There is a simple, intuitive theory of the semantic reference of proper names that has been unjustly neglected. This is the view that semantic reference is conventionalized speakers reference, i.e. the view that a name semantically refers to an object if, and only if, there exists a convention to use the name to speaker-refer to that object. The theory can be found in works dealing primarily with other issues (e.g. Stine in Philos Stud 33:319–337, 1977; Schiffer in Erkenntnis 13:171–206, (...) 1978; Sainsbury in Erkenntnis 80:195–214, 2015; Sainsbury, Thinking about things, Oxford University Press, 2018), yet these authors provide no sustained discussion of it. Devitt (Designation, Columbia University Press, 1981) did formulate a view on which semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference, yet his views are assimilated to causalist views. This is a mistake. While the conventionalized speaker’s reference view captures much of what is plausible in descriptivism and causalism, it remains distinct from both. (shrink)

It is argued that the principles of classical physics are inimical to the development of a satisfactory science of consciousness The problem is that insofar as the classical principles are valid consciousness can have no e ect on the behavior and hence on the survival prospects of the organisms in which it inheres Thus within the classical framework it is not possible to explain in natural terms the development of consciousness to the high level form found in human beings (...) In quantum theory on the other hand consciousness can be dynamically e cacious quantum the ory does allows consciousness to in uence behavior and thence to evolve in accordance with the principles of natural selection However this evo lutionary requirement places important constraints upon the details of the formulation of the quantum dynamical principles.. (shrink)

A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations that have been offered for it. Toward the end, a proposal about moral obligation according to which something like a restricted version of 'Ought' Implies 'Can' is true is floated. (...) Though no full-fledged argument for this proposal is offered, that it fits with a rather natural and intuitive picture of the structure of morality and seems to explain certain salient features of the debate over whether the principle is true, goes some way toward recommending it. (shrink)

In this follow up to The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, Peter L. P. Simpson centers his attention on the basics of Aristotelian moral doctrine as found in the Great Ethics: the definition of happiness, the nature and kind of the virtues, pleasure, and friendship. This work's authenticity is disputed, but Simpson argues that all the evidence favors it. Unlike the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle wrote the Great Ethics for a popular audience. It gives us insight less into Aristotle (...) the theoretician than into Aristotle the pedagogue. For this reason, the Great Ethics has distinct advantages as an introduction to Aristotelian ethical thinking: it is simpler and clearer in its argumentation, matters such as the intellectual virtues are made suitably secondary to the practical focus, the moral virtues come through with a pleasing directness, and the work's syllogistic formalism gives it a transparency and accessibility that the other Ethics typically lack. Arius' Epitome, which relies heavily on this work, helps confirm its value and authenticity. Because the Great Ethics is generally neglected by scholars, less has been done to clear up its obscurities or to expose its structure. But to ignore it is to lose another and more instructive way of approaching and appreciating Aristotle's teaching. The translation is prefaced by an analytic outline of the whole, and the several sections of it are prefaced by brief summaries. The commentary supplies fuller descriptions and analyses, sorting out puzzles, removing misunderstandings, and resolving doubts of meaning and intention. This book is a fresh rendition of the work of the preeminent philosopher of all time. (shrink)

Distributive, procedural, and interactional justice are constructs that are increasingly being recognized as important factors that affect individual perceptions in the workplace environment. This paper presents a theoretical perspective that suggests that justice is perceived through a subjective lens that consists of individualized beliefs and proposes that cultural attributes and demographic characteristics play an integral part in determining the perception of justice. The distinctions between these three constructs are presented in context with the core beliefs of individual employees – affected (...) by a multitude of perceptual and demographic factors that we briefly identify herein. Based on the theoretical perspective, an instrument that measures the constructs of justice as perceived by individuals was developed. With a focus on justice within the business setting, hypotheses about attitudes related to justice were tested. Survey results confirm that the three constructs of justice are distinct but correlated. Significant differences were found in the perceptions of African-American respondents with regard to procedural justice. Although the empirical findings do not support all the hypotheses, this research highlights the need for further development of measures to assess the perception of justice in business settings and at an applied level, underscores the importance of recognizing cultural attributes and demographic characteristics in understanding how justice is perceived. (shrink)

This paper explores the philosophical aspects of the "Great Introduction" of Abū Ma'šar, one of the great figures of Arabic astrology and an associate of al-Kindī, the great 9th century philosopher. I argue that the following points of philosophical interest may be found in this text: 1. Astrology is described as a "master science" along the lines proposed by Aristotle, i.e. it provides principles for lower sciences. Also he supplies arguments to ground astrology on methodological grounds, such as the (...) use of empirical evidence and testimony. 2. Abū Ma'šar broadly follows al-Kindī's explanation of how the stars influence the sublunary world, by heating the elements. This agrees with al-Kindī's work "On the Proximate Agent Cause of Generation and Corruption," and I identify some parallels between the two works. 3. Finally, Abū Ma'šarr considers whether human freedom is compatible with this causal account. He holds that human actions do fall under the class of the "possible" and not the "necessary," but only because for him the "possible" is what happens sometimes, not always. Thus he seems tacitly to hold that genuine choice is compatible with causal necessitation. (shrink)

An instrument to assess 'ethical sensitivity' has been developed. The instrument presents four clinical vignettes and the respondent is asked to list the ethical issues related to each vignette. The responses are classified, post hoc, into the domains of autonomy, beneficence and justice. This instrument was used in 1990 to assess the ethical sensitivity of students in all four medical classes at the University of Toronto. Ethical sensitivity, as measured by this instrument, is not related to age or grade-point average. (...) Sensitivity increases between the 1st and 2nd year and then decreases throughout the rest of undergraduate medical training, such that the 4th-year students identify fewer issues than those entering medical school. Students expressing a career choice of family medicine identify more issues than their peers. Several problems with the use of the instrument and the interpretation of the data were found. Nonetheless, these findings, if reproducible, are important and their meaning needs further discussion. (shrink)

In recent years philosophers have given much attention to the ‘ontological problem’ of events. Donald Davidson puts the matter thus: ‘the assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our common talk; or so, at any rate, I have been arguing. I do not know of any better, or further, way of showing what there is’. It might be thought bizarre to assign to philosophers the task of ‘showing what (...) there is’. They have not distinguished themselves by the discovery of new elements, new species or new continents, nor even of new categories, although there has often been more dreamt of in their philosophies than can be found in heaven or earth. It might appear even stranger to think that one can show what there actually is by arguing that the existence of something needs to be assumed in order for certain sentences to make sense. More than anything, the sober reader will doubtlessly be amazed that we need to assume, after lengthy argument, ‘that there are events’. (shrink)

1. Naturalism Naturalism, it has been said, is the distinctive development in philosophy over the last thirty years. There has been a naturalistic turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception of philosophy as continuous with natural science. The doctrine has been extensively discussed and has won considerable following in the USA. This is, on the whole, not true of Britain and continental Europe, where the pragmatist tradition never took root, and the temptations of scientism (...) in philosophy were less alluring. Contemporary American naturalism originates in the writings of Quine, the metaphysician of twentieth-century science. With extraordinary panache, he painted a largescale picture of human nature, of language and of the web of belief. I believe that in almost every major respect, it is, like the picture painted by Descartes, the great metaphysician of seventeenth-century science, mistaken. But it evidently appeals to the spirit of the times. So it is worthy of critical examination and careful refutation. I shall argue that the naturalistic turn is a cul-de-sac – a turn that is to be passed by if we are to keep to the highroad of good sense. Naturalism, like so many of Quine’s doctrines, was propounded in response to Carnap. As Quine understood matters, Carnap had been persuaded by Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External World that it is the task of philosophy to demonstrate that our knowledge of the external world is a logical construction out of, and hence can be reduced to, elementary experiences. Quine rejected the reductionism of Carnap’s Logischer Aufbau, and found the idealist basis uncongenial to his own dogmatic realist behaviourism, inspired by Watson and later reinforced by Skinner. The rejection of reductionism and ‘unregenerate realism’, Quine averred, were the sources of his naturalism (FME 72). What exactly was this? We can distinguish in Quine between three different but inter-related programmes for future philosophy: epistemological, ontological and philosophical naturalism. Naturalized epistemology is to displace traditional epistemology, transforming the investigation into ‘an enterprise within natural science’ (NNK 68) – a psychological enterprise of investigating how the ‘input’ of radiation, etc., impinging on the nerve endings of human beings can ‘ultimately’ result in an ‘output’ of our theoretical descriptions of the external world.. (shrink)

The conception of “prospective potency” was defined by its author H.Driesch as “the sum of the possible modes of development of a given part of the embryo”. However, in the language of science the word “potency” usually means “power”, not “possibility”. Therefore this conception from the beginning possessed a certain ambiguity, that it retained up to the present. The distinction of “active” and “passive” potency, introduced by Roux, has found no general acceptance. It appeared necessary to submit the conception (...) of “potency” to a profound analysis. In the first place it is shown, that the ambiguity of this conception vanishes, if we understand by the word “potency” those fundamental properties of the embryonic material, that are responsible for its various developmental possibilities. We can distinguish among these properties the “reactive powers”, by which the embryonic material reacts to inductive stimulations, and its own “developmental tendencies”. These faculties only differ by their strength; a “reactive power” may change into a “tendency”, when its intensity increases during development; conversely, a “tendency” may change into a mere “reactive power” by a decrease of its strength. The determination of the material results from the conflict of its tendencies. The inductive actions interfere by strengthening or weakening different tendencies, and by activating new tendencies by reinforcement of the “reactive powers” of the embryonic material.La conception de „prospektive Potenz” fut définie par son auteur H.Driesch comme „l'ensemble des modes de développement possibles d'une certaine partie de l'embryon”. Cependant, le, mot „Potenz” dans le langage de la science répond plutôt à la „puissance” qu'à la „possibilité”. De là résulte, que cette conception dès son origine avait une certaine ambiguïté, qui se fait sentir jusqu'à présent. La distinction entre „potentialité active” et „potentialité passive”, proposée par Roux, n'est pas acceptée généralement. Il se trouvait nécessaire, que la conception de „Potenz” fût soumise à une. analyse profonde. D'abord il est démontré, que l'ambiguïté de cette conception disparaît, si on entend par le mot „Potenz” les propriétés fondamentales du matériel embryonnaire, qui sont à la base de ses diverses possibilités de développement. On peut distinguer parmi ces propriétés les „pouvoirs réactifs”, en vertu desquels le matériel embryonnaire répond à des inductions morphogénétiques, et les „tendances propres” du matériel. Ils ne diffèrent que par leur intensité; un „pouvoir réactif” peut se changer en „tendance” par suite d'un renforcement au cours du développement, une „tendance” peut se changer en „pouvoir réactif” par une diminution d'intensité. La détermination du matériel se réalise par une „lutte” entre les tendances. Les actions inductives influent sur cette lutte en renforçant ou en diminuant l'intensité des diverses tendances, et en activant de nouvelles tendances par le renforcement de „pouvoirs réactifs”. (shrink)

Objective: To assess whether continuous consent, a process in which information is given to research participants at different stages in a trial, and clinician training in that process were effective when used by clinicians while gaining consent to the Total Body Hypothermia (TOBY) trial. The TOBY trial is a randomised controlled trial (RCT) investigating the use of whole-body cooling for neonates with evidence of perinatal asphyxia. Obtaining valid informed consent for the TOBY trial is difficult, but is a good test (...) of the effectiveness of continuous consent. Methods: Semistructured interviews were conducted with 30 sets of parents who consented to the TOBY trial and with 10 clinicians who sought it by the continuous consent process. Analysis was focused on the validity of parental consent based on the consent components of competence, information, understanding and voluntariness. Results: No marked problems with consent validity at the point of signature were observed in 19 of 27 (70%) couples. Problems were found mainly to lie with the competence and understanding of the parents: mothers, particularly, had problems with competence in the early stages of consent. Problems in understanding were primarily to do with side effects. Problems in both competence and understanding were observed to reduce markedly, particularly for mothers, in the post-signature phase, when further discussion took place. Randomisation was generally understood but unpopular. Information was not always given by clinicians in stages during the short period available before parents gave consent. Most clinicians, however, were able to give follow-up information. Discussion: Consent validity was found to compare favourably with similar trials examined in the Euricon study. Conclusion: Adopting the elements of the continuous consent process and clinician training in RCTs should be considered by researchers, particularly when they have concerns about the quality of consent they are likely to obtain by using a conventional process. (shrink)

The clinical decision is supposed to be based on evidence. In fact, what counts as evidence is far from being established. Some definition of "proof" is needed to distinguish between scientific medicine and charlatanism. My thesis is that unfortunately a clear-cut boundary between evidence and lack of evidence cannot be found, for several reasons that I summarise in the paper. Evidence in medicine very often has fuzzy boundaries, and dichotomising fuzziness and uncertainty can have serious consequences. Physicians and patients (...) should accept the irreducible fuzziness of many of the concepts they use when dealing with health and disease. (shrink)

We know that John Milton read Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy with very great care, and there is evidence suggesting that initially he found its argument attractive. In the end, however, he repudiated Machiavelli’s peculiar populism in no uncertain terms, and he did so by embracing Aristotle and Cicero in a manner that highlights the radical break which the Florentine initiated with the republicanism of the ancient Romans and Greeks.

This article examines the origin of experiential organization, especially whether it is salient or selective. Aron Gurwitsch believes it is salient and William James that it is selective. I argue that Gurwitsch is right, and recount his argument and his critique of James, but I also pose my own critique and critical questions on the issue. -/- Gurwitsch's argument attempts to show that the organization of consciousness is not arbitrary or merely selected in some way by the subject. He claims (...) that when consciousness is organized it is found as already organized. -/- This is important for Gurwitsch's philosophical system because if he can establish that consciousness is always originally organized, then his famous claim that the theme, thematic-field, margin structure of consciousness is an invariant patterning impervious to the subject's whim, mood, or possible noetic training, is protected at the very start. (shrink)

The Medication Event Monitoring System (MEMS) is a relatively new device designed to overcome some of the disadvantages of traditional adherence-measuring techniques. MEMS has also been found useful in tracking adherence behaviour without the need to visit patients frequently. In this study each patient was given a pre-filled, labelled MEMS bottle and cap. Patients were monitored for 24 weeks. For patients specifically studied, there were periods when drug levels may have been low and some exhibited erratic medication-taking behaviour. It (...) is concluded that MEMS can measure adherence behaviour objectively, and so might be used to improve prescribing decisions, identify drug wastage and improve carer support. Further research is needed before the routine use of electronic medication monitoring can be recommended. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to identify and describe published research articles that were named in official findings of scientific misconduct and to investigate compliance with the administrative actions contained in these reports for corrections and retractions, as represented in PubMed. Between 1993 and 2001, 102 articles were named in either the NIH Guide for Grants and Contracts ( Findings of Scientific Misconduct ) or the U.S. Office of Research Integrity annual reports as needing retraction or correction. In 2002, (...) 98 of the 102 articles were indexed in PubMed. Eighty-five of these 98 articles had indexed corrections: 47 were retracted; 26 had an erratum; 12 had a correction described in the comment field. Thirteen had no correction, but 10 were linked to the NIH Guide Findings of Scientific Misconduct , leaving only 3 articles with no indication of any sort of problem. As of May 2005, there were 5,393 citations to the 102 articles, with a median of 26 citations per article (range 0–592). Researchers should be alert to Comments linked to the NIH Guide as these are open access, and the Findings of Scientific Misconduct’ reports are often more informative than the statements about the retraction or correction found in the journals. (shrink)

In the October 1937 number of Philosophy of Science Lindsay has made certain criticisms of the adequacy of the “operational method” of analyzing and giving meaning to the concepts of physics, documenting his criticisms chiefly from my own writings. In these criticisms he has made statements as to the method which I would by no means accept. This is not characteristic of his paper only, for I have seldom indeed seen a printed discussion of the method which I would accept (...) as being an adequate or sometimes even fair representation of what I understand by it. It will perhaps pay therefore if I attempt to state what I conceive it to be all about, particularly since I have never attempted such a comprehensive statement and since my own ideas on the subject have been developing since I first wrote in the Logic of Modern Physics. For one reason I have hesitated to do this, for fear of seeming to subscribe to the not uncommon idea that we are dealing with some elaborate and profound new theory of the nature of knowledge or of meaning. I believe that I myself have never talked of “operationalism” or “operationism”, but I have a distaste for these grandiloquent words which imply something more philosophic and esoteric than the simple thing that I see. What we are here concerned with is an observation and description of methods which at least some physicists had already, perhaps unconsciously, adopted and found successful—the practise of the methods already existed. What I have attempted is to analyze these successful methods, not to set up a philosophical system and a theory of the properties that any method must have if it hopes to be successful. Since I was concerned with a technique already extant, my principal method of getting others to see what the technique involved has been to exhibit examples of the technique in action, rather than to attempt any exhaustive characterization of the technique itself. (shrink)

This article examines the origin of experiential organization, especially whether it is salient or selective. Aron Gurwitsch believes it is salient and William James that it is selective. I argue that Gurwitsch is right, and recount his argument and his critique of James, but I also pose my own critique and critical questions on the issue. -/- Gurwitsch's argument attempts to show that the organization of consciousness is not arbitrary or merely selected in some way by the subject. He claims (...) that when consciousness is organized it is found as already organized. -/- This is important for Gurwitsch's philosophical system because if he can establish that consciousness is always originally organized, then his famous claim that the theme, thematic-field, margin structure of consciousness is an invariant patterning impervious to the subject's whim, mood, or possible noetic training, is protected at the very start. (shrink)

Gordon Baker and I had been colleagues at St John’s for almost ten years when we resolved, in 1976, to undertake the task of writing a commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. We had been talking about Wittgenstein since 1969, and when we cooperated in writing a long critical notice on the Philosophical Grammar in 1975, we found that working together was mutually instructive, intellectually stimulating and great fun. We thought that we still had much to say about Wittgenstein’s philosophy, (...) and it seemed to us that misinterpretations of passages in the Investigations were so extensive that it would be worth trying to write a detailed analytical commentary. It is difficult to recapture the excitement of those early days in being among the first to work on the microfilms and, subsequently, on the photocopies of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. We spent many hundreds of hours poring over the typescripts and the often only semi-legible manuscripts, fascinated and privileged to be able to try to follow the development of the thoughts of a great philosophical genius. We talked endlessly about what we had found in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts, and debated how it should be understood. The first fruit of our labours was Wittgenstein – Understanding and Meaning. Its guiding idea was to draw attention to the manner in which Wittgenstein linked the concepts of meaning, understanding and explanation, and so to bypass the connections between meaning, truth and truth-conditions that so fascinated philosophers of the 1970s, and to abandon the red-herring of assertion-conditions and anti-realism. After a hiatus of four years, during which time we wrote a controversial book entitled Frege – Logical Excavations and a polemical book on contemporary philosophy of language – Language, Sense. (shrink)

In recent years a number of scholars have argued that Faraday's theories of matter and force were founded on concepts which were derived from Boscovich'sTheoria Philosophiae Naturalis(1758). The notion that Faraday's ideas display Boscovichean tendencies is not a new one: it was proposed by several of Faraday's immediate successors and has been noted by more recent commentators. Statements of this kind are not implausible as assertions of a general correspondence between Faraday's views on matter, as expressed in the “Speculation touching (...) Electric Conduction and the Nature of Matter” of 1844, and Boscovich's theory of point atomism, but Professor L. Pearce Williams has made much stronger claims for the dependence of Faraday's ideas on Boscovich's theory of matter. Williams' interpretation has been questioned by recent scholarship, and in this paper I wish to advance an alternative interpretation of Faraday's ideas on electricity and the nature of matter. (shrink)

Ce travail pose la question des critères de la „progression biologique“ , d'après les documents fossiles, dans le monde des organismes, c'est-à-dire de ce perfectionnement qui ne s'arrête pas à l'intérieur du cadre d'un phylum donné, comme le „perfectionnement de l'adaptation“, mais qui conduit, au-de-là de phylums de rang différent, à des types supérieurs, par exemple, des Poissons pas les Amphibies et les Reptiles jusqu'aux Mammifères ou aux Oiseaux. Deux groupes de critères y sont recensés en détail, leur contenu est (...) exposé, et on les examine pour voir s'ils caractérisent sans ambiguïté la „progression biologique“. Le premier groupe comprend les critères de „différenciation croissante“ et „d'intégration harmonique”. Ils sont fondés sur la différenciation morphophysiologique ou plus exactement sur la „totalité” des organismes, c'est-à-dire leur multiplicité dans l'unité. Le second groupe de critères, à savoir „indépendance croissante du milieu” et „autonomie individuelle croissante”, part des relations de l'organisme au milieu et aux autres formes vivantes et souligne la „subsistence” des individus, c'est-à-dire leur plus ou moins grande indépendence ou leur stabilité interne. Comme „totalité” et „subsistence” sont les éléments décisifs d'une définition biologique de l'individu, on peut dire que la „progression biologique“ d'un organisme est d'autant plus élevée que sa totalité et subsistence et par là son être individuel sont plus accusés.Tous les critères mentionnés ne sont pas uniformes. Les motifs de leur imprécision sont divers. Tout d'abord, il n'y a pas encore de définition unique et complète de l'individu biologique, de sorte qu'on ne peut circonscrire d'une manière univoque ce qui confère à un organisme une individualité plus forte ou moins forte. Ensuite les lignées au-delà desquelles s'accomplissent des perfectionnements, et dont l'une reste intérieur au phylum , tandis que l'autre le transcende , sont entrelacées si intimement et d'une façon si particulière qu'elles ne se laissent pas séparer franchement et décrire rigoureusement selon leurs signes distinctifs. Tout représentant d'un phylum, peu importe son palier, est en effet nécessairement inséré dans un milieu et en quelque façon spécialisé. Il n'existe pas des types à caractères phylétiques purs, qui ne montrent dans aucune direction un „perfectionnement de l'adaptation”, mais seulement des marques caractéristiques de la „progression biologique”. Enfin nous ne connaissons pas les restes fossiles que le développement ou la formation des grands phylums du règne animal, à savoir du rameau des Vertébrés et des divers groupes des Invertébrés, mais non pas le plus intéressant et le plus important, leur „progression biologique” jusqu'au degré d'organisation qu'ils présentent déjà à l'époque du Silurien ou plutôt du Cambrien. C'est cela seulement qui permettrait une vue plus profonde sur la nature de la „progression biologique”.Die Arbeit stellt die Frage nach den Kriterien des fossil belegten Biologischen Aufstiegs” der Organismenwelt, d.h. derjenigen Vervollkommnung, die sich nicht innerhalb des Rahmens eines gegebenen Bauplans hält, wie die „Anpassungsvervollkommnung”, sondern über verschiedenrangige Baupläne hinweg zu höheren Typen führt, z.B. von den Fischen über die Amphibien und Reptilien zu den Säugern bzw. Vögeln. Ausführlich werden zwei Gruppen von Kriterien besprochen, ihr Inhalt dargelegt und ihre Eindeutigkeit zur Charakterisierung des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” untersucht. Die erste Gruppe umfasst die Kriterien der „zunehmenden Differenzierung” und „harmonischeren Integration”. Diese legen die morphologisch-physiologische Differenzierung oder genauer die „Ganzheit” der Organismen zugrunde, d.h. ihre Vielheit in der Einheit. Die zweite Kriteriengruppe, nämlich „zunehmende Umweltunabhängigkeit” und „zunehmende individuelle Autonomie”, geht von den Beziehungen des Organismus zur Umwelt und zu andern Lebensformen aus und betont die „Subsistenz” der Individuen, d.h. ihr grösseres oder geringeres Losgelöstsein oder ihre Selbständigkeit. Da nun „Ganzheit” und „Subsistenz” die entscheidenden Elemente einer biologischen Definition des Individuums sind, lässt sich sagen, dass der „Biologische Aufstieg” eines Organismus um so höher ist, je stärker seine Ganzheit und Subsistenz und damit sein Individuumsein ist.Eindeutigkeit kommt allen genannten Kriterien nicht zu. Die Gründe für ihre Unschärfe sind verschiedener Art. Zunächst gibt es noch keine eindeutige und vollständige Definition des biologischen Individuums, so dass sich nicht eindeutig umreissen lässt, was einem Organismus eine stärkere oder weniger starke Individualität verleiht. Dann sind die Linien, über die sich Vervollkommnungen vollziehen und von denen die eine innerhalb des Bauplans bleibt , die andere aber über ihn hinausführt so innig und in so eigenartiger Weise miteinander verflochten, dass sie sich nicht sauber scheiden und in ihren charakteristischen Merkmalen genau beschreiben lassen. Jeder Vertreter eines Bauplans, ganz gleich von welcher Ranghöhe, ist nämlich notwendig in eine Umwelt eingepasst und irgendwie spezialisiert. Es gibt keine Typen mit reinen Bauplanmerkmalen, die nach keiner Richtung hin eine „Anpassungsvervollkommnung”, sondern nur Merkmale des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” aufweisen. Schliesslich kennen wir fossil nur die Entfaltung oder Ausgestaltung der Grossbaupläne des Tierreichs, nämlich des Wirbeltierstammes und der verschiedenen Gruppen der Wirbellosen, nicht aber das Interessanteste und Wichtigste, nämlich ihren „Biologischen Aufstieg” zu der organisatorischen Höhe, mit der sie sich im Silur bzw. im Kabrium bereits vorstellen. Das erst würde einen tieferen Einblick in das Wesen des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” vermitteln.This article deals with the question of the criteria for the “biological ascent” of the organic world, resting on fossil evidence. That is, of that improvement which is not only restricted to the framework of a given “general structure” as is the “improvement of adaptation”, but which also leads beyond general structures of differentiated levels to a higher type,e.g. from the fishes through the amphibians and reptiles to the mammals or birds. Two groups of criteria are discussed at length, their content exposed and their univocity for the characterisation of this “biological ascent” is examined. The first group includes the criteria of “increasing differentiation” and “more harmonious integration”. The basis for these is the morphological-physiological differentiation, or more exactly, the “totality” of the organisms,i.e., their variety-in-unity. The second group of criteria, “increasing independence of environment” and “increasing individual autonomy”, is derived from the relationships of the organism to its environment and to other living forms, and stresses the “subsistence” of individuals,i.e., their greater or lesser degree of independence or self-sufficiency. Now since “totality” and “subsistence” are the decisive elements in a biological definition of the individual, it may be said that the “biological ascent” of an organism is higher, the more perfect its totality and subsistence and therefore its individuality is.The criteria mentioned are not univocal. The reasons for this lack of clarity are varied. First of all, there is no univocal and complete definition of the biological individual, so that it cannot be exactly stated just what gives an organism a more or less perfect individuality. Then the lines, along which improvements are made, and according to which the one remains within the general structure and the other goes beyond the general structure , are so intimately and singularly bound together, that they cannot be cleanly distinguished, and their characteristic notes exactly described. For each representative of a general structure, regardless of its level, is necessarily fitted into an environment and somehow or other specialised. There are no types with only notes of the general structure which show in no direction an “improvment of adaption”, but only the signs of “biological ascent”. Finally, we only have fossil evidence for the development or deployment of the “great general structures” of the animal world, namely that of the vertebrates and of the different groups of invertebrates, not for the most interesting and most important, that is, their “biological ascent” to the level of organisation with which they are found in the Silurian or Cambrian periods. Only that would give us a deeper insight into the essence of “biological ascent”. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that the rules of language, as distinct from its semantic features, are the characteristics which most clearly distinguish language from the communication systems of other species. A number of linguists (e.g., Chomsky 1972, 1980; Pinker 1994) have suggested that the universal features of grammar (UG) are unique human adaptations showing no evolutionary continuities with any other species. However, recent summaries of the substantive features of UG are quite remarkable in the very general nature of the features (...) proposed. While the syntax of any given language can be quite complex, the specific rules vary so much between languages that the truly universal (i.e. innate) aspects of grammar are not complex at all. In fact, these features most closely resemble a set of general descriptions of our richly complex semantic cognition, and not a list of specific rules. General principles of the evolutionary process suggest that syntax is more properly understood as an emergent characteristic of the explosion of semantic complexity that occurred during hominid evolution. It is argued that grammatical rules used in given languages are likely to be simply conventionalized, invented features of language, and not the result of an innate, grammar-specific module. The grammatical and syntactic regularities that are found across languages occur simply because all languages attempt to communicate the same sorts of semantic information. (shrink)

Multidisciplinary healthcare committees meet regularly to discuss patients’ candidacy for emerging functional neurosurgical procedures, such as Deep Brain Stimulation . Through debate and discussion around the surgical candidacy of particular patients, functional neurosurgery programs begin to mold practice and policy supported both by scientific evidence and clear value choices. These neurosurgical decisions have special considerations not found in non-neurologic committees. The professional time used to resolve these conflicts provides opportunities for the emergence of careful, ethical practices simultaneous with the (...) expansion of therapy applications. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to examine developmental differences in autobiographical memory using a novel test that assesses its semantic and episodic subcomponents. Forty-two children aged 7–13 years were asked to recall semantic information and episodic events from three different time periods. For the recalls of all events, sense of remembering or sense of just knowing was measured via the Remember/Know paradigm. Age-related differences were observed for episodic autobiographical memory whereas semantic autobiographical memory was characterized by a relative developmental (...) invariance. The increase with age was also found in the number of “Remember” responses and their justification in terms of the actual contextual information retrieved—factual, spatial, and, more especially, temporal details. These findings highlight developmental differences between the episodic and semantic subcomponents of autobiographical memory and support the view that mental ‘time travel’ through subjective time, which allows one to re-experience the past through self-awareness, is the last feature of autobiographical memory to become fully operational. (shrink)

In biology, and particularly in morphology, various types of explanation are found,e.g. causal, teleological, historical, etc.In this article an attempt has been made to analyse the relations between the various explanations to strive for an encompassing explanatory theory.The general structure of the explanatory theories appeared to be very similar, but the terms defining the phenomena and the types of the relations within the theories differ. To obtain a unifying theory it is necessary to develop methods to connect or transform (...) the different elements.An important aspect is that the definition of selected phenomena depends on the explanation pursued. (shrink)

The experimental study of the emotions as pursued by LeDoux and Damasio is argued to be flawed as a consequence of the inadequate conceptual framework inherited from the work of William James. This paper clarifes the conceptual structures necessary for any discussion of the emotions. Emotions are distinguished from appetites and other non-emotional feelings, as well as from agitations and moods. Emotional perturbations are distinguished from emotional attitudes and motives. The causes of an emotion are differentiated from the objects of (...) an emotion, and the objects of an emotion are distinguished into formal and material ones. The links between emotions and reasons for the emotion, for associated beliefs and for action are explored, as well as the connection between emotion and care or concern, and between emotion and fantasy. The behavioural criteria for the ascription of an emotion are clarified. In the light of this conceptual network, Damasio’s theory of the emotions is subjected to critical scrutiny and found wanting. (shrink)

Alan Gibson has invited me to discuss publicly some of the issues I raised in my referee's report for History of Political Thought on his article ‘Ancients, Moderns and Americans: The Republicanism- Liberalism Debate Revisited’. I gladly accepted, not least because a dialogue on views of the American Founding is fitting both for the subject and Gibson's instructive characterization of it. The Federalist opens by identifying candid debate as a fundamental achievement for young America, giving hope that reflection and choice, (...) not just accident and force, can govern humans. Similarly, Gibson's argument that America's formative political thought comprises ‘multiple traditions’ — including Lockean liberalism, the republicanism of English opposition writings, and other influences — seems to define the Founding as not a monologue but a lively dialogue. I agree that complexity and not a single, pure strain of thought defines America's Founding, but this is not to say there are no fundamental principles for which the Founding stands. In the spirit of candid exchange, I will not discuss the many points in Dr Gibson's article with which I agree but those where one might interpret the American Founding differently or find an important dimension overlooked. (shrink)

Minorities who disagree with the “scientific consensus” must be allowed to air their viewsI will begin by discussing the example used in Schüklenk’s paper1 of the self proclaimed “HIV dissidents” and then discuss whether the recommendations made are useful and could be applied to other examples in science.Schüklenk’s primary concern according to his title is with the professional responsibilities of biomedical scientists engaging in public discourse. The example given is of the effect that self proclaimed HIV dissidents have had on (...) the provision of HIV related public health measures in South Africa. Fundamental to the example given is a distinction that both Schüklenk and indeed the general public often fail to make. It is important to recognise the difference between biomedical science and clinical practice. Science and medicine are two distinct fields, each with their own historically founded methods and purposes; they have had little in common with each other until relatively recently. Schüklenk confuses the two when he judges a scientific hypothesis by its clinical utility."It certainly seemed prudent to me at the time to give support to critics of a hypothesis, the pursuit of which had done little to bring those in need closer to life extending or life saving AIDS drugs."He later reconsiders his position on the basis of new clinical evidence."My own conversion to the mainstream view took place roughly when dissident predictions about AIDS deaths resulting from what they believed were highly poisonous drug cocktails—that is, triple therapy, did not occur, and when it became clear that actually the opposite was true; these drugs were at least life extending. I saw … ". (shrink)

In this paper I will describe four theories of time that can be found in Aristotle. I will compare these four theories with modern notions of time, and propose that the ancient and modern views are substantively the same. Of course, all four theories cannot be true together. I will present four ways to resolve the inconsistencies, and conclude that the contradictions can be resolved.

Recently, Alper, Bridger, Earman and Norton have all proposed examples of dynamic systems that, in their view, are incompatible with classical (Newtonian) mechanics. In the first section of the present paper I shall show that their arguments are all undermined by the same fallacy. The second section proves that their conclusions of incompatibility are indeed false, and that what we are really looking at are new forms of indeterminist evolution of the same kind as that found recently in the (...) literature on supertasks. In the third section of the paper, I argue that one of these new forms of evolution is particularly interesting, and that analysis of it leads to a new vision of the relation between interaction by contact and impenetrability. 1. Introduction2. The fallacy3. Understanding some physical supertasks4. A philosophically interesting implication: contact and impenetrability. (shrink)

From Descartes to Popper, philosophers have criticized and tried to improve the strategies of reasoning invoked in science and in everyday life. In recent years leading cognitive psychologists have painted a detailed, controversial, and highly critical portrait of common sense reasoning. Stephen Stich begins with a spirited defense of this work and a critique of those writers who argue that widespread irrationality is a biological or conceptual impossibility.Stich then explores the nature of rationality and irrationality: What is it that distinguishes (...) good reasoning from bad? He rejects the most widely accepted approaches to this question approaches which unpack rationality by appeal to truth, to reflective equilibrium or conceptual analysis. The alternative he defends grows out of the pragmatic tradition in which reasoning is viewed as a cognitive tool. Stich's version of pragmatism leads to a radical epistemic relativism and he argues that the widespread abhorrence of relativism is ill founded. (shrink)

In the experimental psychology of attention, the phenomenon of attentional context has been underappreciated, while focal attention has taken center stage. Similar problems of context are found in certain realist arguments in.the philosophy of science. Through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch's phenomenology of attention, this paper discusses and evaluates the ways in which context is or is not brought into focus in experimental psychology and the philosophy of science. It concludes that recent developments in both realms show promise. Also (...) some ways are indicated in which phenomenology, experimental psychology, and philosophy of science can benefit from each other. (shrink)

‘I proceed. ‘Edwin and Morcar, the earls of Mercia and Northumbria, declared for him: and even Stigand, the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury, found it advisable—”’ ‘Found what?” said the Duck. ‘Found it’ the Mouse replied rather crossly: ‘of course you know what “it” means.’ ‘I know what “it” means well enough, when I find a thing’, said the Duck: ‘it's generally a frog or a worm. The question is, what did the archbishop find?’.

At the heart of the underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence is the simple idea that the evidence available to us at a given time may fail to determine what beliefs we should hold in response to it. In a textbook example, if I all I know is that you spent $10 on apples and oranges and that apples cost $1 while oranges cost $2, then I know that you did not buy six oranges, but I do not know whether (...) you bought one orange and eight apples, two oranges and six apples, and so on. A simple scientific example can be found in the rationale behind the sensible methodological adage that “correlation does not imply causation”. If watching lots of cartoons causes children to be more violent in their playground behavior then we should (barring complications) expect to find a correlation between levels of cartoon viewing and violent playground behavior. But that is also what we would expect to find if children who are prone to violence tend to enjoy and seek out cartoons more than other children, or if propensities to violence and increased cartoon viewing are both caused by some third factor (like general parental neglect or excessive consumption of jellybeans). So a high correlation between cartoon viewing and violent playground behavior is evidence that (by itself) simply underdetermines what we should believe about the causal relationship between these two activities. As we will see, however, the challenge of distinguishing correlation from causation is far from the only important circumstance in which underdetermination is thought to arise in scientific inquiry. (shrink)

The principle of excluded middle is the logical interpretation of the law V ≤ A v ヿA in an orthocomplemented lattice and, hence, in the lattice of the subspaces of a Hilbert space which correspond to quantum mechanical propositions. We use the dialogic approach to logic in order to show that, in addition to the already established laws of effective quantum logic, the principle of excluded middle can also be founded. The dialogic approach is based on the very conditions under (...) which propositions can be confirmed by measurements. From the fact that the principle of. excluded middle can be confirmed for elementary propositions which are proved by quantum mechanical measurements, we conclude that this principle is inherited by all finite compound propositions. For this proof it is essential that, in the dialog-game about a connective, a finite confirmation strategy for the mutual commensurability of the subpropositions is used. (shrink)

It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the (...) structure of the adaptive responses is innate, the contents of the system which triggers them are largely learnt. The circuits subserving the adaptive responses are probably located in the limbic system. This theory of emotion is directly applicable only to a small sub-domain of the traditional realm of emotion. It can be used, however, to explain the grouping of various other phenomena under the heading of emotion, and to explain various characteristic failings of the pre-scientific conception of emotion. (shrink)

Greek ontology eventually developed a notion variously described as ‘timeless’, ‘atemporal’, or ‘non-durational’ eternity. In Proclus and Simplicius it is already a school-commonplace, with a stable vocabulary in which aiōn is sharply distinguished from what is merely aïdios. Plotinus had perfected this notion beforehand, believing not only that he found it in Plato, but that Plato had developed it on Parmenidean grounds.

If the agent responsible for an action is to be given praise or blame by the moral community for that action, then accurate responsibility ascriptions must be made. Since the moral community may have to evaluate the actions of corporate agents, care must be taken to insure that the assumption of Methodological Individualism (MI) does not infect that process. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that accurate responsibility ascriptions will be made in cases connected with corporate action as long as corporate (...) scapegoating may occur. Because corporate scapegoating is a behavior pattern that attempts to falsify correct responsibility ascriptions it will be of interest to the moral theorist. Once I have considered three objections to the idea of corporate scapegoating I shall offer a fictional description of it found in Ayn Rand''s work,Atlas Shrugged. Finally, I shall raise a question about its present day use by corporations in our society. (shrink)

Philosophy and model theory frequently meet one another. Philosophy and Model Theory aims to understand their interactions -/- Model theory is used in every ‘theoretical’ branch of analytic philosophy: in philosophy of mathematics, in philosophy of science, in philosophy of language, in philosophical logic, and in metaphysics. But these wide-ranging appeals to model theory have created a highly fragmented literature. On the one hand, many philosophically significant mathematical results are found only in mathematics textbooks: these are aimed squarely at (...) mathematicians; they typically presuppose that the reader has a significant background in mathematics; and little clue is given as to their philosophical significance. On the other hand, the philosophical applications of these results are then scattered across disconnected pockets of papers, separated by decades or more. -/- The first aim of Philosophy and Model Theory, then, is to consider the philosophical uses of model theory. On a technical level, we try to show how philosophically significant results connect to one another, and also to state the best version of a result for philosophical purposes. On a philosophical level, we show how similar dialectical situations arise repeatedly, across fragmented debates in varied philosophical areas. -/- The second aim of Philosophy and Model Theory, though, is to consider the philosophy of model theory. Model theory itself is rarely taken as the subject matter of philosophising (contrast this, say, with the philosophy of biology, or the philosophy of set theory). But model theory is a beautiful part of pure mathematics, and worthy of philosophical study in its own right. (shrink)

Many critics, Descartes himself included, have seen Hobbes as uncharitable or even incoherent in his Objections to the Meditations on First Philosophy. I argue that when understood within the wider context of his views of the late 1630s and early 1640s, Hobbes's Objections are coherent and reflect his goal of providing an epistemology consistent with a mechanical philosophy. I demonstrate the importance of this epistemology for understanding his Fourth Objection concerning the nature of the wax and contend that Hobbes's brief (...) claims in that Objection are best understood as a summary of the mechanism for scientific knowledge found in his broader work. Far from displaying his confusion, Hobbes's Fourth Objection in fact pinpoints a key weakness of Descartes's faculty psychology: its unintelligibility within a mechanical philosophy. (shrink)

The language of Greek Tragedy can be considered as a whole by virtue of the characteristics which distinguish it from that of other branches of Greek literature, and the resemblance between the three tragedians in this respect is more noticeable than the differences. Still, if we compare Aeschylus and Euripides it is impossible not to feel a marked change of tone, in λ⋯ξις as in δι⋯νοια and ἤθη. As in E. the familiar legends are frequently set in a more everyday (...) atmosphere and the characters cast in a less heroic mould, it is natural that the tone of the language should be lowered, partly by the frequent use of distinctively prosaic expressions and partly by the introduction of what appear to be colloquialisms. This change of tone in language was at once noted by Aristophanes and is referred to by Aristotle as an innovation of E. On the other hand E.'s style presents a certain anomaly, since while deliberately securing a closer approximation to the language of prose and ordinary conversation he also shows a poetic and archaizing tendency in the use of Aeschylean and Homeric words and forms not found in Sophocles. This may be due to a reluctance to depart too far from the poetic tradition of Greek tragedy, and possibly to a scholar's interest in the language of Aeschylus and Homer, in a minor degree a foreshadowing of the learned archaism of the Alexandrian poets. (shrink)

A ring is said to be clean if every element of the ring can be written as a sum of an idempotent element and a unit element of the ring and a ring is said to be nil-clean if every element of the ring can be written as a sum of an idempotent element and a nilpotent element of the ring. In this paper, we generalize these arguments to symbolic 2-plithogenic structure. We introduce the structure of clean and nil-clean symbolic (...) 2-plithogenic rings and some of its elementary properties are presented. Also, we have found the equivalence between classical clean(nil-clean) ring R and the corresponding symbolic 2-plithogenic ring 2-SPR. (shrink)

In this paper we describe a propagation experiment to measure the one-way velocity of electromagnetic radiation. The experiment utilizes the rotation of the earth to interchange the positions of two rubidium vapor frequency standards over12 h, thereby canceling initial clock phase differences. It is demonstrated that although the drift characteristics of modern rubidium atomic clocks may be large for long-term absolute timing requirements, the short-term random fluctuations are small. It is found that over a24-h period, the long-term drift can (...) be accurately parameterized in retrospect and removed, thereby permitting the detection of temporal variations less than1 nsec in magnitude. With coherent summing techniques this value may be significantly reduced, and it becomes realistic to consider an experiment where the clocks are separated by distances of the order of several hundreds of meters in order to detect velocities of the order of that of the solar system with respect to the center of the galaxy(≈10 5 m sec −1 ), thus ensuring that the rotational motion of the earth has a negligible effect in altering the relative inertial characteristics of the reference frames of each clock. It is demonstrated that under such conditions the measurement of the one-way speed of propagation of electromagnetic radiation is not only meaningful, but can be simply implemented with commercially available instrumentation. (shrink)

Wikipedia is a free encyclopedia that is written and edited entirely by visitors to its website. I argue that we are misled when we think of it in the same epistemic category with traditional general encyclopedias. An empirical assessment of its reliability reveals that it varies widely from topic to topic. So any particular claim found in it cannot be relied on based on its source. I survey some methods that we use in assessing specific claims and argue that (...) the structure of the Wikipedia frustrates them. (shrink)

The Alagadd?pama Sutta is the 22nd discourse of the Majjhima-nik?ya of the Pali canon. In the sutta itself it is mentioned that the Buddha’s delivery of this discourse was necessitated by the need to refute a wrong view held by one of his disciples named Ari??ha. Parallel versions of the sutta are found preserved in the Chinese?gamas. The two main similes used in the sutta, those of the snake and of the raft, are referred to in the scriptures of (...) a number of non-Therav?da Buddhist traditions as well, showing that the Buddhist doctrine represented in it is early and authentic and the message contained in the sutta was considered to be extremely significant by many early Buddhist traditions. The Alagadd?pama Sutta shows the Buddha’s role as one of the earliest thinkers in the history of philosophy who engaged in a critique of the craving for metaphysics and dogma frequently exhibited in those who propound worldviews. The Buddha did not value a belief or a worldview on grounds of the logical skill with which it was constructed but on grounds of the transformative effect it could have on the character of an individual and the sense of wellbeing it could promote. There are several discourses of the Pali canon which give prominence to this aspect of the Buddha’s teaching. Among them the Brahmaj?la Sutta of the D?gha-nik?ya and the A??hakavagga of the Suttanip?ta need special mention. The Buddha is seen to have consistently avoided engagement in speculative metaphysics, pointing out that the goal of his teaching goes beyond all such engagement. The Buddha himself distinguished his own worldview as a Teaching in the Middle avoiding the common tendency of humankind to be trapped by either of the two extremes, Eternalism or Annihilationism. These distinctive standpoints of the Buddha are all seen to be amply represented in the Alagadd?pama Sutta. (shrink)

Integrated information theory (IIT) is a candidate theory of consciousness that highlights the role of complex interactions between parts of a system as the basis of consciousness – and, due to its general information-theoretic formulation, is capable of making statements about consciousness in neural and non-neural systems alike. Here, we argue that a system radically different to a human brain, host to complex physiological and functional structures capable of integrating information, can be found in the meristems and vascular system (...) of higher plants. Following a pragmatic and ontologically innocent approach, neither taking for granted that plants are conscious nor dismissing the possibility that they are, we argue that the time is ripe to apply analysis tools inspired by IIT to plants, taking advantage of recent developments in both plant imaging and information theory. We introduce and discuss the relevant literature, and pro information and integration in plant behaviour, assessing the plausibility of plant sentience. If successful, these experiments could position plants as the next frontier in consciousness science, and urge us to rethink our perspectives on consciousness, how to measure it, and its prevalence amongst living beings. (shrink)

The language of Greek Tragedy can be considered as a whole by virtue of the characteristics which distinguish it from that of other branches of Greek literature, and the resemblance between the three tragedians in this respect is more noticeable than the differences. Still, if we compare Aeschylus and Euripides it is impossible not to feel a marked change of tone, in λ⋯ξις as in δι⋯νοια and ἤθη. As in E. the familiar legends are frequently set in a more everyday (...) atmosphere and the characters cast in a less heroic mould, it is natural that the tone of the language should be lowered, partly by the frequent use of distinctively prosaic expressions and partly by the introduction of what appear to be colloquialisms. This change of tone in language was at once noted by Aristophanes and is referred to by Aristotle as an innovation of E. On the other hand E.'s style presents a certain anomaly, since while deliberately securing a closer approximation to the language of prose and ordinary conversation he also shows a poetic and archaizing tendency in the use of Aeschylean and Homeric words and forms not found in Sophocles. This may be due to a reluctance to depart too far from the poetic tradition of Greek tragedy, and possibly to a scholar's interest in the language of Aeschylus and Homer, in a minor degree a foreshadowing of the learned archaism of the Alexandrian poets. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:P. Christopher Smith HEIDEGGER'S MISINTERPRETATION OF RILKE Certainly one of Heidegger's most important accomplishments is to have reminded us of the original unity of poetry and philosophy. The "metaphysical" philosophy which Heidegger calls into question is characterized by its sharp separation of itself from what it calls "unscientific" modes of discourse. But that, Heidegger shows, is a limitation which comes from its narrowed conception of itself as strict, methodical (...) science, and one need only turn to Parmenides before the tradition of metaphysics or Nietzsche at the end of that tradition to see that in fact Heidegger is right: philosophy and poetry are not necessarily to be dissociated. Indeed, the former can and should grow out of the soil of the latter. The point here is one which Heidegger might be said to have learned by experience: he found that the poetry of Hölderlin opened a way for philosophy out of the cul de sac into which phenomenological science had led it. And of course not only Hölderlin: Rilke was obviously important too. In fact to some, myself included, it seems that certainly as much as Hölderlin and perhaps even more, Rilke is the poet who displays the pre-metaphysical unity of poetry and philosophy. But that is not how Heidegger views Rilke. In respect to its philosophical value, Rilke's poetry, we are told, is inferior to Hölderlin's. There is, I suggest, a most puzzling blend of attraction and suspicion in Heidegger's interpretation of Rilke. On the one hand, Heidegger, perhaps better than anyone, is able to make clear the philosophical importance of Rilke's poetry and yet, having done that and having shown thereby the greatest sympathy for Rilke's thought, Heidegger goes on to portray Rilke as "metaphysical" and to claim for that reason that he is not the poet Hölderlin is. Is that assessment valid? And how did Heidegger arrive at it? It is to these questions that the following study is addressed. On my reading of "Wozu Dichter"1 the charge that Rilke persists in "metaphysical" thought has three dimensions. To begin with, the overriding consideration in the whole of the essay is that, like all "metaphysicians," Rilke is oblivious to the Being event. There are in 4 Philosophy and Literature turn two consequences which follow from that obliviousness: first, Rilke grounds all of what is in some highest existent, namely nature taken as will, and second, in turning inwards to consciousness he re-presents the original presencing of existents. The theme of grounding in a highest existent is worked out from page 256 (p. 100) to page 281 (p. 126) and that of the re-presentation in consciousness, from page 281 (p. 126) to page 294 (p. 141). It will become evident, I think, that the discussions of two other apparently separate questions, that of the Open and that of saying and singing, fit respectively into each of these major sections of the essay. Let us now consider the aspects of the charge that Rilke is "metaphysical" one by one. Just what does obliviousness to Being mean? It means obliviousness to the clearing or lighting {Lichtung). Heidegger, it must be kept in mind, distinguishes between what is and the event in which what is comes to be displayed as such. He refers to the event itself as the lighting and it is only in the light of the lighting, he tells us, that what is can be. Obliviousness to Being is obliviousness, not to some highest existent or even to the whole of beings, but to the Being event, to the lighting. "Metaphysics," in seeking the ontos on, the being which in being most truly underlies all other existents, forgets the event in which any being, even the highest, comes to be. Consequently, instead of experiencing temporal presencing, arising out of non-presence, das Nichts, "metaphysics" reduces anything which comes to be to something which always is in steady presence. Obliviousness to Being is, if seen in this way, obliviousness to the nicht-ist, das Nichts from which any ist originates. That shows up in Rilke in that for him beings are not "dissolved in void... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Burma’s Healthcare Under Fire: My Experience as an Exiled Medical ProfessionalP. P. KyawI used to work as a medical doctor in a less developed state than many big cities in Burma1 that experienced prolonged civil wars and current similar atrocities decades before the urban areas of the country experienced them. Before everything started, I was responsible for the medical management of the most vulnerable communities and had been struggling (...) with pandemic-related medical activities. Those were the happiest years of my life. I was with one of the best international organizations, where every effort I made was directly delivered to the patients with no unnecessary paperwork. The system was efficient, my colleagues were supportive, and I had a good work-life balance. I supported my family and whoever needed temporary financial support, played music weekly, met good friends who I hung out with every weekend, and [End Page 164] found hobbies like gardening and crocheting. I was content and happy. I even postponed my plans to get registered as a doctor in the Western world.Before moving to this beautiful ethnic state in 2019, I previously worked as a government medical doctor in Yangon, the capital. As much as I loved working in those civilian hospitals, I could not support myself with a monthly pay of $100-$150 USD. It was a hard decision to leave the service because it meant I could not pursue the medical specialty that I had always longed for and had to leave like-minded supportive colleagues. In Myanmar, unless you are a civil servant, you cannot pursue further clinical specialties. However, after leaving the government’s service to work in humanitarian medical assistance in hard-to-reach areas of Burma, I learned that life is still beautiful outside my comfort zone, until February 2021 when the coup began. Democratically elected members of the country’s ruling party were overthrown by the military, which then bestowed power in a military junta.I expected the election prior to the coup in November 2020 to be an uphill battle for Burma, but nothing more. I was still in denial when I first heard the news from one of the town’s NGO staff. The person had to travel on a motorbike to inform everyone that the junta had staged the coup. No telephone or internet was working at that time. My colleagues and I cried in our office, saying, “We are so young, and the future is still ahead. I don’t think this is going to last long. Maybe it will be over in a few days or, at most, a few weeks.” Once the peaceful protests started nationwide, my friends and I provided medical cover for the protesters, initially for minor medical problems such as low sugar, low blood pressure, injuries from accidental minor slips and falls, etc. Never in my life had I imagined that I would be taking care of bullet wounds and people injured by live rounds. While learning about gunshot wounds in forensic medicine, I thought, “Oh, this is not going to be very useful because Burma is not America, and I am not going there.” Then suddenly, it became too real and more useful than I would’ve liked it to be.I always think back to one especially bloody day when many people in the town were shot with live rounds. We assisted many patients. Usually, we would go around with the protest groups until they were over in the late afternoon. The protesters were always peaceful. There were no riots, no harmful acts, or vandalism. Only when the protesters were cruelly dispersed with tear gas, high-pressure pumps, rubber bullets, and live rounds (to the head) did they decide to defend themselves while still making their voices heard. The only defenses people had to counteract the live rounds were things like metal covers, firecrackers, and slingshots.One afternoon in March 2021, my team and I took an early break for lunch—unaware that some people would lose their lives that afternoon. We followed the local protests through Facebook Live while having lunch and started to hear firecracker sounds. A few seconds later, we knew... (shrink)