The so-called ”argument from religious experience’ plays a prominent role in today’s analytical philosophy of religion. It is also of considerable importance to richard Swinburne’s apologetic project. However, rather than joining the polyphonic debate around this argument, the present paper examines the fundamental concept of religious experience. The upshot is that Swinburne neither develops a convincing concept of experience nor explains what makes a religious experience religious. The first section examines some problems resulting mainly from terminology, specifically Swinburne’s use of (...) appear-words as success-verbs. While these problems might be resolved by a recurrence to the observer, the second and third part of our paper present problems not so easily resolved: namely, that Swinburne’s concept of experience as conscious mental events is too broad and inaccurate for its role in the argument given ; and that Swinburne does not even attempt to figure out which features of an experience, when present, turn an experience simpliciter into a distinctly religious experience. Section 4, in conclusion, outlines possible reasons for this unusual and remarkable inaccuracy in conceptualisation. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIm allgemeinen Vorverständnis sind Ethik und Mathematik nahezu disjunkt. Demgegenüber möchte dieser Aufsatz verdeutlichen, dass eine Verhältnisbestimmung der beiden ein eminentes Forschungsdesiderat ist, und zugleich versuchen, erste Schritte zu einer solchen zu unternehmen.SummaryAccording to common sense ethics and mathematics are nearly disjoint. To the contrary, this paper fosters the view that it is highly desirable to develop a relation between these two perspectives and it tries to do first steps towards this goal.