Résumé Confronté à l’orientation tendanciellement matérialiste des sciences de la nature dans le dernier tiers du xix e siècle, Hermann Cohen s’efforça d’offrir une fondation idéaliste de ces sciences en recourant à la philosophie transcendantale kantienne. Il fut en accord avec Friedrich Albert Lange dans le refus de toute métaphysique dogmatique, mais il ne partagea pas son naturalisme, et l’idéalisme poético-fictif qui le complétait. Alors que Lange, dans son Histoire du matérialisme, avait eu pour but de décrire l’autodissolution de la (...) métaphysique matérialiste, Cohen voulut montrer comment le matérialisme débouchait dans un idéalisme méthodique, de provenance kantienne. En fin de compte, la distance dans le temps par rapport à Lange s’accroissant, il en vint à prêter un tel idéalisme à Lange lui-même ; ce qui est problématique. (shrink)

Qu’en est-il pour nous aujourd’hui de la prétention au savoir absolu dont la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit se voulait la justification ? Renvoie-t-elle encore à la clôture sur soi du discours dont ont parlé tant d’interprètes ? L’analyse de la représentation religieuse, celle de la belle âme, ne peuvent-elles au contraire être comprises comme une mise en question de toute métaphysique de la subjectivité ? En sorte que, loin d’être le comble du dogmatisme métaphysique, la Phénoménologie chercherait à nous en libérer, (...) comme le soutiennent des lectures telles que celles de R. Brandom, R. Pippin ou T. Pinkard.What means for us today the claim to absolute knowledge the Phenomenology of Spirit wanted to justify ? Is it still referring to the closure of discourse so many commentators have been talking about ? On the contrary, the way in which representation and beautiful soul are analyzed couldn’t it be understood as a way of questioning any metaphysics of the subjectivity ? Thus, far from bringing the metaphysical dogmatism to a climax, the Phenomenology would be an attempt to free us from it, just as readers like R. Brandom, R. Pippin or T. Pinkard point it out. (shrink)

Cet article vise à clarifier la position de Marx relativement au libéralisme politique au moment où, en 1843, il se consacre, dans le Manuscrit de Kreuznach, à la critique d’une grande partie de la section « État » des Principes de Hegel. Récusant comme archaïque la critique hégélienne du libéralisme politique, Marx reconnaît à ce dernier le mérite d’avoir séparé la société civile et l’État, mais, ce faisant, Marx entérine aussi la représentation de la société civile que propose le libéralisme. (...) Il se contente d’opposer à l’abstraction libérale de la représentation politique une autre abstraction : celle de la société civile, abstraitement assimilée au « peuple », là où Hegel avait su au contraire en reconnaître l’articulation en groupes sociaux différenciés. (shrink)

Partly in response to fundamental changes which have occurred in the social relations of actually existing capitalism, and to the concomitant political upheavals, partly as a result of the related debates and transformations in social and cultural theory, several social historians of the 1970s and 1980s began to rethink their ideas about class. Having previously made a powerful contribution to the history of working-class formation, the historians in question began to advocate the necessity of a decisive break with Marxist and (...) other materialist sociologies, by way of a turn to various forms of cultural and linguistic analysis (“the discursive approach to history”). By the end of the 1990s, forms of consensus had coalesced around this so-called cultural turn, stressing the complex and contingent relationship between a society’s forms of collective agency and identification (such as “class”) and its structural circumstances and characteristics (such as the organization of work and the distribution of inequality). During the first two-thirds of the 20th century, distinctive political traditions of the Left had developed around the given processes of capital development and their associated social histories, acquiring strong and long-lasting shape after 1945. Since the 1970s however, as capitalist restructuring under neoliberal auspices inexorably remade the social worlds of class, those earlier patterns of politics also ceased to work. In the light of the fundamentally different patterns of working-class formation, the terms of Left political practice consequently need to be radically rethought. (shrink)

How do we conceive of class and class struggle? Orthodox Marxism has often been represented as understanding class as a relationship to production, a conceptualization reinforcing a sense of class struggle where the accent is placed on the conflictual relations within the workplace. Overt capitallabour conflict at the point of production does indeed constitute class struggle, but neither class nor class struggle can be reduced in Marxist terms to strikes, lockouts, and the like. Rather, as Marx’s writings suggest, the origins (...) of class formation lie in dispossession, and it is as the dispossessed that workers, waged and wageless, have routinely resisted both the exploitation and the oppression that is fundamental to capitalism’s project. This project, in which accumulation through dispossession is driven by periodic crises, necessarily involves destruction and creates not only vast wealth but vast destitution. The working class is made as a productive force, divorced from ownership of the means of production, but it is also made amidst persistent crises, which lead to unemployment, the precariousness of labour, and the existence of reserve armies of labour. A comprehension of the origins of class in dispossession thus widens our understanding of class struggles, which take place at the point of production but which also develop in all manner of other ways, including struggles around space, against the state, and in the reproductive realm. (shrink)

This paper argues that in Marx’s metaphysics, especially in his philosophical anthropology, a certain number of reasons can be identified which explain why he neither developed a political theory nor disposed of the conceptual space that might have enabled him to integrate a plausible system of political institutions within his social philosophy. As I argue here, this can be shown via a close analysis of the way Marx both criticised Hegel’s metaphysics while at the same time integrating a number of (...) crucial conceptions of Hegel’s philosophy within a philosophical anthropology. The article therefore demonstrates that the metaphysics of species being is to be understood as a synthesis of Hegel, Feuerbach and Hess, leaving no room for a tension between individual and species. (shrink)

It is time for a paradigm shift in our study of world capitalism and the global ruling class. The statecentrism informing much theorization and analysis of world politics, political economy, and class structure is less and less congruent with 21st century world developments. Global capitalism represents a new stage in the ongoing and open-ended evolution of world capitalism, characterized by the rise of transnational capital and a globally integrated production and financial system commanded by a transnational capitalist class, or TCC, (...) that attempts to exercise its class power through transnational state apparatuses. The TCC, as the new global ruling class, has been attempting, albeit with limited success, to construct a global hegemonic bloc in which one group, the TCC, exercises leadership and imposes its project through the consent of those drawn into the bloc, while those from the majority who are not drawn into this hegemonic project, either through material rewards or ideological mechanisms, are contained or repressed. Global capitalism is in crisis. A popular revolt is spreading worldwide, thus posing many challenges. Transformative struggles must be informed by an accurate analysis of global capitalism and its ruling class. (shrink)

« Real politics » : Some remarks on justice and politics The focus of the article is on the foreclosure of justice from the constellation of modern political concepts, that is, the erosion which modernity operates concerning the conditions which would enable us to pose the question of justice. The failure of all modern attempts to formulate the right of resistance shows the collapse of the idea of justice, henceforth reduced to being either a purely formal procedure or the will (...) of majority. From this point of view, justice is merely the advantage of the stronger, as we can see in the position of Thrasymachus, already criticised by Plato. The essence of the crisis we are facing today involves more than just economics. It also involves law and politics. The moment is thus an opportunity to re-open the question of justice. To do so, we must go beyond the principle of majority decision. True politics, an idea which traverses Kant and Walter Benjamin, envisages the question of justice beyond the doxastic horizon. It re-opens the Socratic conflict between truth and opinion. The core of the problem hinges on the possibility of a real political change in this political form, the form of a modern democracy which represents itself as absolute and un-transcendable. (shrink)