequately prepare its pupils for participation in such a polity. (shrink)

Current debates about whether schools which are not secular should be supported by the State within a society which is secular demand clarity about the distinction between the secular and the non-secular. It is argued that the notions of a secular society and of a secular polity help to illuminate the nature of a secular school. More substantively, it is suggested that we have reason to support a form of polity which allows both secular and non-secular contributions into the public, (...) forum, without privileging either; and that there is at least a case to be made that a non-secular school may more adequately prepare its pupils for participation in such a polity. (shrink)

Though talking a language of virtues — and doing so with consistency and clarity — may well be more challenging for teachers — as for all of us — than talking a language of norms, there is one area, relevant to violence, where it is unlikely to be avoidable in schools. People get angry, and sometimes anger leads to violence. Though there is also much violence that does not stem from anger, as I have acknowledged in the previous chapter, anger (...) is surely an important element in much of the almost `casual' violence that can break out in homes, in the playground or classroom, and in the streets. (shrink)

The role of rules in moral education has often been recognised by moral philosophers, but sometimes with the implication that this role is rather unimportant from the moral philosopher's point of view. Thus Geoffrey Warnock (1971, p. 51): It is often said, reasonably enough, that the moral education of children at any rate may include, at a certain stage, the promulgation to them by parents and teachers of rules for their conduct on certain moral matters.… However, if it is to (...) be admitted that there are moral rules in this sense, it must surely be added at once that they are of no great theoretical importance. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Distinguishing Moral Education by Its Aims Rationalistic Accounts and Their Critics Virtue Accounts and Their Limitations Schools and Dialogue Conclusion.

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is One Committed to When One Supports the Common School? What is the Common School? Minimal and Maximal Interpretations of the Comprehensive Ideal Values Underlying the Comprehensive Ideal Conclusion Notes References.

Whatever may be the case for philosophy in general, philosophy of education has had rather little to say about violence. The Journal of Philosophy of Education, for instance, from its conception in the 1960s under the title of Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, has contained very little discussion of violence. There have been occasional papers in which violence is referred to, from discussions of the justification of punishment in schools, which include corporal punishment within their (...) remit, to discussions of peace education. But the idea of violence itself has hardly been a focus at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

Graham Haydon; Collective Moral Philosophy and Education for Pluralism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 97–106, https.

Graham Haydon; Collective Moral Philosophy and Education for Pluralism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 97–106, https.

Graham Haydon; Dogmatic Liberalism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 115–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1988.

Graham Haydon; Dogmatic Liberalism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 115–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1988.

Graham Haydon; Educational Relevance: A Slogan Examined, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 223–238, https://doi.org/10.1.

Graham Haydon; Educational Relevance: A Slogan Examined, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 223–238, https://doi.org/10.1.

I have suggested that popular demands for moral education, and beliefs that it can be effective, for instance in reducing violence, presuppose some appropriate and shared conception of morality and moral education. But the existence, and even the possibility, of such a shared conception is often now called into question. The focus is very often on diversity within a plural society. And I have myself argued before that not only do we have differences of opinion over whether certain sorts of (...) conduct are morally right or wrong, we also have different conceptions of what it means to call something morally right or wrong, and even disagreement over whether such terminology has any useful role at all. (cf. Haydon, 1995; 1999c; 1997 Chapter 6; White, 1990, Chapter 3; Williams, 1985, Chapter 10.). (shrink)

I have suggested that popular demands for moral education, and beliefs that it can be effective, for instance in reducing violence, presuppose some appropriate and shared conception of morality and moral education. But the existence, and even the possibility, of such a shared conception is often now called into question. The focus is very often on diversity within a plural society. And I have myself argued before that not only do we have differences of opinion over whether certain sorts of (...) conduct are morally right or wrong, we also have different conceptions of what it means to call something morally right or wrong, and even disagreement over whether such terminology has any useful role at all. (cf. Haydon, 1995; 1999c; 1997 Chapter 6; White, 1990, Chapter 3; Williams, 1985, Chapter 10.). (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

Graham Haydon; How to Think about Moral Education? John Wilson revisited, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 26, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 127–131, ht.

Graham Haydon; How to Think about Moral Education? John Wilson revisited, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 26, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 127–131, ht.

‘This book is a response to renewed and widespread public interest in moral education.’.

‘This book is a response to renewed and widespread public interest in moral education.’.

This introductory article first gives a brief overview of the articles in the remainder of this special issue. It then considers what we can learn about the comprehensive ideal, and what questions still remain about it, from the treatment it receives in these articles. After an initial discussion of the nature of the common school, two dimensions are identified in which interpretations of the comprehensive ideal often differ: how fully the content of such schooling is filled in, and what its (...) scope is considered to be. Six categories of values are identified to which arguments both for and against the comprehensive ideal may appeal: educational values; values of community; justice and equality; respect; freedom; and non-discrimination. It is suggested that in a context of value-pluralism there can be no canonical interpretation of the comprehensive ideal. (shrink)

This introductory article first gives a brief overview of the articles in the remainder of this special issue. It then considers what we can learn about the comprehensive ideal, and what questions still remain about it, from the treatment it receives in these articles. After an initial discussion of the nature of the common school, two dimensions are identified in which interpretations of the comprehensive ideal often differ: how fully the content of such schooling is filled in, and what its (...) scope is considered to be. Six categories of values are identified to which arguments both for and against the comprehensive ideal may appeal: educational values; values of community; justice and equality; respect; freedom; and non-discrimination. It is suggested that in a context of value-pluralism there can be no canonical interpretation of the comprehensive ideal. (shrink)