The main thesis of the dissertation is that Hume resolves his central concern with the problem of reason by arguing for a pragmatic conception of that notion. After a discussion of Hume's argument to the effect that the traditional conception of reason leads to unmitigated scepticism, I turn to Hume's account of belief. Vivacity is the distinguishing mark of a belief. That notion has two aspects: an intrinsic felt quality, and a causal connection to action. The former is part of (...) the descriptive account of belief and the latter accounts for the normative distinctions among beliefs. A belief is rationally warranted, if it leads to beneficial consequences. Both the descriptive-explanatory and the normative-evaluative accounts of belief rest on Hume's conception of the imagination. In the last chapter, it is argued that Malebranche significantly influenced Hume's conception of the imagination. (shrink)