In this article we evaluate claims that language structure adapts to sociolinguistic environment. We present the results of two typological case studies examining the effects of the number of native (= L1) speakers and the proportion of adult second language (= L2) learners on language structure. Data from more than 300 languages suggest that testing the effect of population size and proportion of adult L2 learners on features of verbal and nominal complexity produces conflicting results on different grammatical features. The (...) results show that verbal inflectional synthesis adapts to the sociolinguistic environment but the number of genders does not. The results also suggest that modelling population size together with proportion of L2 improves model fit compared to modelling them independently of one another. We thus argue that surveying population size alone may be insufficient to detect possible adaptation of linguistic structure to the sociolinguistic environment. Rather, other features, such as proportion of L2 speakers, prestige and social network density, should be studied, and if demographic numeric data are used, they should not be used in isolation but rather in competition with other sociolinguistic features. We also suggest that not all types of language structures within a given grammatical domain are equally sensitive to the effect of sociolinguistic variables, and that more exploratory studies are needed before we can arrive at a reliable set of grammatical features that may be potentially most (and least) adaptive to social structures. (shrink)

Reason is the tool of our knowledge but in philosophy this tool encounters difficulties, especially, when it is faced with the big questions - the source of philosophy's deep disagreements. Another difficulty arises from the fact that philosophy and religion cross each other's path: the first draws deductions from rational principles in its approach to religion while the second does not remain firm on its terrain - it keeps looking for rational answers. In essence, this is what this article deals (...) with. If for thousands of years philosophers have been taking turns in arguing and disagreeing with one another on some big questions, there comes a time when the circle has to be broken. In fact, that time has come; this article offers a novel approach to end the age-old debate on, for instance, God talk. (shrink)

SUMMARYThe aim of this article is to analyse the complex roots of Carl Schmitt's theory on dictatorship in the classical world through the lens of classical receptions. It argues that Schmitt was deeply engaged with the classical tradition in formulating his theory on dictatorship. Knowingly or unknowingly, Schmitt legitimates his theory through a foundation in both the Roman idealisation of the virtuous dictators of the early Republic as well as the long tradition of the narrative of the enlightened sovereign as (...) a guarantor of law, present in both Greek and Roman antiquity and in the subsequent European tradition. Schmitt skilfully repurposed the Roman historical tradition on dictators but glossed over the traditional antipathy of Roman republicanism towards sovereign rule. The claim that this article is presenting is that even though it has been overlooked by earlier scholars, Schmitt was both directly and indirectly influenced by the classical tradition of dictatorship and utilised their mythical and symbolic dimensions in the later Roman and the subsequent European legal and political traditions. The reason for this omission was that Schmitt, like his contemporaries, belonged to one of the last generations to be groomed in the classical tradition of literature. (shrink)

This concluding article draws together some of the connecting strands between the preceding four articles, seeking to outline a number of fundamental issues common to them all and ultimately the legal concept of universality in general. I argue that there is a fundamental Eurocentrism present that has a number of implications, ranging from the hierarchical worldview and its ingrained evolutionary basis to the notion of communities beyond the nation state which would in the guise of benevolence impose and dictate both (...) law and values with an universal reach and finally, an idea that legal concepts were in an by themselves universal. What these had in common was that they were based on an understanding of humanity as universal, a certain concept of concept as universal and, finally, resorting to a very particular concept of universal rights. However, despite the manifold claims of universality, the practical application and interpretation of these rights was exceedingly limited to a certain group and a certain time and a place. (shrink)