Research on ethical, legal and social aspects of life sciences and new technologies has mainly been focused on impacts and consequences, while the emerging framework of Responsible Research and Innovation focuses rather on increased involvement and reflexivity in research processes to foster science and technology that better answers the needs of society. I argue that philosophy of science should be a central feature of RRI and demonstrate how the philosophy of science can contribute in this sense. I show how investigating (...) basic assumptions in research, here exemplified by reductive assumptions in causal modeling, can have important ethical and societal implications. (shrink)

Lynch et al. (Biol Philos 34:62, 2019) employ stability, specificity, and proportionality as criteria for evaluating microbiome causal explanations. Although these causal characteristics signify relevant differences between causal roles, I suggest that they should not be used as general criteria for strong or good causal explanations.

The method in human genetics of ascribing causal responsibility to genotype by the use of heritability estimates has been heavily criticized over the years. It has been argued that these estimates are rarely valid and do not serve the purpose of tracing genetic causes. Recent contributions strike back at this criticism. I present and discuss two opposing views on these matters represented by Richard Lewontin and Neven Sesardic, and I suggest that some of the disagreement is based on differing concepts (...) of genetic causation. I use the distinction of structuring and triggering causes to help clarifying the basis for the opposing views. (shrink)

A wide range of gene knockout experiments shows that functional stability is an important feature of biological systems. On this backdrop, we present an argument for higher‐level causation based on counterfactual dependence. Furthermore, we sketch a metaphysical picture providing resources to explain the metaphysical nature of functional stability, higher‐level causation, and the relevant notion of levels. Our account aims to clarify the role empirical results and philosophical assumptions should play in debates about reductionism and higher‐level causation. It thereby contributes to (...) the development of a philosophical foundation for systems biology. †To contact the authors, please write to: CSMN/IFIKK, University of Oslo, Box 1020 Blindern, N‐0315, Oslo, Norway; e‐mail: [email protected] , [email protected]. (shrink)

Synthetic biology research is often described in terms of programming cells through the introduction of synthetic genes. Genetic material is seemingly attributed with a high level of causal responsibility. We discuss genetic causation in synthetic biology and distinguish three gene concepts differing in their assumptions of genetic control. We argue that synthetic biology generally employs a difference-making approach to establishing genetic causes, and that this approach does not commit to a specific notion of genetic program or genetic control. Still, we (...) suggest that a strong program concept of genetic material can be used as a successful heuristic in certain areas of synthetic biology. Its application requires control of causal context, and may stand in need of a modular decomposition of the target system. We relate different modularity concepts to the discussion of genetic causation and point to possible advantages of and important limitations to seeking modularity in synthetic biology systems. (shrink)

Causal selection and priority are at the heart of discussions of the causal parity thesis, which says that all causes of a given effect are on a par, and that any justified priority assigned to a given cause results from causal explanatory interests. In theories of causation that provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of causal claims, status as cause is an either/or issue: either a given cause satisfies the conditions or it does not. Consequently, assessments of causal (...) parity and priority require more resources, which can either be additional or part of the causal analysis itself. While adding resources in terms of a theory of causal explanation has been standard, here we develop a unified conceptual analysis that includes a range of different precise causal concepts that allows for assessments of causal priority in terms of different kinds of causal relevance. (shrink)

In many biological experiments, due to gene-redundancy or distributed backup mechanisms, there are no visible effects on the functionality of the organism when a gene is knocked out or down. In such cases there is apparently no counterfactual dependence between the gene and the phenotype in question, although intuitively the gene is causally relevant. Due to relativity of causal relations to causal models, we suggest that such cases can be handled by changing the resolution of the causal model that represents (...) the system. By decreasing the resolution of our causal model, counterfactual dependencies can be established at a higher level of abstraction. By increasing the resolution, stepwise causal dependencies of the right kind can serve as a sufficient condition for causal relevance. Finally, we discuss how introducing a temporal dimension in causal models can account for causation in cases of non-modular systems dynamics. (shrink)

The study of similarity is fundamental to biological inquiry. Many homology concepts have been formulated that function successfully to explain similarity in their native domains, but fail to provide an overarching account applicable to variably interconnected and independent areas of biological research despite the monistic standpoint from which they originate. The use of multiple, explicitly articulated homology concepts, applicable at different levels of the biological hierarchy, allows a more thorough investigation of the nature of biological similarity. Responsible epistemological pluralism as (...) advocated herein is generative of fruitful and innovative biological research, and is appropriate given the metaphysical pluralism that underpins all of biology. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je soutiens que les métaphores « missile » et « ciblage » dans la recherche sur les médicaments à base de nanoparticules jouent différents rôles. Je soutiens que le « missile » joue un rôle scientifique marginal et un rôle plus central dans la communication, tandis que le « ciblage» est devenu une métaphore organisatrice dans le domaine de la recherche. La raison, je le suggère, est que le ciblage est l’explanandum principal du domaine et que cette (...) métaphore continue d’être pertinente même lorsque la nanomédecine mûrit pour s’attaquer à des problèmes plus complexes. Enfin, je discute des suggestions récentes de nouvelles métaphores axées sur la complexité, et je suggère que le rôle significatif des modèles simplificateurs et le besoin réel de tels modèles peuvent expliquer pourquoi les métaphores de complexité n’ont pas retenu l’attention des chercheurs. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je soutiens que les métaphores « missile » et « ciblage » dans la recherche sur les médicaments à base de nanoparticules jouent différents rôles. Je soutiens que le « missile » joue un rôle scientifique marginal et un rôle plus central dans la communication, tandis que le « ciblage» est devenu une métaphore organisatrice dans le domaine de la recherche. La raison, je le suggère, est que le ciblage est l’explanandum principal du domaine et que cette (...) métaphore continue d’être pertinente même lorsque la nanomédecine mûrit pour s’attaquer à des problèmes plus complexes. Enfin, je discute des suggestions récentes de nouvelles métaphores axées sur la complexité, et je suggère que le rôle significatif des modèles simplificateurs et le besoin réel de tels modèles peuvent expliquer pourquoi les métaphores de complexité n’ont pas retenu l’attention des chercheurs. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je soutiens que les métaphores « missile » et « ciblage » dans la recherche sur les médicaments à base de nanoparticules jouent différents rôles. Je soutiens que le « missile » joue un rôle scientifique marginal et un rôle plus central dans la communication, tandis que le « ciblage» est devenu une métaphore organisatrice dans le domaine de la recherche. La raison, je le suggère, est que le ciblage est l’explanandum principal du domaine et que cette (...) métaphore continue d’être pertinente même lorsque la nanomédecine mûrit pour s’attaquer à des problèmes plus complexes. Enfin, je discute des suggestions récentes de nouvelles métaphores axées sur la complexité, et je suggère que le rôle significatif des modèles simplificateurs et le besoin réel de tels modèles peuvent expliquer pourquoi les métaphores de complexité n’ont pas retenu l’attention des chercheurs. (shrink)