A Critique of Localized Realism Abstract In an attempt to avert Laudan’s pessimistic induction, Worrall and Psillos introduce a narrower version of scientific realism. According to this version, which can be referred to as “localized realism”, realists need not accept every component in a successful theory. They are supposed only to accept those components that led to the theory’s empirical success. Consequently, realists can avoid believing in dubious entities like the caloric and ether. This paper examines and critiques localized realism. (...) It also scrutinizes Psillos’s historical study of the caloric theory of heat, which is intended to support localized realism. (shrink)

Hacking and other entity realists suggest a strategy to build scientific realism on a stronger foundation than inference to the best explanation. They argue that if beliefs in the existence of theoretical entities are derived from experimentation rather than theories, they can escape the antirealist's criticism and provide a stronger ground for realism. In this paper, an outline and a critique of entity realism are presented. It will be argued that entity realism cannot stand as a separate position from classical (...) realism. Thus, entity realism cannot avoid the problems facing classical realism.. (shrink)

Hacking and other entity realists suggest a strategy to build scientific realism on a stronger foundation than inference to the best explanation. They argue that if beliefs in the existence of theoretical entities are derived from experimentation rather than theories, they can escape the antirealist's criticism and provide a stronger ground for realism. In this paper, an outline and a critique of entity realism are presented. It will be argued that entity realism cannot stand as a separate position from classical (...) realism. Thus, entity realism cannot avoid the problems facing classical realism. (shrink)

This paper argues that conceptual factors are as important as empirical factors in theory acceptance. Coherence between a new theory that is assessed for acceptance and the existing (established) theories in the same domain is among such conceptual factors. For example, a new theory about spectroscopy that does not cohere with established theories of spectroscopy is unlikely to be accepted, even if it was supported by empirical considerations. It is argued that a new theory coheres with a group of established (...) theories when it shares important elements with these theories and contains no items that conflict with their central concepts and assumptions. (shrink)

Conceptual merits of a theory are important for its acceptance. According to the traditionally held view, theory acceptance depends mainly on empirical support or confirmation. This paper argues that a new theory has also to cohere with already accepted theories to be accepted. In other words, confirmation alone is insufficient for acceptance. Coherence, like simplicity and internal consistency, is a conceptual merit. Coherence between theories, according to this paper, consists in agreement on the main concepts and mutual support. That is, (...) two theories cohere with each other when they do not differ on the principal notions and assumptions and also provide support for each other. (shrink)