In later Yogācāra, the path to enlightenment is the course of learning the Four Noble Truths, investigating their meaning, and realizing them directly and experientially through meditative practice (bhāvanā). The object of the yogi’s enlightenment-realization is dharma and dharmin: The dharma is the true nature of real things, e.g., momentariness, while the dharmin is real things i.e., momentary things. During the practice of meditation, dharma is directly grasped in the process of clear manifestation (viśadābhā) and the particular dharmin is indirectly (...) ascertained in the process of determination (adhyavasāya). So, even though a yogi does not directly perceive any actual thing, s/he is still nonetheless able to undertake practical activity directed toward it. The realization of the Four Noble Truths consists of two aspects: firstly, the manifestation of momentariness, etc., in the stream of the yogi’s consciousness; secondly, the ascertainment of momentariness, etc., in whatever s/he happens to encounter. (shrink)

In the tradition of Dharmakīrti, perception is, by definition, free from conceptual construction. Insofar as perception is thus, it lacks the nature of determining its object. Without identifying its object, how does perception lead one to a successful action? Perception in isolation would not be pramāṇa unless it is supplemented by perceptual judgement. This paper looks at how Dharamkīrti and his commentators offer solutions to the contradiction between perception’s foundational role and its seeming dependence on conceptual construction. The key point (...) in their proposed solutions is the argument that perception is understood in accordance with two distinct perspectives of the moment and the continuum. Perception from the perspective of the moment has the activities of ‘grasping’ and ‘ascertaining’. The ‘grasping’ induces perceptual awareness to be possessed of the image of an object-moment; the ‘ascertaining’ identifies its object in the form of “this is something.” Perception from the perspective of the continuum, on the other hand, consists of a series of the first moment of sense perception and its subsequent moments of mental perception. It is a continuous process allowing one to attain or avoid a thing that s/he sees. The fulfilment of a purpose is achieved not through a perception-moment but through a perception-continuum. It is worthy stressing, however, that in a very strict sense, the perception-moment alone is ultimately real. Perception from the perspective of the moment is purely epistemological while perception from the perspective of the continuum is pragmatic. (shrink)

In modern Buddhist scholarship, J. Takasaki’s English and Japanese translations of the Ratnagotravibhāga in 1966 and 1989 have been read as an exemplary one until now without any meaningful revision. This paper critically reviews his translations of the twenty-seventh verse in the first chapter of the work, which explicates the key doctrine in the Tathāgatagarbha thought that every living being is a tathāgatagarbha. The method is to clarify the ambiguity of expressions appeared in the verse by changing its nominal style (...) into a general one. After resolving the problems that occur due to vague phrasing, it attempts to investigate the doctrine on the basis of the concepts of buddhakāya, tathatā and gotra, which respectively consist in the first, the second, and the third pāda of the twenty-seventh verse. This paper, thus, provides a new translation of the verse: “Since the Buddha’s wisdom is inherent in all living beings; since the immaculateness of living beings and that of the Buddha are essentially non-dual; and since a buddha is figuratively expressed to be the effect of the buddha-nature with which all living beings are endowed; all body-possessors [=living beings] are by their nature buddhas.”. (shrink)

In the later Indian Yogācāra school, yogipratyakṣa, the cognition of yogins is a key concept used to explain the Buddhist goal of enlightenment. It arises through the practice of meditation upon the Four Noble Truths. The method of the practice is to contemplate their aspects with attention (sādara), without interruption (nairantarya), and over a long period of time (dīrghakāla). A problem occurs in this position since Buddhists hold the theory of momentariness: how is possible that a yogin attains yogipratyakṣa even (...) when everything arises and perishes moment by moment. It is not possible for the momentary mind to fix on the object. Neither is the intensification of the practice possible in a stream composed of cognitions different at each moment. To provide a solution of this problem, a renown eleventh century Buddhist logician, Jñānaśrīmitra, assures us that momentariness is incompatible with duration (sthāyitā), but not with the occurrence of dissimilarity (visadṛśotpāda). Even if cognitions are momentary, the vividness of an object continues to intensify in the course of each preceding cognition-moment producing, in turn, its following moment. Jñānaśrīmitra discusses the attainment of yogipratyakṣa in terms of Buddhist ontological distinctions of moment (kṣaṇa) and continuum (santāna). At the level of the continuum, the process of enlightenment is considered gradual. By retaining a strict adherence to the final moment of the practice, on the other hand, the process is considered sudden. (shrink)