D. Lewis proposed the reformed conditional analysis of disposition to handle Martin's influential counterexamples to the simple counterfactual analysis. Some philosophers, however, argue that the mere fact that the reformed conditional analysis of disposition can handle Martin's counterexamples should not be regarded as a reason to prefer the reformed conditional analysis to the simple analysis. In this paper, I argue that the reformed version should be preferred not because it can handle Martin's counterexamples but because there are other counterexamples to (...) the simple conditional analysis. (shrink)

나는 이 논문에서 장-뤽 마리옹이 데카르트 이래 철학의 과제였던 타자의 현존으로의 접근의 문제를 파스칼적 의미의 사랑으로 해결하려 했다는 점을 밝힌다. 그리고 나는 그가 데카르트와 파스칼 사이에서 사랑에 대해 사유하면서 존재론에 선행하는 제일철학의 사건으로서의 사랑 개념을 정립했다는 사실을 보여준다. 이를 위해 나는 마리옹의 사유에서 사랑이 가지는 세 가지 지위를 설명한다. 첫째, 사랑은 데카르트에서 레비나스에 이르는 타자 문제의 해결이다. 둘째, 사랑은 제일철학의 지위를 차지한다. 셋째, 사랑은 형이상학 밖으로 나가는 사건이다. 끝으로 나는 마리옹의 사유의 궁극적 질문은 “무엇을 위한 사랑인가?”이며 이 질문과 함께 그가 (...) 철학 외부로 향한다는 사실을 보여준다. (shrink)

Choi (Philosophia, 38(3), 2010) argues that my counterexamples in Lee (Philosophia, 38(3), 2010) to the simple conditional analysis of disposition ascription are bogus counterexamples. In this paper, I argue that Choi’s arguments are not satisfactory and that my examples are genuine counterexamples.

In this paper, I examine J. Carroll's “Mirror Argument” against the Humean conception of law and H. Beebee's response to this argument. I will first show that Beebee's criticism is quite plausible if it is refined slightly. Then, I will propose a revised version of the Mirror Argument which is immune to criticisms like that of Beebee's. According to the Humean conception of law, I will argue, we should accept the existence of counterfactual dependence relation where there should not be (...) such relation. (shrink)

David Armstrong once argued that to solve the problem of induction with inference to the best explanation we need an anti-Humean conception of law. Some Humeans have argued that this argument begs the question against Humeanism. In this paper, I propose a new argument for the same conclusion which is not vulnerable to this criticism. In particular, I argue that explanationist approaches to the problem of induction that are combined with Humeanism is internally incoherent.

Since K. Fine’s influential criticism of modalism, many philosophers have agreed that we cannot understand the concept of essence with that of modality. However, some philosophers have resisted this mainstream position. In this paper, I examine N. Wildman’s claim that, unlike other versions of modalism, his version of modalism, namely Sparse Modalism can save modalism. I will argue first that if we introduce the notion of grounding into this debates, Wildman’s criticisms of other versions are significantly undermined. Next, I will (...) argue that since Sparse Modalism has an implicit commitment to grounding Wildman cannot blame revising other versions modalism with the concept of grounding. From these claims, I will conclude that the prospect of the success of modalism in general is at best dubious. Without the concept of grounding no version of modalism can succeed and with the concept of grounding no version is well motivated. (shrink)