People often do things together and form groups in order to get things done that they cannot do alone. In short they form a collectivity of some kind or a group, for short. But if we consider a group on the one hand and the persons that constitute the group on the other hand, how does it happen that these persons work together and finish a common task with a common goal? In the philosophy of action this problem is often (...) solved by saying that there is a kind of collective intention that the group members have in mind and that guides their actions. Does such a collective intention really exist? In this article I’ll show that the answer is “no”. In order to substantiate my view I’ll discuss the approaches of Bratman, Gilbert and Searle on collective intention. I’ll put forward four kinds of criticism that undermine the idea of collective intention. They apply mainly to Bratman and Gilbert. First, it is basically difficult to mark off smaller groups from bigger unities. Second, most groups change in membership composition over time. Third, as a rule, on the one hand groups are internally structured and on the other hand they belong to a larger structure. It makes that generally it cannot be a collective intention that moves the actions of the members of a group. Fourth, conversely, most individual actions cannot be performed without the existence of a wider context of agents who support these actions and make them possible. My critique on Searle mainly involves that in his approach his idea of collective intention is superfluous and that he is not radical enough in his idea that collective action is based on coordinated individual intentions and actions. However, it is a good starting point for showing how collective action actually functions, especially when combined with Giddens’s structuration theory. Every agent in a group executes his or her own individual intentions, relying on what the group offers to this agent and asks from him or her. In this way individual actions of the members of a group are coordinated and it makes that the group can function and that its goals can be performed. And in this way the group is produced and reproduced by fitting individual actions together. An individual agent who belongs to a group only needs to know what s/he wants and what s/he has to do in the group, even if s/he has no knowledge of the intentions and commitments of the other members. Then he or she can do things together with others in a group without supposing that there is something like a collective intention. (shrink)

One of the currently most discussed themes in the philosophy of action is whether there is some kind of collective intention that explains what groups do independent of what the indi-viduals who make up the group intend and do. One of the main obstacles to solve this prob-lem is that on the one hand collective intentionality is no simple summation, aggregate, or dis-tributive pattern of individual intentionality (the Irreducibility Claim), while on the other hand collective intentionality is in the heads (...) of the participating individuals, so to speak, and so it is owned by each of the separate individuals who make up the group (the Individual Ownership Claim). The claims are contradictory and until now no satisfactory solution how to reconcile them has been found. In this article I argue that the constitution view, like the one developed by Lynne R. Baker, can provide a way to sidestep the contradiction. Just as a statue as such is constituted by the marble it is made of but has characteristics that are different from the mar-ble (a statue has a head and legs, while the marble hasn’t; while the marble is stony and the statue as such isn’t), I argue that a group is constituted by its members and that a group on the one hand and its members on the other hand have different characteristics. This is possible be-cause group and members are on different levels. Then there is no longer a contradiction be-tween the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership Claim, for the former claim con-cerns the group level and the latter claim concerns the level of the group members. This ex-plains that a group can have intentions that are no simple summation, aggregate, or distributive patterns of the intentions of its members and that group intentions can be different from if not contradictory to what the individual members taken together intend. (shrink)

One of the most discussed articles in the theory of knowledge is Edmund Gettier’s article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, published in 1963. In this article Gettier undermined the view that knowledge is justified true belief. I think that Gettier’s analysis has consequences not only for the question what knowledge is but also for our idea of truth. In this paper I argue that an analysis in the sense of Gettier shows that a statement can be both true and not (...) true at the same time. (shrink)

of “Reason and the structure of Davidson’s ‘Desire-Belief-Model’ ” by Henk bij de Weg In the present discussion in the analytic theory of action, broadly two models for the explanation or justification of actions can be distinguished: the internalist and the externalist model. Against this background, I discuss Davidson’s version of the internalist Desire-Belief Model . First, I show that what Davidson calls “pro attitude” has two distinct meanings. An implication of this is that Davidson’s DBM actually comprises two different (...) models: the “classical” DBM and a model that has an extra premise, the “nonclassical” model. However, from another point of view one can say that the classical DBM is the nonclassical model in which a premise is missing. In order to determine which viewpoint is correct, I introduce Schütz’s distinction between “because-motives” and “in-order-to-motives”. With the help of this distinction, I can show that the classical DBM is an incomplete version of the nonclassical model. Besides of the premise that refers to the agent’s pro attitude, we need this extra premise in order to refer to the occasion as experienced by the agent that makes him or her act. Only then can we fully explain or justify an action. (shrink)

Most philosophers in the analytical philosophy answer the question what personal identity is in psychological terms. Arguments for substantiating this view are mainly based on thought experiments of brain transfer cases and the like in which persons change brains. However, in these thought experiments the remaining part of the body plays only a passive part. In this paper I argue that the psychological approach of personal identity cannot be maintained, if the whole body is actively involved in the analysis, and (...) that the body is an intrinsic part of what I am as a person. (shrink)

In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are (...) different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind. (shrink)

In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from (...) each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception. (shrink)

In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are (...) different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind. (shrink)

Footnotes to Plato. A plea for writing philosophical dialogues This article aims to encourage writing philosophical dialogues. Its main focus is education. Writing philosophical dialogues introduces students to a genre that was once widely practiced. It can teach philosophical skills, such as the ability to put oneself in the position of another. Yet, writing philosophical dialogues is not as common as it used to be and this creates difficulties when teaching students to write such dialogues. In order to deal with (...) these difficulties I first consider reasons for the contemporary scarcity of philosophical dialogues. I then provide possible ways to help students write philosophical dialogues. I show that writing philosophical dialogues today can benefit from working with other disciplines, especially creative writing and it thus has the additional benefit of encouraging reflection on philosophical practices. My argument is based on my own experience of writing (and failing to write) philosophical dialogues and as well as the experience of teaching philosophical dialogue writing to students. (shrink)

In this article I propose to understand inertia in art as a “disposition to meaning”. I compare inertia in art with that of a face of a person recently deceased. To acquaintances, i.e. to family and friends, it holds a promise of memories (of the deceased); to all the others the corpse offers the possibility of a projection of meanings. Art is made of plain, or extra-ordinary stuff, which is turned into artistic material. The artist is to bring the inert (...) potency of stuff to artistic life, and to turn it into something that is expressive. If she is successful, then the work will offer its audience a concentrated, absorbing experience. Art is autonomous in that the aimed for experience is morally neutral. In the view of many contemporary artists, such experiences fail art’s deeper significance: absorbing experiences are, simply, too easy. If artists want to really move the audience (to emotion), or so they feel, they should also move the audience into action. Wanting to achieve this is not just difficult; it is a paradox. (shrink)

Plato on eros What is love for Plato, and why, after his analysis of eros in Symposium, did Plato take up the subject again, some ten years later, in Phaedrus? This article describes a transtition in Plato’s thinking about eros. In the Symposium, eros is a desire for immortality and a creative power, and it is is elicited by a beautiful person. In the homoerotic case, the lover’s soul is pregnant, and his eros produces the good in the form of (...) poems, laws, philosophical ideas, and virtue. But the philosopher has to gradually outgrow his love for a beautiful body, and turn towards the realm of abstract ideas. In the Phaedrus, by contrast, the beauty of a boy can straightforwardly connect the philosopher to the divine, i.e., perfect and timeless reality. Here, the philosopher does not leave his love for the person behind. On the contrary, the friendship is forever, and it is the conversation between the friends that generates knowledge. (shrink)

In this article I deal with the question of how time and eternity can be linked or even how they can come together, for they are in themselves incompatible. The problem is expounded with the help of Meister Eckhart’s mysticism. For Meister Eckhart knows of a unity between God and man that is no moment of exstasis but durable in time. In the first part of the article I give several metaphores Eckhart uses to describe God and man getting one, (...) and the feelings that go along with it: or, for that matter, the feelings resulting from God and man remaining apart. In the second and third part of the article the problem of the unity of God and man is approached from two sides: l. man becoming God; 2. God becoming man. 1. Man becomes God by means of what I – anachronistically – call ‘amor fati’: the love for everything that inevitably happens, or, even stronger, wanting these events to happen. This brings about a comparison between Eckhart and Nietzsche, the one who coined the word ‘amor fati’. With all the differences, both Eckhart and Nietzsche know the joy of man’s godliness by means of the amor fati. 2. God becomes man because of his love for man. And then, Eckhart is thoroughly ingrained with the idea that man is nothing compared to God. So God’s love becomes tragic: God gets involved with life in time, with all the shortcomings and misery that implies. Secondly, man who did become God, becomes, like God, man again too, out of, of course, love for his fellow men. So time and eternity get linked in an exchange of the qualities of God and man. Nevertheless, man does not end up with being God, or God with being man, for two reasons: 1. God had already involved himself with time with the creation ; and man, being capax dei, had already been meant to be eternal, then. So God and man become what they, basically, have always been. 2. The exchange between God and man dialectically dissolves – “hebt auf” – in neighbourly love. So, although God and man remain together, their unity does not become ‘stable’ in the sense that God and man in their unity are not changing anymore. In this way, the problematic nature of the relationship of time and eternity does not get acute. (shrink)

In this paper a distinction is made between two conceptions of the ego in freudian metapsychology. According to the first conception, a conception which Freud never gave up, the ego is conceived as a specific function on the surface of the living organism ; it is the result of a progressive differentiation of the Id ('Es') under the driving power of internal stimuli and external reality. Fitted with specific neutral, i.e. non-conflictual functions as perception, memory, control of the bodily motions (...) and consciousness, the ego has to defend the individual as a biological living organism against the threats from without and within. In this conception the ego is treated as an instance that doesn't take part in the different psychic conflicts. We analyse the philosophical presuppositions and show the metapsychological disadvantages of this hypothesis that has been worked out especially in the American ego-psychology. According to the second conception, that takes into account important clinical pheno mena as identification, idealisation, narcissism, ideal of the ego, the ego is conceived as a metaphorical effect of a specific psychic act. With Lacan, we try to analyse and to interpret this specific act as an act that causes an infinite splitting in the ego : the ego is constituted as a subject that from its origin is separated from itself. Instead of being a biological function that lives in the immediate metonymical prolongiation of the living organism, it rather has to defend a certain representation of himself. This point of view doesn't exclude a purely functional description of the ego ; but the different functions have now to be interpreted differently because the ego is the effect of conflicts in which it takes part (consciousness is interlaced with unconsciousness, perception with denying...). In the last part of our study we show how Freud makes the philosophically important distinction between the ego as an object of the Id and the ego as a subject that has to speak in the first person ('I'). We try to give a Lacanian interpretation of the subject as act on the basis of the well-known Freudian formula 'Wo Es war soll Ich werden'. (shrink)

The fundamental and unevitable risk of schizophrenia and paranoia reveals to us that the ego is not originally given ; the ego, that unifies the psyche and gives it a personal character (my psyche), is not from the very beginning necessarily present in my psyche. The ego has to be constituted; and in some extreme cases (i.e. schizophrenia and paranoia ) this process of constitution may radically fail : the ego might not have come about. This constitution cannot be thought (...) as a selfconstitution : it is the effect of the Other. I am constituted by the Other ; I receive my personal being from the Other and not from myself. The fundamental processes of the primary repression ('Urverdrängung'), the mirror phase, identification and idealisation, and finally the discourse of the Other are interpreted by De Waelhens against the back-ground of this primordial, — clinical — evidence. The philosophical interpretation of these fundamental structures of our being induces us to understand the ego from the very beginning as separated from itself by the Other, — the Other in me. The different facets of this original splitting and its consequences for our conception of the ego and his relation with the Other are worked out in this study. (shrink)

In this article, I present the concept of narrative in Ricoeur’s thinking as an epistemological tool that grants access to the meaning of human being. For Ricoeur, a narrative is meaningful when it is understood as an articulation of time as a dimension of our being. By articulating time humans express their very existence as humans and have access to the meaning of it. The narrative, as an epistemological path to this meaning, also has ontological implications. The dimension of narrativity (...) is then not only a tool for epistemological reflection, but also the milieu of our existence. The narrative as epistemological ‘detour’ becomes a structural element of being. Thus human beings find themselves in a paradoxical position of distance and involvement. Consequently, a firm and stable ontology can no longer be reached. Rather, ontology operates from out of a dynamical concept of being in which the contribution of language should be considered. I conclude this article by pointing to Ricoeur’s emphasis on language and narrative, resulting from his linguistic turn, and leading him to onto-logy. (shrink)

Now being one of the 10 most important urban centres, Leuven provides a good case to study the determinant elements that have inspired the policy of mergers of communes in Belgium in 1975.Technocracy, consultation of the municipal councils concerned, preferences of the population, the opposition in parliament have all had very little or no influence at all on the eventual decision-making.On the contrary, specific pressure groups, supervision authorities, the extent to which one tried to anticipate the 1976 local elections, and (...) the power position of the majority parties have substantially infiuenced the merger map. Thus, these decision-making elements contain a considerable distortion - in terms of actual realization - of the official ideology behind the mergers, i.e. to make the municipal executive power more efficient. (shrink)

The current debate about the moral status of animals is strongly determined by a misunderstanding of the role of moral intuitions. It is often assumed that our moral intuitions contain an implicit understanding of something that could ideally always be made explicit in terms of a consistent set of general principles. I have argued that this assumption is certainly wrong with respect to our moral intuitions about how we should behave towards animals. The meaning of these intuitions will always be (...) intimately tied up with deeply ingrained attitudes which precede the endorsement of any explicit moral view. While it cannot be excluded that these attitudes might radically change, it is wrong to suppose that such a transformation could result from abstract reasoning. (shrink)

Neurotheology is a rather young scientific discipline that investigates the common biological basis of religion in our brain. Because neurotheologians do not fear to draw theological conclusions from their scientific research results, the phenomenon of neurotheology can be an interesting focus of the widespread dialogue between science and religion. The first part of this article is dedicated to a detailed presentation of the project of neurotheology. I discuss the research results of Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg, pioneers of the neurotheological (...) discipline, who discovered that, during a ‘religious experience’, a certain part of the brain receives less blood so that the distinction between the self and its environment drops. The result is that the test subject feels united with the cosmos. Neurotheologians thus assert that all religions arise from this capacity of the brain to transcend the ‘I’. In the second part of this article, I formulate some severe critiques on the project of eurotheology from a strict scientific perspective, but also from an anthropological and theological point of view. The core of the problem, I argue, is situated in the kind of connection that is made between a scientific observation and a phenomenological experience. By calling the brain the basis of any religious experience, d’Aquili and Newberg develop what we can call a ‘theologized neurology’. In a third, more tentative part, I suggest another way in which we can relate neurology and theology without domesticating or reducing the transcendent, by thoroughly examining the meaning of the research results of the neurosciences in a more philosophical reflection. (shrink)

Psychopaths’ Dysfunctional Conscience and their Moral Incompetence1I develop here a Kantian framework for understanding conscience in order to examine whether moral flaws of psychopaths are traceable to their dysfunctional conscience. When understood as the reflective capacity for moral self-assessment that triggers certain emotional reactions, conscience proves to be a fruitful tool for explaining psychopathic moral incompetence. First, I show how the unrealistic moral self-assessment of psychopaths affects their competence in judging moral issues and in being motivated to act morally. I (...) then highlight how focusing on this specific rational deficit of psychopaths significantly modifies the status of rationalism within the contemporary dispute as to whether psychopathy supports sentimentalism alone. (shrink)

‘Subject of one’s acts’: Lacanian reflections on a Foucauldian art of living In Les aveux de la chair, the fourth volume of his Histoire de la sexualité, Foucault explains how the still dominant idea that man is ‘subject of desire’ – and thus subjected to the law of desire – has its origin in the libido theory of Augustine. With this genealogical analysis Foucault targets, among other things, the libido theory of his contemporary, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. This essay briefly (...) discusses what makes Lacan and Foucault theoretically opposed to each other. I zoom in on how both conceive the modern ‘subject’. Opposite to the subject as ‘subject to desire’, Foucault puts forward the ‘subject of one’s own actions’, the subject that is itself the ground/base of its own ‘care for oneself’ (epimileia heautou). This essay presents a critical reflection on the possibility of such a subject. It is here that Lacan’s theory of the subject can shed a light on Foucault’s understanding of a modern ‘care of oneself’ or ‘art of living’. Lacanian psychoanalysis can provide a ‘critical theory’, indispensable for what is at stake in a Foucauldian ‘art of living’. (shrink)

In his work on reasons Dretske argues that reasons are only worthwhile for having them if they are causally relevant for explaining behaviour, which he elaborates in his representational theory of explanation. The author argues against this view by showing that there are reasons that are relevant for explaining behaviour but not causally relevant. He gives a linguistic foundation of his argumentation and shows that Dretske’s representational theory cannot explain human actions because man does not only perceive things that have (...) already meaning but also assigns meanings to what (s)he perceives and that therefore reasons are fundamentally different from causes. (shrink)

"Biograficheskiĭ slovarʹ russkikh filosofov"--Tom 3, pages 488-639.