The process by which the genetically identical cell lineages of a multicellular organism acquire the propensity to express distinct arrays of gene products is among the most significant and fascinating questions in modern biology. Not surprisingly, this complex process requires control at several levels, each level providing a condition that is necessary but not sufficient for transcription to occur. Evidence suggests that one level of control concerns a region of DNA much larger than the transcription unit itself – the chromatin (...) domain. This domain must be in a specific chromatin conformation in order to permit transcription; other control mechanisms may be required to bring about overt transcription. A hypothesis concerning the nature of chromatin domains and the relationship between early replication and transcription potential is presented. (shrink)

When purged of its connection to libertarian forms of capitalism, Ayn Rand’s ethical “egoism” is not an implausible ethical theory. I argue (1) that Rand in fact fails to show the connection between her ethics and the political economy she has championed and (2) that in fact her ethics is at least as compatible with socialism as with capitalism.

When purged of its connection to libertarian forms of capitalism, Ayn Rand’s ethical “egoism” is not an implausible ethical theory. I argue that Rand in fact fails to show the connection between her ethics and the political economy she has championed and that in fact her ethics is at least as compatible with socialism as with capitalism.

But the dangers to abnormal discourse do not come from science or naturalistic philosophy. They come from the scarcity of food and from the secret police. Given leisure and libraries, the conversation which Plato began will not end in self‐objedification ‐ not because aspects of the world, or of human beings, escape being objects of scientific inquiry, but simply because free and leisured conversation generates abnormal discourse as the sparks fly upward.

But the dangers to abnormal discourse do not come from science or naturalistic philosophy. They come from the scarcity of food and from the secret police. Given leisure and libraries, the conversation which Plato began will not end in self‐objedification ‐ not because aspects of the world, or of human beings, escape being objects of scientific inquiry, but simply because free and leisured conversation generates abnormal discourse as the sparks fly upward (Rorty 1979, 389).

Gonzalo Munevar has recently suggested that a criterion for scientific success and scientific progress can be found in the ability of a culture to "get along better" with the help of that science, and that as a consequence there is much to be said in favor of a proliferationist approach to scientific methodology. I argue that there are severe constraints upon the possibility and desirability of proliferation even under these conditions. I offer some tentative suggestions for defining areas to which (...) the limited resources available for scientific research may be most constructively put. (shrink)

It is a remarkable fact that in the past ten years the Philosophical Index shows a mere handful of entries under the heading ‘poverty.’ This is remarkable because of the widespread interest found in the population in general and among philosophers in particular in the identification, analysis, and solution of moral and social problems, and the cultural consensus that poverty is just such a problem. Perhaps the lack of philosophical attention reflects the assumption that there is no conceptual problem with (...) ‘poverty': we all know pretty much what it is, we simply disagree about the principles which can legitmately be implemented to eliminate it. There is some evidence for this in the fact that literature on distributive justice abounds even where the literature on poverty is scarce, and discussions of related issues, such as famine, population ethics, etc., take for granted that the concept of poverty is not problematic. (shrink)

The “Why question” approach serves as a pedagogical tool to facilitate student comprehension of various forms of philosophical justification for motives, behavior, and values in arguments about cultural relativism. The author's approach focuses on two examples of justification arguments to examine and explain why and how people discover what their values are and to what extent this process is culturally relative. The first example in the model is from the perspective of the present state of Western culture and the second (...) example is derived from Inuit Eskimo culture. The philosophical significance of this approach and its application to lived examples allows students to recognize the difference between roots and causes in philosophical debates. Incorporating this approach into the classroom acquaints students with a range of legitimate forms of inquiry and equips them to situate their own philosophical inquiries within that range. (shrink)

Whatever is distributed must first be produced, and since the recipients are also the producers there will be constraints on distribution determined by productive necessity. Standard theories of distributive justice systematically ignore these constraints. In light of these considerations I define what it is that must be produced and how it must be distributed in order to assure continued production. Desert, equality, entitlement, and the other values normally associated with distributive justice must take a back seat to the need to (...) assure that there is anything to distribute at all. (shrink)

This is a collection of thirteen essays, most of which first appeared in the mid-1980s, though one dates from 1963 and one, presented in 1993, was first published in 2000. The essays have as their common thread Singer’s well-known commitment to a rational morality, but beyond that it is difficult to detect a theme or progression among them.

This paper offers a number of tips for teaching small philosophy classes (under twenty-five students). Some of these include using a horseshoe seating arrangement, replacing hand-raising with name cards, engaging in “real” Socratic dialogues, having students create a philosophical “Question of the Day”, and assigning students “Critical Response” papers.

Husserl and Contemporary Thought contains twelve essays that address certain key themes in Husserl's thought, each in some way confronting issues critical to the Husserlian project. The essays first appeared in the 1982 volume of Research in Phenornenology. The "contemporary thought" in the title should be understood in a limited sense as refer- ring to certain strains of thinking pursued in the present decade, build- ing however on past research. The volume shows several directions in which contemporary thinkers are taking (...) Husserlian phenomenology. The most common direction is through an evaluative contrast between Husserl's vision and the ideas of other philosophers, some of whom listened to Husserl but went their own ways. The second direction taken is represented in a series of current works by active phenomenol- ogists. Some of these essays - and here we have the greatest concentra- tion on a single theme - expand upon Husserl's analyses concerning the temporality of human experience. Other essays take up the threads of long-standing debates among Husserl scholars. I will treat each group of essays - on other philosophers, on time, and on topics other than time in turn, although the essays do not follow this order in the volume. (shrink)