El presente artículo busca presentar los resultados de un estudio desarrollado entre los años 2011 y 2012 sobre las representaciones sociales y percepciones de los migrantes peruanos acerca de su proceso de integración en Santiago de Chile, particularmente respecto del acceso a los servicios públicos de educación, salud y vivienda. A partir de una metodología cualitativa, estos servicios son puestos bajo la mirada de los discursos de los migrantes peruanos, develando la discriminación de la que son objeto debido a su (...) procedencia nacional, así como otras formas de exclusión derivadas de su origen popular, y retratando a la ciudad de Santiago como un escenario receptor de flujos migratorios internacionales. (shrink)

El libro de Osvaldo Torres Gutiérrez, es un trabajo descriptivo, bien documentado y fundamentado en el uso de fuentes y bibliografía general y específica sobre el tema en cuestión, siendo uno de los aspectos más importantes las entrevistas realizadas a dirigentes de las dos organizaciones político revolucionarias que son el centro de su análisis.En las primeras líneas, el autor deja establecida la pregunta sobre la cual girará su trabajo, “por qué dos organizaciones de la izquierda revolucion..

One important limitation of the current renditions of interpretivism is that its emphasis on the moral dimension of sport has overlooked the aesthetic dimension lying at the core of this account of sport. The interpretivist’s failure to acknowledge and consider the aesthetic implicitly distances this realm from the moral. Marcia Muelder Eaton calls this distancing the separatist mistake. This paper argues that interpretivism presupposes not only moral but also aesthetic principles and values. What it sets out to demonstrate is that (...) interpretivism is an integralist, or nonseparatist, account of sport, one in which ethical and aesthetic values are not exclusive. Making explicit and specifying interpretivism’s combined moral-aesthetic approach to sport not only helps to better distinguish the whole range of values that make up sport as well as their interconnection but also encourages sportspeople to pursue more coherent sport and, thus, more enriching lives. (shrink)

A commonly held idea regarding the nature of time is that the future is open and the past is fixed or closed. This article investigates the notion that there is an asymmetry in openness between the past and the future. The following questions are considered: How exactly is this asymmetry in openness to be understood? What is the relation between an open future and various ontological views about the future? Is an open future a branching future? What is the relation (...) between an open future and the question of whether contingent statements about the future are true or false? Is an open future compatible with a single determinate future? (shrink)

This article provides a comprehensive review of the rather intricate relationship between contemporary environmental ethics, understood as a philosophical branch, and ancient philosophy. While its primary focus is on Western philosophy, it also includes some brief yet crucial considerations about the influence of Eastern traditions of thought on environmental ethics. Aside from the introduction in the first section, the discussion is organised into three main sections. In the Reception: Ancient philosophy in environmental ethics section, I review the initial reception of (...) ancient philosophy in contemporary environmental ethics. Next, in the Reaction: Environmental ethics in ancient philosophy scholarship section, I examine how the scholarship in AP responded to this early reception. I conclude, in the final section, with some constructive suggestions for future research. (shrink)

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

Many of the social deprivations of Mexico will be worsened due to the SARSCOV2 pandemic. Namely, the insufficient access to public health, lack of labor rights, and the unsuccessful government’s response to eradicate male violence against women. The historical unconcern in promoting a culture rooted in mutual aid and self-care has provoked many citizens are disconnected from their social and health rights. Thus, people’s inability to carry through one direction –stay home- is unfulfilled, in part, due to structural inequalities. I (...) affirm that effective liberty could be obtained by approving a Universal Basic Income from a feminist perspective. I conclude that the aftermath of COVID-19, which will define everyday life for a while, require the endorsement of such measure. Likewise, women as a class deserve protection from a feminist critical framework. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

Presents opposing viewpoints on various ethical, moral, legal, and medical issues concerning euthanasia.

In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...) for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences. (shrink)

In this chapter I will present, in a general way, Millikan's biosemantic theory of the phenomenon of intentionality. For this purpose, the text will take the following path. First, I will present the problem of intentionality and an overview of the dominant theories of intentional content during the twentieth century and part of the twenty-first century. Then, I will present a general version of Millikan's biosemantic theory, appearing in 1984, which will allow us to see what the relevance and originality (...) of his proposal consists in. Finally, in keeping with one of the central purposes of Las filósofas que nos formaron, I will share a brief interview that Millikan very kindly agreed to give for this publication, in which she tells us some non-theoretical aspects of her history as a philosopher. (shrink)

It is common in contemporary sport to liken the notion of the team to that of the family. That is, the family is used to evoke team life. Portraying the team as a family usually implies a positive evaluation. Despite its prevalence, the team as a family equation has not been analyzed in the sport philosophy literature. Thus, the purpose of this article is twofold. First, it explores whether the team is to be equated with the family. To discuss the (...) nature of the family and the team, I draw together the work of several sport philosophers with that of Laura Wildemann Kane. Second, and considering what characterizes the team, this article investigates whether teammates have special responsibilities to one another by virtue of their relationship and the value attached to it. I propose that the team as a family equation does not align with the constitution of these two social groups and that teammates have special responsibilities to one another, but such responsibilities are different from those observed in the family. (shrink)

I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations (...) of the self-ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. I argue that a self-ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self-ascription of relations rather than properties. I argue that whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary personstage or an enduring person, the self-ascription theory provides a plausible B-theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible. (shrink)

This paper presents a method for investigating counterfactual histories of science. A central notion to our theory of science are "advances" (ideas, data, etc.), which are units passed among scientists and which would be conserved in passing from one possible history to another. Advances are connected to each other by nets of causal influence, and we distinguish strong and weak influences. Around sixty types of advances are grouped into ten classes. As our case study, we examine the beginning of the (...) Old Quantum Theory, using a computer to store and process historical information. We describe four plausible possible histories, along with six other implausible ones. (shrink)

When do objects at different times compose a further object? This is the question of diachronic composition. The universalist answers, ‘under any conditions whatsoever’. Others argue for restrictions on diachronic composition: composition occurs only when certain conditions are met. Recently, some philosophers have argued that restrictions on diachronic compositions are motivated by our best physical theories. In Persistence and Spacetime and elsewhere, Yuri Balashov argues that diachronic compositions are restricted in terms of causal connections between object stages. In a recent (...) article, Nikk Effingham argues that the standard objections to views that endorse restrictions on composition do not apply to a view that restricts composition according to compliance with the laws of nature. On the face of it, such restrictions on diachronic composition preserve our common-sense ontology while eliminating from it scientifically revisionary objects that travel faster than the speed of light. I argue that these attempts to restrict diachronic composition by appealing to either causal or nomological constraints face insurmountable difficulties within the context of special relativity. I discuss how the universalist should best respond to Hudson’s argument for superluminal objects, and in doing so, I present and defend a new sufficient condition for motion that does not entail that such objects are in superluminal motion. 1 Introduction2 Diachronic Composition3 Diachronic Composition and Superluminal Objects4 Restricting Diachronic Composition5 Causal and Nomological Restrictions on Composition in a Relativistic Context6 Superluminal Objects and Motion7 Conclusion. (shrink)

In Philosophy, it is well known that of the total faculty population, the proportion of women is significantly lower than men. This disproportion is odd for a discipline within the humanities; these numbers seem more compatible with what is found in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) careers. These proportions are in turn a product of the low female presence that exists from the previous levels of academic training in philosophy. What happens in the case of the philosophy student body? For (...) example, the report presented by BeeBee and Saul (2011), on women in philosophy in the United Kingdom, in the period 2008 and 2009, points out that in the first degrees of academic training, in the bachelor's degree, women occupy 45% of the student population, in the master's degree 38% and in the doctorate 35%. Thus, "it is notable that there is a reduction in the proportion of women from the bachelor's degree to the doctorate [...]. This has as a consequence that at the professional level women holding positions as professors represent only 19%" (BeeBee & Saul, 2011, p. 11). Recently, Torres González (2018), based on European Union studies, points out that in Spain, with respect to gender disparity in students, "the data yield as a result masculinized studies, where, contrary to what happens in the branch of the humanities to which it [philosophy] belongs, males outnumber females by 28 percentage points" (2018, p. 328). This disparity is reflected in philosophy at the professional level, "the indicators of vertical segregation show a reinforced glass ceiling, which presents one of the worst data of hierarchical discrimination in the university: the percentage of female professors in philosophy is 12% compared to 21% of female professors in higher education" (Idem). Although it is a fact that there are fewer women than men studying philosophy and, therefore, fewer women than men working professionally in this discipline, we do not yet have possible explanations for this phenomenon of gender disparity in the student body in philosophy. In some cases, even if the number of women entering the philosophy degree program is already low, the number of women graduating is even lower, which indicates that there is attrition along the way; the initial numbers of women entering the program tend to decrease by the time they graduate. Thus we come to the question that is the subject of this paper: What causes female students to drop out of the philosophy program? In this article we answer this question from the philosophy of science and supported by local empirical data, so we do not give a complete or even less exhaustive answer. We review two explanatory models that purport to answer the question of why there are fewer women in philosophy, both formatively and professionally. These are the Different Voices Model (DVM) and the Perfect Storm Model (PSM); we opt for the latter and give reasons for it. Regarding the empirical aspect of our research, our source of statistical data belongs to the undergraduate program in philosophy at the Facultad de Estudios Superiores Acatlán-UNAM, Mexico (FES Acatlán), obtained in the framework of the SWIP-Analytic Mexico workshops. Our analysis of these data shows that even when female students have better GPAs than male students and take fewer subjects while enrolled, female students graduate less than male students in the FES Acatlan degree program. (shrink)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...) argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se problematiza un aspecto de la crónica modernista: su compilación y publicación en ediciones críticas. Se revisa el caso de tres libros de autores centroamericanos que aparecieron, originalmente, en publicaciones periódicas: La vida de Rubén Darío Escrita por él mismo (1915), de Rubén Darío; Sensaciones de París y de Madrid (1900), de Enrique Gómez Carrillo; y El libro del trópico (1907), de Arturo Ambrogi. Las tres obras ofrecen particularidades que las convierten en modelos diferentes de un (...) mismo problema filológico, por lo que evidencian lo provechoso que sería para el proceso de lectura de un receptor de hoy, acceder a un texto anotado y editado críticamente. (shrink)

Este libro recoge una veintena de estudios que, desde el punto de vista de la teoría social abordan aspectos variados de la Globalización, el Riesgo y la Reflexividad, considerados como los retos fundamentales con los que ha de enfrentarse la sociología actual.

Este libro recoge una veintena de estudios que, desde el punto de vista de la teoría social abordan aspectos variados de la Globalización, el Riesgo y la Reflexividad, considerados como los retos fundamentales con los que ha de enfrentarse la sociología actual.

This paper explores the challenges posed by the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence specifically Large Language Models (LLMs). I show that traditional linguistic theories and corpus studies are being outpaced by LLMs’ computational sophistication and low perplexity levels. In order to address these challenges, I suggest a focus on language as a cognitive tool shaped by embodied-environmental imperatives in the context of Agentive Cognitive Construction Grammar. To that end, I introduce an Embodied Human Language Model (EHLM), inspired by Active Inference (...) research, as a promising alternative that integrates sensory input, embodied representations, and adaptive strategies for contextualized analysis and conceptual utility maximization. By incorporating Active Inference, which sees perception as inferring the world's state from sensory data, the findings reveal that the characterization of the English modal be able to, as a triadic construction encoding biological intelligent agency, introduces a more plausible theoretical basis for the positing of linguistic constructions. This emphasizes the crucial role of embodied human language models in the comprehension of how humans construct preferred futures through language. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:The present article reassesses Aristotle's views on the relationship between ethical character and the natural environment. The standard reading, to the effect that Aristotle endorsed environmental determinism, is rejected. The discussion invites a more careful examination of Aristotelian texts commonly adduced to support the orthodox reading, while also providing a clear account of what environmental determinism is. I argue that the textual evidence presented by defenders of the standard reading does not match that account. All in all, I conclude, we (...) are not authorized to invoke Aristotle's views on the relationship between natural environment and human beings in order to discredit his ethical and political project. (shrink)

Focusing on the relation between Freud and Nietzsche, the paper aims at pointing to an alternative path to the displacement of subjectivity among the moderns. Nietzschean notions of instinct and sublimation, which are among the central tenets of his critique of culture and modernity, could be the starting point for a productive discussion with psychoanalysis.

Após apresentar, em linhas gerais, a abordagem dos modelos causais em história da ciência, define-se a noção de “avanço” como uma manifestação cultural de natureza cognitiva ou, na linguagem da biologia evolutiva, como um “meme” cognitivo. Discute-se até que ponto tais avanços podem ser considerados verdadeiras “unidades”, e discorre-se sobre a noção problemática de “unidades que se conservariam na passagem de uma história possível para outra”. Comentários são feitos sobre a distinção entre a definição de um avanço e seu grau (...) de aceitação e, por fim, sobre a plausibilidade de considerar que (em primeira aproximação) o significado de um avanço não se modifica com a evolução da ciência. No apêndice, descreve-se a classificação de avanços em sessenta tipos, distribuídos em dez classes. Palavras-chave: Mudança científica, história da ciência, modelos causais, unidade de conhecimento, avanço, meme. (shrink)

The situation of childhood and the adolescence in the Republic of Argentina as object of social politics is discussed from a clinical point of view. This matter seems to be connected to the problems of (personal) security, sometimes mingling the barrier that separates this from the way Justice fu..

There are different ways in which imaginings can involve the first-person. I can imagine skiing down a mountain, looking down the slope, the wind whipping me in the face. I can also imagine myself skiing down a mountain from the outside, adopting the point of view of a spectator watching myself fly down the mountain. I can also imagine that I am someone else entirely, say Angela Merkel, skiing down a mountain. In this paper I develop and defend a new (...) account of the content of first-person imaginings. I first look at two existing accounts, one proposed by Francois Recanati (2007a, 2007b) and the other proposed by Dilip Ninan (2008), and I argue that they lack the resources to model the rich and distinct types of first-person imaginings that we can have. I then present and defend a new account that reconstrues the imagining from the inside vs. imagining from the outside distinction and can accommodate the various ways in which imaginings involve the first-person. (shrink)

Opdagelsen af det ubevidste skete som bekendt inden for rammerne af Freuds tera­peutiske erfaring. Dets udforskning viste imidlertid, at følgerne af denne opdagelse var betydeligt mere omfattende end han først antog.

The main topics of this thesis are cardinal invariants, P -points and MAD families. Cardinal invariants of the continuum are cardinal numbers that are bigger than $\aleph _{0}$ and smaller or equal than $\mathfrak {c}.$ Of course, they are only interesting when they have some combinatorial or topological definition. An almost disjoint family is a family of infinite subsets of $\omega $ such that the intersection of any two of its elements is finite. A MAD family is a maximal almost (...) disjoint family. An ultrafilter $\mathcal {U}$ on $\omega $ is called a P-point if every countable $\mathcal {B\subseteq U}$ there is $X\in $ $\mathcal {U}$ such that $X\setminus B$ is finite for every $B\in \mathcal {B}.$ This kind of ultrafilters has been extensively studied, however there is still a large number of open questions about them.In the preliminaries we recall the principal properties of filters, ultrafilters, ideals, MAD families and cardinal invariants of the continuum. We present the construction of Shelah, Mildenberger, Raghavan, and Steprāns of a completely separable MAD family under $\mathfrak {s\leq a}.$ None of the results in this chapter are due to the author.The second chapter is dedicated to a principle of Sierpiński. The principle $\left $ of Sierpiński is the following statement: There is a family of functions $\left \{ \varphi _{n}:\omega _{1}\longrightarrow \omega _{1}\mid n\in \omega \right \} $ such that for every $I\in \left [ \omega _{1}\right ] ^{\omega _{1}}$ there is $n\in \omega $ for which $\varphi _{n}\left [ I\right ] =\omega _{1}.$ This principle was recently studied by Arnie Miller. He showed that this principle is equivalent to the following statement: There is a set $X=\left \{ f_{\alpha }\mid \alpha \alpha $ then $f_{\beta }\cap g$ is infinite. Miller showed that the principle of Sierpiński implies that non $\left =\omega _{1}.$ He asked if the converse was true, i.e., does non $\left =\omega _{1}$ imply the principle $\left $ of Sierpiński? We answer his question affirmatively. In other words, we show that non $\left =\omega _{1}$ is enough to construct an $\mathcal {IE}$ -Luzin set. It is not hard to see that the $\mathcal {IE}$ -Luzin set we constructed is meager. This is no coincidence, because with the aid of an inaccessible cardinal, we construct a model where non $\left =\omega _{1}$ and every $\mathcal {IE}$ -Luzin set is meager.The third chapter is dedicated to a conjecture of Hrušák. Michael Hrušák conjectured the following: Every Borel cardinal invariant is either at most non $\left $ or at least cov $\left $. Although the veracity of this conjecture is still an open problem, we were able to obtain some partial results: The conjecture is false for “Borel invariants of $\omega _{1}^{\omega }$ ” nevertheless, it is true for a large class of definable invariants. This is part of a joint work with Michael Hrušák and Jindřich Zapletal.In the fourth chapter we present a survey on destructibility of ideals and MAD families. We prove several classic theorems, but we also prove some new results. For example, we show that every almost disjoint family of size less than $\mathfrak {c}$ can be extended to a Cohen indestructible MAD family is equivalent to $\mathfrak {b=c}$. A MAD family $\mathcal {A}$ is Shelah–Steprāns if for every $X\subseteq \left [ \omega \right ] ^{<\omega }\setminus \left \{ \emptyset \right \} $ either there is $A\in \mathcal {I}\left $ such that $s\cap A\neq \emptyset $ for every $s\in X$ or there is $B\in \mathcal {I}\left $ that contains infinitely many elements of X $ denotes the ideal generated by $\mathcal {A}$ ). This concept was introduced by Raghavan which is connected to the notion of “strongly separable” introduced by Shelah and Steprāns. We prove that Shelah–Steprāns MAD families have very strong indestructibility properties: Shelah–Steprāns MAD families are indestructible for “many” definable forcings that does not add dominating reals. According to the author’s best knowledge, this is the strongest notion that has been considered in the literature so far. In spite of their strong indestructibility, Shelah–Steprāns MAD families can be destroyed by a ccc forcing that does not add unsplit or dominating reals. We also consider some strong combinatorial properties of MAD families and show the relationships between them.The fifth chapter is one of the most important chapters in the thesis. A MAD family $\mathcal {A}$ is called $+$ -Ramsey if every tree that branches into $\mathcal {I}\left $ -positive sets has an $\mathcal {I}\left $ -positive branch. Michael Hrušák’s first published question is the following: Is there a $+$ -Ramsey MAD family? It was previously known that such families can consistently exist. However, there was no construction of such families using only the axioms of ZFC. We solve this problem by constructing such a family without any extra assumptions.In the fourth and fifth chapters, we introduce several notions of MAD families, in the sixth chapter we prove several implications and non implications between them. We construct several MAD families with different properties.In the seventh chapter we build models without P -points. We show that there are no P -points after adding Silver reals either iteratively or by the side by side product. These results have some important consequences: The first one is that is its possible to get rid of P -points using only definable forcings. This answers a question of Michael Hrušák. We can also use our results to build models with no P -points and with arbitrarily large continuum, which was also an open question. These results were obtained with David Chodounský.prepared by Osvaldo Guzmán GonzálezE-mail : [email protected] : https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.09680. (shrink)

The principle of Sierpinski is the assertion that there is a family of functions $\left\{ {{\varphi _n}:{\omega _1} \to {\omega _1}|n \in \omega } \right\}$ such that for every $I \in {[{\omega _1}]^{{\omega _1}}}$ there is n ε ω such that ${\varphi _n}[I] = {\omega _1}$. We prove that this principle holds if there is a nonmeager set of size ω1 answering question of Arnold W. Miller. Combining our result with a theorem of Miller it then follows that is equivalent (...) to $non\left = {\omega _1}$. Miller also proved that the principle of Sierpinki is equivalent to the existence of a weak version of a Luzin set, we will construct a model where all of these sets are meager yet $non\left = {\omega _1}$. (shrink)

En las pocas ocasiones en que Kant aborda el tema de la verdad, lo suele hacer en función de los problemas implicados en la definición nominal de verdad y en la búsqueda de un criterio de verdad. El objetivo de este trabajo es ofrecer una visión sinóptica del modo en que Kant plantea estas dos cuestiones. En la primera sección del trabajo se aborda el tema de la definición de la verdad. Primero explico qué es una definición y qué implica (...) esto para el caso de la verdad. Tras esto, expongo las consecuencias y problemas que Kant extrae al respecto. En la segunda sección del trabajo se desarrolla el tema del criterio de verdad. Para comenzar expongo las expectativas de Kant respecto de dicho criterio y los límites con que se encuentra. Tras esto ofrezco una clasificación y explicación de los criterios de verdad que menciona a lo largo de su obra. (shrink)