What is the nature of scientific progress and what makes it possible? When we look back at the scientific theories of the past and compare them to the state of science today, there seems little doubt that we have made progress. But is it a continuous process which gradually incorporates past successes into present theories, or are entrenched theories overthrown by superior competitors in a revolutionary manner? _Theories of Scientific Progress _is the ideal introduction to this topic. It is clearly (...) organized, with suggestions for further reading that point the way to both primary texts and secondary literature. It will be essential reading for students of the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Philosophy of science and history of science are both interpretations of scientific practice, and the relationship between these two disciplines can take various forms: they may be mutually exclusive, interdependent, or related by inclusion. Much depends on whether philosophy of science is taken to be a prescriptive or a descriptive science. This book is concerned with the nature of the relationship between philosophy of science and history of science, and sheds new light on our understanding of those activities that comprise (...) science. (shrink)

Toulmin, Hull, Campbell, and Popper have defended an "Evolutionary-Analogy" view of scientific evaluative practice. In this view, competing concepts, theories and methods of inquiry engage in a competitive struggle from which the "best adapted" emerge victorious. Whether applications of this analogy contribute to our understanding of science depends on the importance accorded the disanalogies between natural selection theory and scientific inquiry. Michael Ruse has suggested instead an "Evolutionary-Origins" view of scientific evaluative practices in which scientific inquiry is directed by application (...) of epigenetic rules that have become encoded in homo sapiens in the course of evolutionary adaptation. Among these rules are "formulative theories that are internally consistent," "seek severe tests of theories," and "achieve a consilience of inductions". As a descriptive theory of science, the "Evolutionary-Origins" view is prima facie inconsistent with evidence that human beings often make decisions that violate the "genetically-hard-wired rules." As a normative-prescriptive philosophy of science, the "Evolutionary-Origins" view is limited by the fact that in biological evolution, adaptation to present pressures may be achieved at the expense of a loss of adaptability. (shrink)

Two types of philosophical arguments are employed by the defenders and critics of the Copenhagen Interpretation. One type of argument is a confrontation of an opponent's interpretation with criteria of demarcation and criteria of acceptability. The purpose of such arguments is either to exclude an opponent's interpretation from the range of permissible discourse in quantum physics, or to establish the inadequacy of an opponent's interpretation. A second type of argument is a justification of the value, or utility, of the criteria (...) selected. (shrink)

Designed for those coming to the subject for the first time, this introduction offers a historical exposition of the differing views on the philosophy of science. In this new edition, John Losee also covers contemporary developments within the discipline, incorporating recent work on theory-appraisal, experimental practice, the debate over scientific realism, and the philosophy of biology. (publisher, edited).

Philosophers have discussed the relationship of cause and effect from ancient times through our own.Prior to the work of Niels Bohr, these discussions presupposed that successful causal attribution implies explanation.The success of quantum theory challenged this presupposition.Bohr introduced a principle of complementarity that provides a new way of looking at causality and explanation. In this succinct review of the history of these discussions, John Losee presents the philosophical background of debates over the cause-effect relation.He reviews the positions of Aristotle, Rene (...) Descartes, Isaac Newton, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill.He shows how nineteenth-century theories in physics and chemistry were informed by a dominant theory of causality and how specific developments in physics provided the background for the emergence of quantum theory. Problems created for the "causality implies explanation" thesis by the emergence of quantum theory are reviewed in detail.Losee evaluates Bohr's proposals to apply a principle of complementarity within physics, biology, and psychology.He also discusses the feasibility of using complementarity as a principle of interpretation within Christian theology.This volume, which includes an in-depth index, is an essential addition to the libraries of advanced undergraduate and graduate students, philosophers, and those interested in causality and explanation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Demarcation Project John Losee Demarcation, Ideas and Impressions David Hume sought to exclude certain concepts from the domain of empirically significant discourse. He was critical of talk about "substances" that bear qualities, "forces" that cause motions, "powers" that produce effects, "necessary connections" that determine sequences of events, "extension without matter" and "time independent of succession or change in any real existence."1 Hume proposed a demarcation ofideas, a demarcation (...) intended to exclude these notions. The demarcation project, if successful, would exclude Locke's notion of "substance" as well as Newton's notions of "Absolute Space" and "Absolute Time." Some interpreters have taken the demarcation project to be the centrepiece of Hume's philosophy. Others have seen it to be an incidental aspect of Hume's search for an empirical theory of human nature. I believe that David Pears was correct to insist that an acceptable account ofHume's philosophy include both the "destructive emphasis" and the "constructive emphasis."2 Hume's demarcation project is based on a presumed relation, or relations, between ideas and impressions. Hume made the following claims about "simple ideas," those ideas that "admit of no distinction nor separation" (T 2): 1)every simple idea in its first appearance is derived from some impression (Derivability Principle); 2)every simple idea in its first appearance copies some impression (Copy Principle); 3)every simple idea represents some impression (Representation Principle); 4)simple ideas and impressions resemble one another; 5)simple ideas correspond to impressions; 6)every simple idea is borroVd from some impression; Volume XVII Number 2 51 JOHN LOSEE 7)for every simple idea there is some temporally antecedent impression; and 8)impressions cause simple ideas. Primafacie, these claims are empirical claims about the genesis of our ideas. But within Hume's demarcation project these claims also function as criteria for membership in the class of simple ideas. Those ideas that satisfy the criteria constitute raw material from which complex ideas are formulated. Complex ideas are constructed from simple ideas. However, they are not copies of simple ideas. Aparticular complex idea is empirically significant provided that, 1) it is derivable from simple ideas; and 2) each of those simple ideas is derivable from impressions. The Case of the Missing Shade ofBlue Tensions arise within the demarcation project in part because Hume employs nonequivalent criteria—Derivability Principle, Copy Principle, Representation Principle—as if they were equivalent. The tension is acute in the case of the missing shade ofblue. The "missing shade" is an idea formulated by a person with extensive experience of colours, but no prior exposure to the shade in question. If this idea is a simple idea, then it is false that every simple idea copies some antecedent impression. Why did Hume cite—in both Treatise and Inquiry—this apparently destructive exception? Bernard Rollin has suggested that Hume may have cited the missing-shade-of-blue example as a rhetorical device toprotecthis dichotomous divisionofpropositionsinto those that are analytic a priori and those that are synthetic a posteriori (including the Derivabihty Principle).11 John O. Nelson agreed that Hume is concerned to emphasize the contingent, empirical status of the Derivabihty Principle.12 Nelson suggested that Hume sought tomake two points. The first pointis that an exception to the Derivability Principle is empirically possible. The second point is that thought-experiments like the missing-shade example are inadequate to establish conclusions about matters offact. To entertain such thought-experiments is to lapse into hypothetical speculation, a violation ofthe "experimental method ofreasoning."13 Perhaps it was for this reason that Hume dismissed the missing-shade case as unimportant. Hume urged that this case is "so particular and singular" thatit provides nogoodreason to abandon the Copy Principle (T 6). 52Hume Studies HUME'S DEMARCATION PROJECT D. M. Johnson has developed a hypothesis to explain why Hume believed that this exceptional case is not damaging to his demarcation project. According to Johnson, Hume may have believed that for a person to reconstruct a shade he never saw before, he must have developed an appropriately detailed Tiabitual spectrum'—i.e., an ordered set oftendencies and expectations concerning colours, built up as a result oflong experience with thingshavingthese colours—whichhe then employs... (shrink)

What types of entities qualify as causes and effects? What is the relationship between cause and effect? How are causal claims to be assessed? The first question deals with the structure of the world; the second is about theories that interpret the relationship of causes to effects; while the third has to do with proper procedure in science and everyday life. This volume is a wide-ranging history of answers that have been given to these three questions, and their relationship to (...) scientific understanding.Losee presents a number of theories of causality within a historical survey that emphasizes the interrelationship between these theories and developments in science. His analysis displays the strengths and weaknesses of these theories so as to contribute to our present understanding of causal relatedness.Among the positions discussed are those of Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Salmon, Lewis, and Woodward. Losee's analysis displays the strengths and weaknesses of theories that identify causal relatedness with regularity of sequence, probability increase, energy transfer, exchange of a conserved quantity, counterfactual dependence, and inferability.These theories are judged, in part,by their ability to resolvedifficulties posed by instances of overdetermination,causation by omission, preventive causation, and causation by disconnection. Since applications of the theories to these instances disagree, a strategy of employing multiple concepts of causation is examined.Theories of Causality also describes the particular difficulties for causal analysis posed by quantum mechanics. One such difficulty is the prohibition against combining a causal analysis of a quantum process with a spatio-temporal description of that process. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard sought to clarify what it means to be a Christian. He concluded that a one-on-one relationship with God is required, to encounter the "Absolute Paradox," defined as an immutable being entering into and transforming human history. Kierkegaard's dim view of a systematic Christian theology includes a preoccupation with theological exposition that distracts from the essential task of achieving a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. Alternatively, Paul Tillich's theology is based on a triadic relationship of being, nonbeing and Being-Itself, (...) a doctrine of symbols, and a reinterpretation of the Incarnation. It correlates a culture's questions and concerns with the Christian message to certain criteria of acceptability that, to Tillich, must satisfy the "Protestant Principle," stipulating that a theological system both restates the present-time Christian message and acknowledges that this restatement cannot be the definitive, ultimate expression of that message. Theology on Trial presents and assesses whether, and to what degree, Tillich's theology satisfies his own criteria of acceptability. An acceptable theology must be logically consistent and free of equivocation. The concluding section of the book examines the views of each author from the standpoint of the other. (shrink)

The Golden Age of Philosophy of Science, 1945 to 2000 offers the reader a guide to the major philosophical approaches to science since World War Two. Considering the bases, arguments and conclusions of the four main movements - Naturalism, Descriptivism, Foundationalism, and Logical Reconstructionism - John P. Losee explores how philosophy has both shaped and expanded our understanding of science. The volume features major figures of twentieth century science, and engages with the work of previous philosophers of science, including Norman (...) Campbell, Ernest Nagel, Rudolf Carnap, Karl Popper, Richard Dawkins, and John Worrall. In particular, The Golden Age of Philosophy of Science, 1945 to 2000 aims to answer the following questions: should philosophy of science be a prescriptive discipline? Can philosophy of science achieve normative status without designating evaluative principles? How should competing philosophies of science be balanced? And finally, how can understanding the history of science aid us in analyzing the philosophy of science? In answering these questions, this book shows us why we understand science the way we do. The Golden Age of Philosophy of Science 1945 to 2000 is essential reading for students and researchers working in the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)