In his later work, Metafizicheskie predpolozheniia poznaniia. Opyt preodoleniia Kanta i kantianstva [Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge. An Attempt to Overcome Kant and Kantianism], Evgeny N. Trubetskoy tried to overcome the Kantian tradition in philosophy in order to advance his conception of all-unity and the philosophy of absolute and unconditional consciousness. Despite insisting on the distinction between the “historical Kant” and Neo-Kantianism, in reality Trubetskoy was strongly dependent on the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant’s philosophy, which meant that his fight against Kantian (...) philosophy was really fought against a conception of Kant he unconsciously adopted from the Neo-Kantians. Evidence of this can be seen in his interpretation of the theory of knowledge and its tasks, his thesis concerning the antimetaphysical direction of Kantian philosophy, and his insistence on the presence of the transcendental method in Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

First Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Main Pedagogical Institute and then also St. Petersburg University, Carpatho-Rusyn P. D. Lodij spent a quarter of a century teaching philosophy and law in the Russian Empire in the first third of the 19th century. His knowledge of Kant’s philosophy and his attitude to Kant’s criticism are estimated diametrically opposed in the research literature. An analysis of his main philosophical work, “Logical Precepts which Lead to Cognition and the Distinction of the True from (...) the False” (1815), convincingly proves that Lodij was an excellent scholar of Kant’s philosophy. In Russia, he was the first thinker who spoke about the differences between the first and second editions of the “Critique of Pure Reason”. Lodij also was the first who noted both the revolutionary role of Kant’s Copernican turn, and the importance of Humeʼs causality problem for the formation of critical philosophy. In Russia, Lodij was the first who proposed a detailed description of Kant’s transcendental idealism. At the same time, Lodij’s general attitude to Kant was rather skeptical. In his own logic, he does not follow Kant’s division of logic into pure and applied, but he returns to pre-Kant’s split into theoretical and practical logics. Lodij disputes with the basic conclusions about the space derived from the transcendental aesthetic, denies synthetic judgments a priori and the rooting of the cognizing reason in illusions. Despite his unequivocal claims regarding Kant’s philosophy, “Logical Precepts” and its author were persecuted during the so-called “professorsʼ affair” of the 1820s. As a result, Lodij was suspended from teaching philosophy, and his logic textbook was withdrawn from teaching for both “disgrace” and imaginary Kantianism. (shrink)

At the beginning of 20th century, there was a problem of establishing which version of the association of Kant’s and Marx’s ideas is correct. If some Legal Marxists more or less combined Kant and Marx, most Russian Social Democrats, especially Bolsheviks, were against such an association. Under the influence of G. V. Plekhanov, Russian Marxists announced a sharply critical attitude toward Kant’s philosophy. This position was reinforced by Russian philosophers, poets, and slavophiles who accused Kant of being militarist. During the (...) World War I, both tendencies faced each other. Plekhanov’s desperate appeal to „the simple laws or morals and justice” and Kant’s “Critique of Practical Reason”, which was supported by L. I. Axelrod, failed. It was rejected by the majority of Marxists both during the World War I and after the triumph of the 1917 October Revolution. (shrink)

For over a century, Hegel’s view of war is seen as controversial that results in mutually exclusive interpretations. To reach a proper evaluation of Hegel’s views, it is necessary to consider both Hegel’s initial states of philosophical doctrine about war and peace, and the development of his understanding of war from early works to mature ones. In the first part of the paper, I characterize Kant’s position on war, since it was the starting point for Hegel. Contrary to popular representations (...) about Kant as an exclusive pacifist, the philosopher of Koenigsberg had a philosophical-historical treatment of war, in which the war appeared as something sublime. However, both legal-ethical peace understanding and veto of war from the point of practical reason were not dominant in Kant’s philosophy, subordinating the sublime treatment of war. Kant’s next contemporaries could not already keep this position, emphasizing either one or the other side of war interpretation. Starting from the early writings (the paper “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” or manuscripts “System of Ethical Life” and “The German Constitution”), Hegel stresses an ethical aspect of war and its necessity, so that the shield is arranged on the way of systems isolation and individuals atomization, and the unity in its ethical health is saved. Perpetual peace, on the contrary, leads to diseases. The statement about equality of claims and the same truthfulness of warring parties’ rights is the originality of Hegel’s view. It makes absolutely impossible the war evaluation from the point of its justice and injustice. (shrink)

In “The Phenomenology of Spirit” and “Philosophy of Right”, Hegel gives a detailed specification of the theses about the war that were claimed in earlier papers and manuscripts, but his position is not fundamentally changed. In the “The Phenomenology of Spirit” Hegel advocates governments’ need and right to initiate a war from time to time in order to prevent both the isolation and atomization, and let individuals feel the death. As in the past, the war, as Hegel says, has a (...) moment of ethical life. In the “Philosophy of Right” Hegel introduces final deliberations about war that rely on ideas of his earlier paper about natural law even more than in the “The Phenomenology of Spirit”. Hegel emphasizes the ethical role of sacrifice in the war and expresses opinions critical of not an abstract perpetual peace but a concrete philosophical project of Kant. Due to Hegel, Kant’s perpetual peace does not resemble a perpetual deception, since the required union of states is elusive and none except the world spirit in the world history can be a praetor. In line with Heraclitus, Hegel maintains that wars underlie the nature of things. I contribute to the discussions of Hegel scholars if Hegel’s philosophy glorifies a war or not as follows: I substitute the term “glorification” with the term “bellicisme” that suits better to measured, not snobbish and deprived of certain historical implications Hegel’s theses about reasonableness, necessity, the ethicality of war and ethicality of perpetual peace illness. (shrink)

This chapter provides a brief history of Kantianism in Russia since the late eighteenth century and identifies the main themes of Kantianism in Russia. It considers the reasons for the uneven and intermittent spread of Kantianism, the main motives behind the fierce resistance to Kantianism within the framework of certain trends of Orthodox thought, and the ways in which this philosophical polemic was reflected in the Russian literature. The achievements of Russian Kantianism are analyzed with attention to both its undeniable (...) merits and its weaknesses and inconsistencies. In addition, the scope and scale of Russian Kantianism will be compared with Schellingism and Hegelianism in Russia. On the basis of this comparison, I will argue against the stereotype that Russian philosophy is resistant to Kant. (shrink)

The modern popularity of the Kantian definition of enlightenment often leads to a distorted notion that his understanding of enlightenment was dominant already during his lifetime, expressing the quintessence of all-European Enlightenment. This turns our attention away from entire layers of philosophical thought, since the Kantian definition of enlightenment in the late eighteenth century was neither the only one nor the preeminent one. The study of alternatives represented in the German philosophy of that period gives a deeper insight into the (...) originality of the Kantian approach with regard to both its merits and demerits. The presentation of the Kantian definition of enlightenment as the standard turns out to be a rather late historical phenomenon. Even Kant’s closest followers did not turn to his interpretation of enlightenment and, indeed, were sharply critical of the phenomenon as a banal and superficial one, opposed to faith. Further transformation of the views on the Enlightenment led to the emergence of the inauthentic terms of “Enlightenment” and Lumières applied post factum to the eighteenth-century philosophy in Europe. As a result, the essence of the enlightenment was defined not so much by the eighteenth-century Enlighteners as by historians and philosophers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who constructed a model notion of enlightenment against which philosophical figures were then compared. This approach ignored, first, the authentic definition of enlightenment (in Germany and Russia in the eighteenth century there were authentic terms “Aufklärung” and “prosveshcheniye”, and in France the proto-term “eclairé”) and, second, important national differences in the interpretation of the phenomenon. The emasculate Kantian definition of enlightenment used to legitimise the proposed approach. A closer look at the authentic view of eighteenth-century philosophers and a comparison of the Kantian approach to enlightenment with its alternatives that existed at the time might perhaps demonstrate that the philosophical and heuristic potential of the allegedly overcome and discredited Enlightenment is far from exhausted and is still relevant today. (shrink)

Russian occupation of Königsberg during the Seven Years’ War had a great impact on the residents of East Prussia capital. That time significantly changed the cultural city life, i.e. there was a release from narrow-mindedness and prejudices of the Protestant city that was influenced by Pietism; social mores were liberalized; in comparison with pre-war time the university started playing a more significant part, and the status of university professors rose. All these changes positively affected Kant’s life and his philosophical formation. (...) Because of the occupation Kant remained in contact with Prussian, Austrian, and Russian officers for many years, and made friends with a number of merchants. This influenced his position regarding the war, history understanding, and his assessment of Frederick the Great’s role and significance. (shrink)

Tolstoy’s literary works, as well as a number of events in his life, leave no doubt about the writer’s deep familiarity with law in both the theoretical and practical spheres. In his later years, t...

The life story of Kant’s student F. A. Hahnrieder (1765/6–1829) provides us with new examples of the application of the categorical imperative. Kant has given his opinion about that. The biography of Hahnrieder suggests that Kant has not always insisted on the uniqueness of the interpretation of the categorical imperative. He has also admitted other, “paradoxical”, “unusual”, but not “fantastic” interpretations. Kant has even respected a radical interpretation of the categorical imperative. On the base of the archive data, numerous mistakes (...) about Hahnrieder were corrected in biographies of Kant and in the Akademie-Ausgabe. (shrink)

The sources of Kant’s term Gesinnung and a review of the problems of its translation into English were presented in the first part of this article; the second part examines the novel features that Kant brings to the interpretation of this concept in the critical period. In the Critique of Practical Reason these include the questions of manifestation of Gesinnung in the world, apprehended through the senses, the method of establishing and the culture of truly moral Gesinnung, as well as (...) the problem of the immutability of Gesinnung in the progress towards the good. The new theses that appear in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason are Gesinnung as the internal subjective principle of maxims, on virtue as evidence of the presence of Gesinnung, on act as a manifestation of Gesinnung, on the unintelligibility of Gesinnung in its noumenal, suprasensible character, on the innateness of Gesinnung in the sense that it exists not in time, but in the form of its acceptance by free expression of the will, on the singleness of Gesinnung and its indivisibility into periods, on revolution in Gesinnung as distinct from empirical reform, on the creation of the new human being as distinct from the ancient one as a result of the revolution of Gesinnung, on the link between the revolution in Gesinnung and “conversion” or second birth. After discussing the problem of distinguishing the terms Gesinnung and Denkungsart in translation as well as a review of all the existing variants of translating Kant’s concept of Gesinnung into Russian, the author comes to the conclusion that the uniform variant umonastroenie is best suited for Russian translations of Kant’s works. (shrink)

After a year at Brandeis I was hired by MIT, and then I realized for the first time that there was a struggle and that I was on the losing end of it. The people there, particularly Judith Thomson, who is still at MIT, called Continental philosophy “stone-age philosophy,” and wouldn’t let me teach in the graduate program at all, because they thought that it would just corrupt the students and waste their time. I did feel a little unhappy because (...) I wasn’t allowed to teach graduate students, but not very, because I had never taught graduate students, so I didn’t think I had to, and I was still feeling grateful that I could teach philosophy anywhere at all. And I had Todes to talk to, and he was writing his brilliant thesis. (shrink)

Aphoristic work on Vedanta philosophy; critical edition with commentary and supercommentaries.

Classical work on Advaita Vedanta philosophy; includes commentaries in Hindi and Sanskrit.

Compiled by scholars at the court of Liu An, king of Huainan, in the second century B.C.E, _The Huainanzi_ is a tightly organized, sophisticated articulation of Western Han philosophy and statecraft. Outlining "all that a modern monarch needs to know," the text emphasizes rigorous self-cultivation and mental discipline, brilliantly synthesizing for readers past and present the full spectrum of early Chinese thought. _The Huainanzi_ locates the key to successful rule in a balance of broad knowledge, diligent application, and the penetrating (...) wisdom of a sage. It is a unique and creative synthesis of Daoist classics, such as the _Laozi_ and the _Zhuangzi_; works associated with the Confucian tradition, such as the _Changes_, the _Odes_, and the _Documents_; and a wide range of other foundational philosophical and literary texts from the _Mozi_ to the _Hanfeizi_. The product of twelve years of scholarship, this remarkable translation preserves _The Huainanzi_'s special rhetorical features, such as parallel prose and verse, and showcases a compositional technique that conveys the work's powerful philosophical appeal. This path-breaking volume will have a transformative impact on the field of early Chinese intellectual history and will be of great interest to scholars and students alike. (shrink)

This book represents a first attempt, after the anti-communist Revolution of 1989, to investigate with analytical methods the reliability of the "official philosophy"in the ex-communist countries - the diamat. It is not a factual, historical or politological approach, but a conceptual analysis of two main topics: the "materialism" and the "dialectics". It is mainly focused on the Romanian case.

On Vedanta philosophy; includes translation in Malayalam.

Classical work, with Hindi and Sanskrit commentaries, on non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy.

Complete works of Śaṅkarācārya, Hindu philosopher; with commentary and Bengali translation.

Contributed articles on Śaṅkarācārya, Hindu philosophy, and religious life.