Las consecuencias para la generación de leyes sociológicas del hecho de la contingencia social y/o de la libertad individual, podrían visualizarse a base de la resolución determinación vs. indeterminación de las mismas. Los enfoques paradigmáticos para abordar el tema de la determinación son: (..

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p1 My purpose is to postulate a principle, which I call “socioantropic”, that can connect in a proper way two historically antithetical notions: free will and determinism in the social word. The main consequence of this is the establishment of a new kind of explanatory structure more in keeping with the special nature of the social sciences. To this end, I shall reconstruct the conventional structure of deductive-nomological explanations, exposing its shortcomings in relation to the social sciences, and hence I (...) shall formulate a proposal for the theoretical resolution of the problem of explanation in the social world. (shrink)

My purpose is to postulate a principle, which I call “socioantropic”, that can connect in a proper way two historically antithetical notions: free will and determinism in the social word. The main consequence of this is the establishment of a new kind of explanatory structure more in keeping with the special nature of the social sciences. To this end, I shall reconstruct the conventional structure of deductive-nomological explanations, exposing its shortcomings in relation to the social sciences, and hence I shall (...) formulate a proposal for the theoretical resolution of the problem of explanation in the social world. (shrink)

In this work, it is argued that one of the foundations of NiklasLuhmann’s theory of social systems, namely that it has no ontology, would prevent the elaboration of explanations in sociology. Because the theory has a formal-logical foundation, which does not presuppose ontology, there are insurmountable obstacles to achieving this objective. For this reason, it is valid to wonder about the merit of a theory that, after 20 years, insists on not aligning itself with ontological premises in a robust way (...) and suggests, therefore, a refusal to integrate sociology within the set of factual sciences. However, we think that the richness of Luhmann’s work allows a dialogue with the mainstream of contemporary theoretical practice. Three rules about what “should not be done” are revalidated from this analysis to philosophically base a theory in sociology and a key suggestion to overcome the problem of explanation in Luhmann’s sociology: social science seeks and directs its activity towards discovery and the use of substantive, real distinctions that also enrich the factual content of statements about social reality. (shrink)

In this work, it is argued that one of the foundations of NiklasLuhmann’s theory of social systems, namely that it has no ontology, would prevent the elaboration of explanations in sociology. Because the theory has a formal-logical foundation, which does not presuppose ontology, there are insurmountable obstacles to achieving this objective. For this reason, it is valid to wonder about the merit of a theory that, after 20 years, insists on not aligning itself with ontological premises in a robust way (...) and suggests, therefore, a refusal to integrate sociology within the set of factual sciences. However, we think that the richness of Luhmann’s work allows a dialogue with the mainstream of contemporary theoretical practice. Three rules about what “should not be done” are revalidated from this analysis to philosophically base a theory in sociology and a key suggestion to overcome the problem of explanation in Luhmann’s sociology: social science seeks and directs its activity towards discovery and the use of substantive, real distinctions that also enrich the factual content of statements about social reality. (shrink)

This essay discusses three axioms of sociopoietic theory from the point of view of philosophy of social science. The first axiom, its de-ontologised character, it is associated to theory formalism and it allows to question the validity of a factual theory that do not presuppose the reality. Th..

This essay tries to synthesize some relevant issues on a classic topic, central for social sciences: social interaction. How is it possible for two or more human beings to build a system of a superior order, composed by elements with emergent properties which are only partially imputable to the indi..

El propósito de este ensayo consiste en aproximarse a una re–evaluación del enfoque negativo de la filosofía hegeliana en el marco de la discusión epistemológica de la ciencia contemporánea. La afirmación de Karel Kosik que sostiene que "En virtud de que la esencia –a diferencia de los fenómenos..

From the traditional point of view, power and truth are not related. Since 20th century there has been a social and historical breach in conventional assumptions about the relationship between power and truth. On one hand, it is generally accepted that scientific facts are considered artificial, in the sense of being constructed. This assumption neither implied any kind of fraud nor did it mean that they could be created ex-nihilo. But the interpretation of Kuhn as well as the subsequent developments (...) of the Strong Programme, successfully postulates that truth is merely a social issue. Since then, it has been increasingly suspected that any objective or neutral description of society is too difficult, rendering it completely illusory. That is why it is necessary to ask again for the relation between the structures of truth and the social structures of power and what kind of impact they have on contemporary sociological theory. In this paper, it is given two examples of that kind of enterprise related to two major leading sociologists: Bourdieu and Giddens. Desde el punto de vista tradicional, no hay asociación entre poder y verdad. Pero desde el Siglo XX existió un quiebre social e histórico en las presuposiciones convencionales acerca de la relación entre poder y verdad. De un lado, en general se acepta que los hechos científicos son artificiales en el sentido que son construidos y se asume que esto no implica algún tipo de fraude ni significa que ellos son creados ex-nihilo. Pero la interpretación de Kuhn, así como también los desarrollos posteriores del Programa Fuerte, permite postular que la verdad es un asunto puramente social. Desde entonces, se ha sospechado cada vez más que cualquier descripción neutral u objetiva de la sociedad es tan difícil que llega a ser completamente ilusoria. Por eso, es necesario preguntarse nuevamente por la relación entre las estructuras de la verdad y las estructuras sociales del poder y qué tipo de impacto ellas tienen en la teoría sociológica contemporánea. En este trabajo, se discuten dos ejemplos de ese tipo de empeño, relacionado con las obras de los sociólogos Bourdieu y Giddens. (shrink)

This essay tries to synthesize some relevant issues on a classic topic, central for social sciences: social interaction. How is it possible for two or more human beings to build a system of a superior order, composed by elements with emergent properties which are only partially imputable to the individuals composing such a system?

There can be no doubt that discrimination based on sex, race, ethnicity, religion or beliefs should not be tolerated in academia. Surprisingly, however, in recent years, policies of Diversity, Inclusion and Equity(DIE), officially introduced to counteract discrimination, have increasingly led to quite the opposite result: the exclusion of individuals who do not share a radical 'woke' ideology on identity politics (feminism, other gender activisms, critical race theory, etc.), and to the suppression of the academic freedom to discuss such dogmas. This (...) subversion of academia ― disguised Trojan-horse style as universal human rights advocacy ― is unacceptable because academia must be politically neutral and protect freedom of speech, a cornerstone of professional scholarly activity without which universities as we know them will slowly but surely suffocate. -/- Our purpose here is to put together some particularly illustrative cases of such repression in a single book, testifying to a ubiquitous trend within western culture, irreducible to a few isolated complaints. The essays contained here illustrate the abuse of power, censorship and witch-hunts at many universities and research centres in the name of DIE. -/- List of coauthors in alphabetical order: Dorian Abbot, Tomonori Agoh, Gerhard Amendt, Ivar Arpi, David Benatar, Peter Boghossian, Civitas Research Team, David Díaz Pardo de Vera, Pedro Domingos, Janice Fiamengo, Étienne Forest, Jorge Gibert Galassi, Norman Goldstuck, José L. González Quirós, Lawrence M. Krauss, Patrick LaBelle, Martín López Corredoira, Heather Mac Donald, Martin Malmgren, Erik. J. Olsson, Jordan Peterson, Constantin Polychronakos, Philip C. Salzman, Alessandro Strumia, Tom Todd, Andrei Yafaev. (shrink)

There can be no doubt that discrimination based on sex, race, ethnicity, religion or beliefs should not be tolerated in academia. Surprisingly, however, in recent years, policies of Diversity, Inclusion and Equity (DIE), officially introduced to counteract discrimination, have increasingly led to quite the opposite result: the exclusion of individuals who do not share a radical 'woke' ideology on identity politics (feminism, other gender activisms, critical race theory, etc.), and to the suppression of the academic freedom to discuss such dogmas. (...) This subversion of academia — disguised Trojan-horse style as universal human rights advocacy — is unacceptable because academia must be politically neutral and protect freedom of speech, a cornerstone of professional scholarly activity without which universities as we know them will slowly but surely suffocate. Our purpose here is to put together some particularly illustrative cases of such repression in a single book, testifying to a ubiquitous trend within western culture, irreducible to a few isolated complaints. The essays contained here illustrate the abuse of power, censorship and witch-hunts at many universities and research centres in the name of DIE. List of coauthors in alphabetical order: Dorian Abbot, Tomonori Agoh, Gerhard Amendt, Ivar Arpi, David Benatar, Peter Boghossian, Civitas Research Team, David Díaz Pardo de Vera, Pedro Domingos, Janice Fiamengo, Étienne Forest, Jorge Gibert Galassi, Norman Goldstuck, José L. González Quirós, Lawrence M. Krauss, Patrick LaBelle, Martín López Corredoira, Heather Mac Donald, Martin Malmgren, Jordan Peterson, Constantin Polychronakos, Erik. J. Olsson, Philip C. Salzman, Alessandro Strumia, Tom Todd, Andrei Yafaev. (shrink)

This article provides a comprehensive review of the rather intricate relationship between contemporary environmental ethics, understood as a philosophical branch, and ancient philosophy. While its primary focus is on Western philosophy, it also includes some brief yet crucial considerations about the influence of Eastern traditions of thought on environmental ethics. Aside from the introduction in the first section, the discussion is organised into three main sections. In the Reception: Ancient philosophy in environmental ethics section, I review the initial reception of (...) ancient philosophy in contemporary environmental ethics. Next, in the Reaction: Environmental ethics in ancient philosophy scholarship section, I examine how the scholarship in AP responded to this early reception. I conclude, in the final section, with some constructive suggestions for future research. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:The present article reassesses Aristotle's views on the relationship between ethical character and the natural environment. The standard reading, to the effect that Aristotle endorsed environmental determinism, is rejected. The discussion invites a more careful examination of Aristotelian texts commonly adduced to support the orthodox reading, while also providing a clear account of what environmental determinism is. I argue that the textual evidence presented by defenders of the standard reading does not match that account. All in all, I conclude, we (...) are not authorized to invoke Aristotle's views on the relationship between natural environment and human beings in order to discredit his ethical and political project. (shrink)

This study intends to vindicate Thomas Aquinas' theory of perception as a key element which is systematically constituent for his theory of knowledge generally. The causal conditions for perception, the physical framework and the resulting perceptual knowledge are analysed.

The purpose of this scoping review is to investigate the value of creative arts therapies in healthy older adults. This article aims to shed light on current knowledge concerning the effectiveness of art therapies for the prevention of common age-related conditions using the definition of art therapy provided by the American Art Therapy Association, as well as Cohen’s conceptual framework for the psychological conceptualization of the relationship between the arts and health in later life. The objective is to carefully capture (...) subthreshold situations of distress, which are often not taken into account and primarily involve psychological aspects that are crucial in the multidimensional perspective of healthy aging. Twelve articles were selected and examined following an initial electronic search on 3 databases. A thematic analysis of the results identified four major themes: improving cognitive performance and proprioception; enhancing self-identity and meaningful life; reducing feelings of loneliness and depressive symptoms; and the importance of socialization. All these aspects constitute the basis for preventing psychological distress and enhancing mental well-being for healthy aging. (shrink)

CONTENIDO: El entierro - El padre - Otro padre - La montaña mágica - Los amigos - Bucarest - En Sumapáz - Yolanda - Cali - Medellín - Freud - Doctorado Honoris Causa - Los derechos humanos - La angustia.

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence (AI) system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with (...) the particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development. (shrink)

Most of the existing natural language processing systems for legal texts are developed for the English language. Nevertheless, there are several application domains where multiple versions of the same documents are provided in different languages, especially inside the European Union. One notable example is given by Terms of Service (ToS). In this paper, we compare different approaches to the task of detecting potential unfair clauses in ToS across multiple languages. In particular, after developing an annotated corpus and a machine learning (...) classifier for English, we consider and compare several strategies to extend the system to other languages: building a novel corpus and training a novel machine learning system for each language, from scratch; projecting annotations across documents in different languages, to avoid the creation of novel corpora; translating training documents while keeping the original annotations; translating queries at prediction time and relying on the English system only. An extended experimental evaluation conducted on a large, original dataset indicates that the time-consuming task of re-building a novel annotated corpus for each language can often be avoided with no significant degradation in terms of performance. (shrink)

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with the (...) particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development. (shrink)

Bioethicists influence practices and policies in medicine, science, and public health. However, little is known about bioethicists’ views. We recently surveyed 824 U.S. bioethicists on a wide range of ethical issues, including topics related to abortion, medical aid in dying, and resource allocation, among others. We also asked bioethicists about their demographic, religious, academic, and professional backgrounds. We find that bioethicists’ normative commitments predict their views on bioethical issues. We also find that, in important ways, bioethicists’ views do not align (...) with those of the U.S. public: for instance, bioethicists are more likely than members of the public to think abortion is ethically permissible but are less likely to believe compensating organ donors is. Our demographic results indicate the field of bioethics is far less diverse than the U.S. population—less diverse even than other academic disciplines—suggesting far more work needs to be done to build an inclusive field. (shrink)

Hundreds of millions of rare biospecimens are stored in laboratories and biobanks around the world. Often, the researchers who possess these specimens do not plan to use them, while other researchers limit the scope of their work because they cannot acquire biospecimens that meet their needs. This situation raises an important and underexplored question: how should scientists allocate biospecimens that they do not intend to use? We argue that allocators should aim to maximise the social value of the research enterprise (...) when allocating scarce biospecimens. We provide an ethical framework for assessing the social value of proposed research projects and describe how the framework could be implemented. (shrink)

The task of this chapter is to investigate and assess Grossmann’s view of the ontological status of categories. It has two dimensions. Because Grossmann does not offer a full discussion of the ontology of categories, we first need to present an interpretation of his view. Our point of departure is Grossmann’s claim that a category is a fundamental property of being (which implies that he holds view 3 above). Our second task is to assess the adequacy of his view. We (...) do this by raising some problems with Grossmann’s account, offering as an alternative view a version of 4 above, and defending it against what we construe as Grossmann’s possible counter-arguments. We argue that the best way to view categories themselves is as ontologically neutral insofar as this opens the way for particular categories to be linguistic entities, mental acts, or properties of extra-mental things. This requires, in turn, a qualified defense of two views rejected by Grossmann—common natures and modes of being. (shrink)

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical (...) and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.” We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest. (shrink)

Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength. In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. Mental strength has been (...) largely overlooked in favor of mental states’ type, representational contents, domain-specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences. (shrink)

Martin Buber believed that life's deepest truth lies in human relationships. In this classic work he puts this belief into practice, applying it to the concrete problems of contemporary society.

In this chapter, we discuss a selection of current views of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). We focus on the different predictions they make, in particular with respect to the role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) during visual experiences, which is an area of critical interest and some source of contention. Our discussion of these views focuses on the level of functional anatomy, rather than at the neuronal circuitry level. We take this approach because we currently understand more about experimental (...) evidence at this coarse level and because these results are appropriate for arbitrating between current theoretical frameworks. We discuss the Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 1995; 2006), Local Recurrency (Lamme 2010; Lamme 2006), Higher Order (Lau 2008; Lau & Rosenthal 2011) and Global Workspace theories (Baars 1997; Baars 2005; Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Dehaene 2014). Despite the apparent stark differences between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing, available evidence suggests that their neural substrates must be largely shared. This indicates that the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing is likely to be subtle and highly specialized. We argue that current experimental evidence about the involvement of specific activity in prefrontal cortex supports the higher order neural theory of consciousness. In consequence, imaging techniques that focus only on marked differences between conscious and unconscious level of activity are likely to be insensitive to the relevant neural activity patterns that underlie conscious experiences. Finally, it follows from the evidence we discuss that the functional advantages of conscious over unconscious perceptual processing may be more limited than commonly thought. (shrink)

Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain (...) an elliptical appearance even when we know it’s circular? This question has generated heated debate from Locke and Hume to the present; but whereas extant arguments rely primarily on introspection, this problem is also open to empirical test. If tilted coins bear a representational similarity to elliptical objects, then a circular coin should, when rotated, impair search for a distal ellipse. Here, nine experiments demonstrate that this is so, suggesting that perspectival shapes persist in the mind far longer than traditionally assumed. Subjects saw search arrays of three-dimensional “coins,” and simply had to locate a distally elliptical coin. Surprisingly, rotated circular coins slowed search for elliptical targets, even when subjects clearly knew the rotated coins were circular. This pattern arose with static and dynamic cues, couldn’t be explained by strategic responding or unfamiliarity, generalized across shape classes, and occurred even with sustained viewing. Finally, these effects extended beyond artificial displays to real-world objects viewed in naturalistic, full-cue conditions. We conclude that objects have a remarkably persistent dual character: their objective shape “out there,” and their perspectival shape “from here.”. (shrink)