In recent years, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed to understand emotions as embodied evaluative attitudes we take towards objects that figure in nonevaluative representational states. Although their account nicely explains some of the key features that emotions are widely taken to have, it runs into a version of what I call the problem of integration. In the case of the attitudinal view, the integration problem takes the form of explaining how, from the point of view of the subject, (...) the bodily responses that make up the attitude part of the emotion and the representational states that provide the particular object of the emotion come to form an intentionally structured unitary experience, that is, one in which the bodily responses are intentionally directed towards the object. I argue that what explains this integration is the way in which the experience of bodily responses and the experience of the representational states interact. This, I propose, produces what I call an experience of convergence. I also suggest that understanding emotional experience in this way not only solves the problem of the integration but also provides a more solid ground for the claim that emotions qua embodied attitudes are evaluative. (shrink)

This article examines the complex relationship between culture, values, and ethics in mental health care. Cultural competence is a practical, concrete demonstration of the ethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence (doing good), nonmaleficence (not doing harm), and justice (treating people fairly)—the cornerstones of modern ethical codes for the health professions. Five clinical cases are presented to illustrate the range of ethical issues faced by mental health clinicians working in a multicultural environment, including issues of therapeutic boundaries, diagnosis, treatment choice, (...) confidentiality and informed consent, and the just distribution of limited health care resources. (shrink)

En el presente texto me propongo mostrar cómo puede entenderse el concepto de ‘metafísica’, no como el estudio de algo “sobrenatural” o “más allá de lo físico”, sino como un estudio de segundo orden que tendría por objeto de análisis los hipotéticos principios fundamentales y modelos de dependencia de la realidad. En este sentido, más que sostener juicios taxativos acerca de lo que las cosas son o qué tipo de entidades existen, las reflexiones de la metafísica podrían entenderse como análisis (...) acerca de las condiciones necesarias y suficientes para que una teoría de primer orden explique un aspecto de la realidad —o toda ella en su conjunto— de la mejor manera posible. (shrink)

Constituye un lugar común en la filosofía de Kant, reducir el papel del cuerpoal aporte que las intuiciones sensibles ofrecen para el conocimiento fenoménico.Otro lugar común lo constituyen las restricciones que para con éstos,se establecen dentro de la filosofía moral. Desde ambos horizontes lasfunciones tanto de la sensibilidad como de la corporalidad, se presentancomo subordinadas, bien al entendimiento teórico, bien a la razón práctica.El propósito de este artículo está destinado a señalar el rol de primer ordenque ambas facultades, poseen para (...) la comprensión del todo de la existenciahumana. Para ello, ciertas consideraciones kantianas ofrecidas en su Antropologíaen sentido pragmático, como en su estética filosófica, resultan reveladorasdel alto valor que ambos fenómenos tienen para su filosofía. (shrink)

El debate reciente iniciado por Hubert Dreyfus y John McDowell ha llamado la atención sobre la relación entre racionalidad y acción no reflexiva. En este artículo propongo una forma de especificar el desacuerdo entre quienes llamaré intelectualistas y antiintelectualistas. A la luz de esta propuesta arguyo que el principal argumento antiintelectualista sólo tiene éxito si se acepta al menos uno de tres presupuestos implícitos que están lejos de ser autoevidentes y cuya verdad es puesta en duda por fenómenos familiares. Termino (...) con consideraciones que sugieren que el intelectualista ha quedado en una mejor posición argumentativa. (shrink)

In the first place, I propose to specify the debate between non-anthropocentrists and anthropocentrists as one between those who defend that the environment has intrinsic value, that is, value that while independent of all relation to human beings is still morally binding, and those who deny this, i.e., assert that the environment only has extrinsic value. I argue for the second option but claim that this should not be an obstacle to address some of the worries of environmental ethics, since (...) extrinsic value is not limited to instrumental value. In this regard, I present sentimentalism as an alternative according to which there are ways of valuing things as ends in themselves and not only as means. (shrink)

El correcto mantenimiento de las zonas donde se alojan los perros y el uso de repelentes es fundamental para la prevención de la transmisión de esta enfermedad.

RESUMEN Con frecuencia el amor y la racionalidad se ven como capacidades que fácilmente entran en conflicto, cuando no se consideran por principio opuestas. En este artículo desarrollo algunos puntos esbozados por Harry Frankfurt con el fin de proponer que la relación entre amor y racionalidad no es de simple oposición. Tras ofrecer una caracterización del amor como disposición híbrida de seguimiento múltiple, defenderé que el amor es racional en el siguiente sentido: el amor no es justificable, pero a pesar (...) de ello es una fuente de razones básicas y a veces irresistibles que en buena medida informan el campo de nuestra racionalidad. Esto no significa que el amor sea una base irracional o arracional, o que sea completamente blindado a la razón, sino que en circunstancias específicas tiene sentido someter el amor a escrutinio racional. ABSTRACT Love and rationality are often considered as capacities which easily come into conflict, or are even opposed to one another. In the paper I elaborate some points suggested by Harry Frankfurt in order to propose that the relation between love and rationality is not one of opposition. After offering a characterization of love as a hybrid multi-track disposition, I will argue that love is rational in the following sense: although love is not justifiable, it is nevertheless a source of basic and sometimes irresistible reasons which to a large extent shape the field of our rationality. This does not mean that love is an irrational or arrational foundation, or that it is impervious to reason; it only means that in certain circumstances it makes sense to subject love to rational scrutiny. (shrink)

This text consists in the exposition of Daniel Dennett’s position on te "problem of qualia". Supposedly, the qualia are the qualitative properties that conform the conscience; a pain, the memory of a sticky sensation, a sticky sensation, the green color of the mountains I see, etc. In permanent opposition to the so-called qualophillians, an antiintuitive but coherent theory is developed, that operates through a form of reductionism.

Resumen: El problema del mal sigue inquietando la conciencia humana, lo que hace indispensable revisar las fuentes de nuestro entendimiento de esa terrible dificultad. Agustí­n de Hipona suele ser considerado el primer filósofo en encarar este problema desde una perspectiva sistemática. Sin embargo, la solución privacionista que presentó, siguiendo directrices neoplatónicas, es considerada como un artefacto más teológico que filosófico. La solución agustiniana, de enorme influencia en la historia de la filosofí­a, ha sido acusada de ser una concepción metafí­sica y (...) falta de claridad, de suerte que no contribuye a aclarar el origen y naturaleza del mal. En este ensayo presentará las lí­neas generales de la solución agustiniana y mostrará su solidez conceptual y su importancia en la solución del problema del mal.: Augustine of Hippo is usually regarded as the first philosopher to affront this problem from a systematic point of view. Nonetheless, the privationist solution he offered, forged in neoplatonic terms, is considered a theological, rather than a philosophical, device. Despite its enormous influence, Augustinian solution has been accused of being both metaphysical and misleading, because it cannot provide an adequate approach the origin and nature of evil. This essay intends to expose the main lines of the Augustinian solution, its internal steadiness and import as solution to the problem of evil. (shrink)

A favourite discussion topic about Wittgenstein is his concept of philosophy. One of its characterizations takes it as an activity by which we reach a panoramic vision of language. This panoramic vision is neither a theoretical issue nor a theoretical construction, but a state of the philosopher or of those readers who understand Wittgenstein´s thought. He often puts it in terms of a path: "the real discovery is the one that gives philosophy peace", he claims in a famous passage of (...) Philosophical Investigations [133], and he is even more explicit and personal on its Foreword: "The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings, which now had to be arranged and sometimes cut down, so that if you looked at them you could get a picture of the landscape" Almost paradoxical: the panoramic vision of the landscape is acquired passing through it.. (shrink)

The thesis is guided by the question: What is the subject matter of Heidegger’s philosophy in the period of Being and Time? I start by arguing that Heidegger’s formulation of the question of being is ambiguous because the term ‘being’ is open to at least two interpretations. I claim that this ambiguity has motivated two types of reading of Heidegger’s early work. On the first reading, Heidegger’s philosophy is understood as attempting to infer metaphysical claims (claims about what-is, or being (...) in a traditionally metaphysical sense) on the basis of claims about the structure of Dasein’s understanding. This reading typically renders Heidegger an idealist. On the second reading, Heidegger’s philosophy is taken to have no metaphysical ambitions, and thereby to be limited to elucidating the structure of Dasein’s understanding. I argue that both types of reading are inadequate and diagnose them as grounded in a Cartesian presupposition that Heidegger rejects. On the basis of direct textual evidence and a number of theoretical considerations I assert that although the second type of reading is right in that the primary object of Heidegger’s philosophy is the conditions of understanding and that the idealist reading is wrong, it is a mistake to deny that Heidegger’s philosophy has metaphysical implications. I claim that Heidegger’s exposition of the conditions of understanding involves a larger picture from the outset, a picture that delineates the relation between understanding and entities, and locates the objective in relation to Dasein. On this picture, 1) empirical entities are unqualifiedly independent of Dasein, 2) we have direct cognitive access to these entities as they are in themselves, and 3) there is no a priori unintelligible entities or aspects of entities. I address a number of potential objections to this way of interpreting Heidegger’s work. (shrink)

Resumen: Una de las nociones más controvertidas dentro de las interpretaciones contemporáneas de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, es la de “sentido común”. Junto a éste, Kant propuso un nuevo modelo de validez normativa calificada como “ejemplar”, cuyo planteamiento resulta bastante problemático. El presente artículo propone una lectura y una interpretación de este tipo de validez, a partir de la reactualización realizada por Alessandro Ferrara, y desde el horizonte de la tradición retórica, representada por Aristóteles Con ello se (...) espera un mejor entendimiento del problema en cuestión, y al mismo tiempo, se pretende hacer mucho más comprensibles las posibilidades que Alessandro Ferrara le atribuye a esta forma de la normatividad.: One of the most controversial notions in contemporary interpretations of the Critique of judgment is that of common sense. Along with it, Kant proposed a new model of normative validity called exemplary, whose approach is quite problematic. This article proposes a reading and an interpretation of this type of validity, based on the reinterpretation carried out by Alessandro Ferrara and from the point of view of the rhetorical tradition as represented by Aristotle. It intends to achieve an improved understanding of the problem in question and, at the same time, to make much more understandable the possibilities that Alessandro Ferrara attributes to this form of normativity. (shrink)