Dorian Gray pays a hefty price for years of sin and vice in this completely unabridged edition of The Picture of Dorian Gray.

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects (...) of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. (shrink)

I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance and non-ignorance, contrary to what the Standard View predicts, are not (...) modal in the sense that knowledge is. After responding to objections, I conclude by sketching an alternative account of ignorance centered on the notions of epistemic access and epistemic agency. (shrink)

This book presents an original thesis about the notion of sensory experience and of the mind’s architecture, which is grounded in current trends in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Presented in the form of a dialogue, the book explores some of the psychological and philosophical consequences that the author derives from his proposal.

Insofar as development implies economic growth, the term 'sustainable development' appears to some as a contradiction in terms. However, such conclusions still lack a thorough examination of the conceptual structure of the two terms between which there is a purported contradiction. In order to address this issue, the present paper scrutinises some of the assumptions which underwrite the ideologies of sustainability and of development. It is argued that there are key assumptions which both ideas have in common, and that sustainable (...) development is thus perfectly coherent on a conceptual level. It is alternatives which retain either term (such as 'sustainable degrowth') that are embroiled in paradox. The paper then examines two concepts for criticising the ideology of economic growth in other terms: dépense and conviviality. It is argued that the latter is preferable to the former for the purpose of developing post-sustainable critiques of growth. (shrink)

An individual's health, genetic, or environmental-exposure data, placed in an online repository, creates a valuable shared resource that can accelerate biomedical research and even open opportunities for crowd-sourcing discoveries by members of the public. But these data become “immortalized” in ways that may create lasting risk as well as benefit. Once shared on the Internet, the data are difficult or impossible to redact, and identities may be revealed by a process called data linkage, in which online data sets are matched (...) to each other. Reidentification, the process of associating an individual's name with data that were considered deidentified, poses risks such as insurance or employment discrimination, social stigma, and breach of the promises often made in informed-consent documents. At the same time, re-ID poses risks to researchers and indeed to the future of science, should re-ID end up undermining the trust and participation of potential research participants. The ethical challenges of online data sharing are heightened as so-called big data becomes an increasingly important research tool and driver of new research structures. Big data is shifting research to include large numbers of researchers and institutions as well as large numbers of participants providing diverse types of data, so the participants’ consent relationship is no longer with a person or even a research institution. In addition, consent is further transformed because big data analysis often begins with descriptive inquiry and generation of a hypothesis, and the research questions cannot be clearly defined at the outset and may be unforeseeable over the long term. In this article, we consider how expanded data sharing poses new challenges, illustrated by genomics and the transition to new models of consent. We draw on the experiences of participants in an open data platform—the Personal Genome Project—to allow study participants to contribute their voices to inform ethical consent practices and protocol reviews for big-data research. (shrink)

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s “lived body” theory, we argue for a shift towards a lived-experience and body-specific curriculum in South Africa. Such a curriculum would view learning as a lived, embodied, social and culturally contextualised field. Its central aim would be to draw the learner into a plane of consciousness conducive to being awakened to the act of learning through an attitude of full attention. We specifically use the term “body-specific” to imply, as opposed to a one-size-fits-all curriculum model, one in (...) which lived experience and the “body” form the conceptual basis on which the curriculum is built. Consequently, we reject the orthodox cognitive conception of the curriculum which views learning as a mental exercise oriented towards the acquisition of pre-designed knowledge that is “outer fixed” and “inner constructed”. In contrast, we propose that learning should be outwardly constructed through lived experience and inwardly fixed as knowledge develops against the pre-noetic background of the lived world. Underpinning this is the essentially Merleau-Pontian notion that the knowledge we hold originates from our relationships with this world that are embodied in experience, and our engagements within society and culture. The “inner” and “outer” shift in learning infers a switch from pure, disciplinary, homogeneous, expert-led, supply-driven, hierarchical, peer-reviewed and almost exclusively university-based learning to experience-based, applied, problem-centred, trans-disciplinary, heterogeneous, hybrid, demand-driven learning. In such a curriculum, the role of the teacher would be to focus on how the world arranges itself around the learner and to guide learners to see how the world reveals itself to them through their personal lived experience. (shrink)

This paper charts the journey that led to the author's discovery of phenomenology as a potential research methodology in the field of science education, and describes the impact on his own thinking and approach of his encounters with the work of Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Van Manen. Drawing on this theoretical framework, the author argues that, as a methodology for investigating scientific thinking in relation to life experience, learning and curriculum design, phenomenology not only provides a means of accessing (...) subjective knowing and pure perception, but is sufficiently rigorous and systematic to represent the lifeworld experiences of research participants with a high degree of accuracy. In the process, he highlights the uniqueness and value of phenomenology in relation to quantitative and other qualitative research methods. The aim of this paper is to inspire insight into the value in science education research of using a methodology that fosters a deeper understanding of both teachers’ and learners’ lived experience of the scientific world. The challenge to science specialists, whether educators or researchers, would be to shift their default mode of understanding from the object pole to the ego pole, from the physical object to the human subject, from the observable and measurable to the lived as the true source of human knowledge. (shrink)

Reconstruction is a central notion in Dewey’s account of inquiry and in his metaphilosophical commitments. In his work, Dewey made a call for reconstruction of philosophy, in the reconstruction of central notions of the discipline, like knowledge, logic, truth, the good, reason, and experience. Inquiry itself is reconstructive, according to Dewey, involving the transformation of an indeterminate situation into one which is determinate and understood. Dewey’s philosophical views should therefore be of interest to those taking part in the recent turn (...) towards revisionary philosophical methodologies, like conceptual engineering, explication, and amelioration. In light of the recent developments in revisionary methodologies, I aim to explore Dewey’s conception of concepts in relation to the conceptual engineering literature, suggesting that it provides a useful conception of concepts for conceptual engineering, and to suggest a Deweyan model of philosophical inquiry where concepts are the objects of inquiry. In both cases, I hope to show a productive interaction between Dewey’s ideas and contemporary discussions of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

A diferencia de las disciplinas en las que la reflexión sobre sí mismas no forma parte de ellas, en la filosofía, como lo testimonia la obra de filósofos pertenecientes a distintas épocas y tradiciones, desde Platón y Aristóteles hasta Wittgenstein o Husserl, esa reflexión ocupa una posición central. Dado que no existe un modo canónico de entender y practicar la filosofía, al menos uno que exceda el ámbito de una particular escuela o tradición, la reflexión sobre la propia disciplina resulta (...) ser más imperiosa que en otros ámbitos. Y lo es sobre todo en tiempos de crisis y de transformaciones, por lo que no es sorprendente que el siglo que acaba de finalizar, caracterizado justamente por una acumulación de cambios radicales o «giros», haya sido una época especialmente rica en producción metafilosófica. En el ámbito de la filosofía iberoamericana la filosofía de la filosofía ha tenido históricamente cierto número de manifestaciones, sobre todo en México a partir de la influencia de José Gaos. Actualmente, el cultivo de la problemática metafilosófica, signo de la madurez de una comunidad filosófica, está despertando un interés creciente entre filósofos iberoamericanos de distintas orientaciones. Con este volumen, cuyo objetivo es proporcionar una muestra variada y plural de la reflexión metafilosófica actual en español, se pretende asimismo estimular el desarrollo ulterior de este campo. (shrink)

In the present work are identified the main features of the algebraic structure with respect to the logical operations, of the set of all the quantum mechanical utterances for which can be specified a factual counterpart and factual rules for truth valuation. This structure is found not to be a lattice. It depends crucially on the spacetime features of the operations by which the observer prepares the studied states and performs measurements on them.

: This essay considers the implications of President George W. Bush's proposal for human embryonic stem cell research. Through the perspective of patent law, privacy, and informed consent, we elucidate the ongoing controversy about the moral standing of human embryonic stem cells and their derivatives and consider how the inconsistencies in the president's proposal will affect clinical practice and research.

A new integrated view on the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics is constructed. It is then proved that for superposition state vectors the theoretical quantum mechanical distribution for the momentum observable is devoid of operational definition, and hence cannot be the source of conditions of compatibility to be imposed upon a researched joint probability concept. A compatible joint probability concept is outlined.

In previous works we have established that the spacetime probabilistic organization of the quantum theory is determined by the spacetime characteristics of the operations by which the observer produces the objects to be studied (“states” of microsystems) and obtains qualifications of these. Guided by this first conclusion, we have then built a “general syntax of relativized conceptualization” where any description is explicitly and systematically referred to the two basic epistemic operations by which the conceptor introduces the object to be qualified (...) and then obtains qualifications of it. Inside this syntax there emerges a general typology of the relativized descriptions. Here we show that with respect to this typology the type of the predictive quantum mechanical descriptions acquires a precise definition. It appears that the quantum mechanical formalism has captured and has expressed directly in a mathematical language the most complex form in which can occur a first descriptional phase that lies universally at the bottom of any chain of conceptualization. The main features of the Hilbert-Dirac algorithms are decoded in terms of the general syntax of relativized conceptualization. This renders explicit the semantical contents of the quantum mechanical representations relating each one of these to its mathematical quantum mechanical expression. Basic insufficiencies are thus identified and, correlatively, false problems as well as answers to these, or guides toward answers. Globally the results obtained provide a basis for future attempts at a general mathematical representation of the processes of conceptualization. “Il pourrait, en effet, être dangereux pour l'avenir de la Physique qu'elle se contente trop facilement de purs formalismes, d'images floues et d'explications toutes verbales s'exprimant par des mots à signification imprécise”—Louis de Broglie,Certitudes et Incertitudes de la Science (Albin Michel, Paris, 1965). (shrink)

Bell's theorem is believed to establish that the quantum mechanical predictions do not generally admit a causal representation compatible with Einsten's principle of separability, thereby proving incompatibility between quantum mechanics and relativity. This interpretation is contested via two convergent approaches which lead to a sharp distinction between quantum nonseparability and violation of Einstein's theory of relativity.In a first approach we explicate from the quantum mechanical formalism a concept of “reflected dependence.” Founded on this concept, we produce a causal representation of (...) the quantum mechanical probability measure involved in Bell's proof, which is clearly separable in Einstein's sense, i.e., it does not involve supraluminal velocities, and nevertheless is “nonlocal” in Bell's sense. So Bell locality and Einstein separability aredistinct qualifications, and Bell nonlocality (or Bell nonseparability) and Einstein separability arenot incompatible. It is then proved explicitly that with respect to the mentioned representation Bell's derivation does not hold. So Bell's derivation does notestablish thatany Einstein-separable representation is incompatible with quantum mechanics. This first—negative—conclusion is asyntactic fact.The characteristics of the representation and of the reasoning involved in the mentioned counterexample to the usual interpretation of Bell's theorem suggest that the representation used—notwithstanding its ability to bring forth the specified syntactic fact—isnot factually true. Factual truth and syntactic properties also have to be radically distinguished in their turn. So, in a second approach, starting from de Broglie's initial relativistic model of a microsystem, a deeper, factually acceptable representation is constructed. The analyses leading to this second representation show that quantum mechanics does indeed involve basically a certain sort of nonseparability, called here de Broglie-Bohr quantum nonseparability. But the de Broglie-Bohr quantum nonseparability is shown to stem directly from the relativistic character of the considerations which led Louis de Broglie to the fundamental relation p = h/λ,thereby being essentially consistent with relativity. As to Einstein separability, it appears to be a still insufficiently specified conceptof which a future, improved specification, will probably be explicitly harmonizable with the de Broglie-Bohr quantum nonseparability.The ensemble of the conclusions obtained here brings forth a new concept of causality, a concept offolded, zigzag, reflexive causality, with respect to which the type of causality conceived of up to now appears as aparticular case of outstretched, one-way causality. The reflexive causality is found compatible with the results of Aspect's experiment, and it suggests new experiments.Considered globally, the conclusions obtained in the present work might convert the conceptual situation created by Bell's proof into a process of unification of quantum mechanics and relativity. (shrink)

A general representation of the processesof conceptualization, founded upon adescriptional mould drawn from fundamentalquantum mechanics, is outlined. The approach iscalled the method of relativizedconceptualization. This stresses that therepresentation is not researched as a ``neutralstatement of facts'' but, from the start on, asa method subjected to definitedescriptional aims, namely an a prioriexclusion of the emergence of false problems orparadoxes and of any gliding into relativism.The method is characterized by an explicit andsystematic relativization of each descriptionalstep, to all the descriptional elementsinvolved in (...) this step, namely: the epistemicaction by which the object-entity is generated,the object-entity itself, and the epistemicaction by which the object-entity is qualified.Successive steps which complexify progressivelya given initial description, form an unlimitedchain of cells of conceptualization wherethe very first cell, necessarily, is rooted in as yet strictly unconceptualizedphysical factuality while the subsequent cellsconsist of increasingly abstract descriptionsthat are connected hierarchically. The chainsinteract at nodes where they branch, thusgenerating an indefinitely evolving,complexifying web of relativizedconceptualization, free of ambiguities, andwhere each element stays under control.The method contains the positedassertion of a realism of which a definite sortof minimality follows then inside themethod. This generates a clear distinctionbetween illusory qualifications of``how-a-physical-entity-is-in-itself'', and models of this physical entity. Thereby aworked out connection with philosophicalthinking is incorporated in the method. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to initiate a new discipline, namely a formalized epistemological method drawn from the cognitive strategies practised in the most effective among the modern scientific disciplines, as well as from general philosophical thinking. Indeed, what is lacking in order to improve our knowledge and our domination of the modes which nowadays are available for the generation and communication of knowledge, thoroughly and rapidly and with precision and detail? It is a systematic explication of the epistemological (...) essence encrypted in the specialized languages and algorithms of the major modern scientific approaches, a systematic cross-referencing of the explicated results, and a final elaboration of a new coherent whole. Quantum mechanics, like a diver, can take us down to the level of the very first actions of our conceptualization of reality. And starting from there, it can induce an explicit understanding of certain fundamental features of the new scientific thinking. A formalized epistemology should not be mistaken for a crossdisciplinary or a multidisciplinary project. The latter projects are designed to offer to nonspecialists access to information, to results obtained inside specialized disciplines, as well as a certain understanding of these results; whereas a formalized epistemology should equip anyone with a framework for conceptualizing himself in whatever domain and direction he or she might choose. A formalized epistemology should not be mistaken either for an approach belonging to the modern cognitive sciences. These try to establish as neutrally as possible descriptions of how the human body-and-mind work spontaneously when knowledge is generated; whereas a method of conceptualization should establish what conceptual-operational deliberate procedures have to be applied in order to represent and to achieve processes of generation of knowledge optimized accordingly to any definite aims. This book addresses philosophers of science, physicists, mathematicians, logicians, computer scientists, researchers in cognitive sciences, and biologists, as well as any intellectual who is interested in scientific and philosophical thinking. (shrink)

The exact bearing of an important theorem proved by Wigner is established. The study brings out the fact that marginal conditions as well as mean conditions of a form currently required in joint probability attempts are in fact inadequate for the determination of a relevant concept of a joint probability. New vistas are thereby opened up.

In connection with my previous paper “Locality, Reflection, and Wave-Particle Duality” [Found. Phys. 17, 813 (1987)], in this paper I distinguish explicitly, in the locality problem, between assertions, deductively established results, interpretations, intuitions, and facts. This clarifies the structure of the problem.

In attempting to debunk moral realism through an appeal to evolutionary facts, debunkers face a series of problems, which we label the problems of scope, corrosiveness, and post‐hoc justification. To overcome these problems, debunkers must assume certain metaphysical or epistemological positions, or otherwise pre‐establish them. In doing so, they must assume or pre‐establish the very conclusion they seek in advancing the argument. This means that such debunking arguments either beg the question against the moral realist or are undermined as standalone (...) metaethical arguments. (shrink)

In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, (...) it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions, that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view. (shrink)

Many people think we should refrain from intervening in nature as much as possible. One of the main reasons for thinking this way is that the existence of nature is a net positive. However, population dynamics teaches us that most sentient animals who come into existence in nature die shortly thereafter, mostly in painful ways. Those who survive often suffer greatly due to natural causes. If sentient beings matter, this gives us reasons to intervene to prevent such harms. This counterintuitive (...) conclusion can be opposed by arguing that we should not care about nonhuman animals; that other values, such as the existence of certain ecosystemic relations or of untouched wild areas, count for more than the interests of sentient beings; or that intervention in nature cannot succeed. There are, however, strong reasons to reject these claims and to support significant intervention in nature for the sake of animals, despite our deep-rooted intuitions to the contrary. (shrink)

ABSTRACTColin Hay's constructivist institutionalism and Vivien A. Schmidt's discursive institutionalism are two recent attempts to theorize ideas as potential explanations of institutional change. This new attention to the causal role of ideas is welcome, but Hay and Schmidt do not take into consideration the constitutive and structural aspects of ideas. Instead they reduce ideas to properties of individual conscious minds, scanting the respects in which ideas are intersubjectively baked into the practices shared by individuals. This aspect of ideas—arguably, the institutional (...) side of ideas—is developed in post-structuralist thought, which therefore demands a place in ideational research. (shrink)

According to an influential view, when it comes to representing reality, some words are better suited for the job than others. This is elitism. There is reason to believe that the set of the best, or elite, words should not be redundant or arbitrary. However, we are often forced to choose between these two theoretical vices, especially in cases involving theories that seem to be mere notational variants. This is the riddle of redundancy: both redundancy and arbitrariness are vicious, but (...) there are cases in which one must be picked. Logical realists admit that there are some logical constants among the elite words. This leads to awkward questions, such as which among conjunction and disjunction is elite. In this paper, I show how the riddle of redundancy arises for logical realists, and offer a solution. This approach requires us to change how we represent negation. Instead of using some particular symbol, we represent negation by flipping formulae over the horizontal axis. (shrink)

The argument from species overlap has been widely used in the literature on animal ethics and speciesism. However, there has been much confusion regarding what the argument proves and what it does not prove, and regarding the views it challenges. This article intends to clarify these confusions, and to show that the name most often used for this argument (‘the argument from marginal cases’) reflects and reinforces these misunderstandings. The article claims that the argument questions not only those defences of (...) anthropocentrism that appeal to capacities believed to be typically human, but also those that appeal to special relations between humans. This means the scope of the argument is far wider than has been thought thus far. Finally, the article claims that, even if the argument cannot prove by itself that we should not disregard the interests of nonhuman animals, it provides us with strong reasons to do so, since the argument does prove that no defence of anthropocentrism appealing to non-definitional and testable criteria succeeds. (shrink)

This collection of more than two hundred of Nietzsche's letters offers a representative body of correspondence on subjects of main concern to him--philosophy, history, morals, music and literature. Also included are letters of biographical interest which, in Middleton's words, mark the stresses and turnings of his life. Among the addressees are Richard Wagner, Erwin Rohde, Jacob Burkhardt, Lou Salome, his mother, and his sister Elisabeth. The annihilating split in Nietzsche's personality that has been associated with his collapse on a street (...) in Turin in 1889 is described in a moving letter from Franz Overbeck which forms the Epilogue. Index. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The technocratic dimension of government—its reliance upon knowledge claims, usually in scientific guise—is of great importance if we wish to understand modern power and governance. In Power Without Knowledge: A Critique of Technocracy, Jeffrey Friedman investigates the often-overlooked question of the relationship between technocratic knowledge/power and ideas. Friedman’s contribution to our understanding of technocracy can therefore be read as a contribution to governmentality studies, one that introduces the possibility of adding normative solutions to this critical tradition.

This paper presents some of the most promising ways wild animals are currently being helped, as well as other ways of helping that may be implemented easily in the near future. They include measures to save animals affected by harmful weather events, wild animal vaccination programs, and projects aimed at reducing suffering among synanthropic animals. The paper then presents other ways of helping wild animals that, while noncontroversial, may reduce aggregate suffering at the ecosystem level. The paper argues that impracticability (...) and normative objections against reducing wild animal suffering fail against these ways of helping wild animals. (shrink)

The term “speciesism” has played a key role in debates about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals, yet little work has been dedicated to clarifying its meaning. Consequently, the concept remains poorly understood and is often employed in ways that might display a speciesist bias themselves. To address this problem, this article develops a definition of speciesism in terms of discrimination and argues in favor of its advantages over alternative accounts. After discussing the key desiderata for a definition of discrimination (...) in general and speciesism in particular, a wide and evaluative account of speciesism is presented. According to it, speciesism is unjustified consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. The article then discusses rival accounts, namely narrow and descriptive definitions of speciesism. The article argues that such accounts are problematic as they overly restrict the scope of phenomena that can be identified as speciesist and disrupt the continuity with other forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism. (shrink)