Nietzsche gilt als ein "Dichterphilosoph", dessen Werk sich der konventionellen Unterscheidung von Literatur und Philosophie entzieht. Das betrifft zum einen seine offensichtliche Vorliebe für literarische Schreibweisen und Textformen, die ein wesentlicher Grund dafür ist, dass Nietzsche sich so schwer auf eindeutige philosophische Positionen festlegen lässt. Damit hängt zum anderen zusammen, dass er, der akademisch ausgebildete Philologe, sich zeit seines Lebens intensiv mit der abendländischen Literatur von der Antike bis zu seiner Gegenwart beschäftigte. Und so wie sein eigenes Schreiben durch vielfältige (...) literarische Einflüsse geprägt wurde, übte er umgekehrt auch eine immense Wirkung auf die nachfolgende Literatur aus. Der Band erkundet in einer exemplarischen Reihe von Beiträgen Nietzsches Verhältnis zur Literatur sowie das Verhältnis der Literatur zu ihm und zeigt neue Wege der Forschung auf. (shrink)

It is fair to say that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's philosophy of mathematics and his interpretation of the calculus in particular have not been popular topics of conversation since the early part of the twentieth century. Changes in mathematics in the late nineteenth century, the new set-theoretical approach to understanding its foundations, and the rise of a sympathetic philosophical logic have all conspired to give prior philosophies of mathematics (including Hegel's) the untimely appearance of naïveté. The common view was expressed (...) by Bertrand Russell: -/- The great [mathematicians] of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were so much impressed by the results of their new methods that they did not trouble to examine their foundations. Although their arguments were fallacious, a special Providence saw to it that their conclusions were more or less true. Hegel fastened upon the obscurities in the foundations of mathematics, turned them into dialectical contradictions, and resolved them by nonsensical syntheses. . . .The resulting puzzles [of mathematics] were all cleared up during the nineteenth century, not by heroic philosophical doctrines such as that of Kant or that of Hegel, but by patient attention to detail (1956, 368–69). (shrink)

Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature begins with the concepts of space and time, and all of the concepts and phenomena that follow in the text are spatio-temporal. But the actual content of Hegel’s theory of space and time has remained obscure despite two centuries of interpretation, and obscure for at least two reasons. First, it is unclear how Hegel’s theory relates to those of his immediate predecessors (Newton, Leibniz, Kant) as well as other theories in the history of philosophy. Second, the (...) theoretical function to be played by this theory of space and time has remained unclear. In this paper, we clarify the first issue by interpreting Hegel’s theory as a theory of space-time, and we clarify the second issue by interpreting that theory as securing the theoretical possibility of motion. Of course, it will not be the same theory of space-time as the one that proceeds from modern relativistic physics; but designating Hegel’s theory as a theory of space-time helps to mark it out from its most prominent predecessors and helps to make sense of some of its most distinctive features—particularly Hegel’s insistence that time has three dimensions just as space does. This latter feature—the three-dimensionality of time—serves to distinguish Hegel’s view both from the classical mechanics of Newton and Kant (in which time does not interact with the spatial directions) and from contemporary relativistic physics (in which there is such interaction but time is only a single dimension added to the spatial dimensions). In Hegelian space-time, three-dimensional time is the flip side of three-dimensional space—it is this conception that makes Hegel’s view so distinctive. (shrink)

We attribute three major insights to Hegel: first, an understanding of the real numbers as the paradigmatic kind of number ; second, a recognition that a quantitative relation has three elements, which is embedded in his conception of measure; and third, a recognition of the phenomenon of divergence of measures such as in second-order or continuous phase transitions in which correlation length diverges. For ease of exposition, we will refer to these three insights as the R First Theory, Tripartite Relations, (...) and Divergence of Measures. Given the constraints of space, we emphasize the first and the third in this paper. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rembrandt and LearningRalph A. Smith (bio)IntroductionIt appears to be a defining characteristic of Rembrandt’s works—as important as the brushstrokes, the underdrawing, the types of ground and the paints used—that they move people exceedingly. [T]hey help us feel something of what the artist may have felt about youth, old age, friendship, isolation, and love.—Anthony Bailey[For] Rembrandt, imperfections are the norm of humanity, which is why he will always speak across (...) centuries to those for whom art might be something other than the quest for ideal form.—Simon SchamaArt can arouse the senses, touch the feelings, and stir the passions. In exercising these formidable powers, the artist should respect certain limits of good taste and moral propriety. Rembrandt possessed unequal skill in depicting the passions in original ways without breaking the code. Well, hardly ever.—Gary SchwartzThe National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Rembrandt Project was designed to apply state-of-the-art digital technology to the development of the multiple competencies needed for understanding and appreciating [End Page 101] Rembrandt and his time. As educational consultant to the project, I was given the assignment of conceptualizing a framework that would accommodate and illuminate the project’s purposes. This meant that I not only had to refamiliarize myself with seventeenth-century Dutch art and culture and with the national and state standards for the visual arts but also acquaint myself with the standards for socials studies; both sets of standards occupy a prominent place in the project and are the subject of the third section of this article. The overarching viewpoint from which I approached my assignment, however, was that of the humanities, a topic to which I turn first. Furthermore, since the project’s foremost concern is with masterpieces of the visual arts, I thought it apposite to address briefly some issues in aesthetics, especially those that relate to experiencing artworks appropriately. Having surveyed the project from the perspectives mentioned, I then ask to what extent it was successful in avoiding the pitfalls that often frustrate the implementation of novel ideas and methods.1The HumanitiesThe following interpretation of the humanities is condensed from the writings of two distinguished philosophers, Albert William Levi and Walter Kaufmann, and the historian Paul Gagnon. Levi, an early member of the National Council for the Humanities and for most of his career a distinguished professor of the humanities at Washington University, was once asked to define the essence of the humanities. He replied that the purposes of the humanities are to encourage persons to “to think critically, to communicate successfully, and to walk proudly with [their] tradition.”2 Noteworthy in this terse statement is its emphasis on the procedural aspects of the humanities, that is, their effects on human actions and attitudes. Such emphasis accorded well with the tradition of the Middle Ages, which construed the humanities as skills of organizing and understanding human experience. Levi, however, also acknowledged the Renaissance conception of the humanities as subject matters, thereby paying tribute to the endeavors of Renaissance scholars who devoted themselves to recovering and transmitting the literary texts of antiquity. A strong believer in historical continuity, Levi synthesized the Medieval and Renaissance traditions by proposing that the humanities be understood as skills of communication, continuity, and criticism. These skills have their substantive grounding in languages and literatures, history, and philosophy, the latter conceived as critical reflection.3 After pondering Levi’s interpretation, I added another “c,” the arts of creation, to his troika. Thus, the humanities can be understood as indispensable to human experience because they are the arts of creation, communication, continuity, and criticism.Another view of the purposes of the humanities and their relevance to the project can be found in the writings of the historian Paul Gagnon. He [End Page 102] stressed the importance of preparing the young for citizenship, personal cultivation, and vocation within a curriculum committed to the values of equity and competence.4 Gagnon interpreted the study of history as providing critical checks on reality, imparting insights into the various ways in which persons have used historical knowledge to find their place in the flow of events, and... (shrink)

McInerny revisits the basics of Thomas's teachings and offers a brief, intelligible, and persuasive summary.

Let us take an example that Bernard Williams (1981: 102) made famous. Suppose that you want a gin and tonic, and you believe that the stuff in front of you is gin. In fact, however, the stuff is not gin but petrol. So if you drink the stuff (even mixed with tonic), it will be decidedly unpleasant, to say the least. Should you choose to drink the stuff or not?

A patient and faithful working of primary Thomistic texts, this volume.

Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition is compatible with (...) “internalism” about rationality, and with a form of “pragmatic encroachment” on the conditions of rational outright belief. An interpretation is given of this definition, and especially of the sense of ’because’ that it involves. On this interpretation, this definition entails that both safety and adherence are necessary conditions on knowledge; it supports a kind of contextualism about terms like ‘knowledge’; and it provides resources to defend safety, adherence, and contextualism, against some recent objections. (shrink)

Hierocles, a Stoic of the second century CE, famously deployed an image of the ‘concentric circles’ that surround each of us. The image should not be read as advocating absolute impartiality (in the style of classical utilitarianism) or as illustrating the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis. Instead, it is designed to illustrate how it is ‘appropriate to act’ in certain cases. Like other Stoics, Hierocles bases his investigation of appropriate acts on what is ‘in accordance with nature’. According to his view, (...) each of us has a duty of mutual aid towards every other human being—but a weightier duty towards those who are socially closer than those who are more distant. The fundamental principle is that each of us has the duty of being an ‘ally’ of every other human being in serving the natural purposes of all the circles to which we and that other human being both belong. (shrink)

In this paper, I apply the "conceptual role semantics" approach that I have proposed elsewhere (according to which the meaning of normative terms is given by their role in practical reasoning or deliberation) to the meaning of the term 'ought'. I argue that this approach can do three things: It can give an adequate explanation of the special connection that normative judgments have to practical reasoning and motivation for action. It can give an adequate account of why the central principles (...) of deontic logic are correct. It can give an explanation of the precise ways in which the term 'ought' is systematically context-sensitive, so that the term expresses different (but systematically related) concepts in different contexts. (shrink)

Often, when one faces a choice between alternative actions, there are reasons both for and against each alternative. On one way of understanding these words, what one “ought to do all things considered (ATC)” is determined by the totality of these reasons. So, these reasons can somehow be “combined” or “aggregated” to yield an ATC verdict on these alternatives. First, various assumptions about this sort of aggregation of reasons are articulated. Then it is shown that these assumptions allow for the (...) proof of a “Reasons Aggregation Theorem” – parallel to John Harsanyi’s 1955 “Social Aggregation Theorem”. All reasons for action are grounded in reason-providing values; and, for every such reason-providing value, there is in principle a way of measuring how strongly this value counts against each alternative. The theorem tells us that the appropriate measure of how much reason ATC there is against each alternative is simply a weighted sum of the strengths with which these values count against that alternative; the agent ought not ATC to perform an action iff there is ATC more reason against it than against some available alternative. (shrink)

Intuitively, it seems that some belief-forming practices have the following three properties: 1. They are rational practices, and the beliefs that we form by means of these practices are themselves rational or justified beliefs. 2. Even if in most cases these practices reliably lead to correct beliefs (i.e., beliefs in true propositions), they are not infallible: it is possible for beliefs that are formed by means of these practices to be incorrect (i.e., to be beliefs in false propositions). 3. The (...) rationality of these practices is basic or primitive. That is, the rationality of these practices is not due simply to the availability, by means of some process of reasoning that relies purely on other practices, of a rational or justified belief in the reliability of these practices. -/- How can there be such practices? This paper offers an answer to that question. (shrink)

This essay offers an account of the truth conditions of sentences involving deontic modals like ‘ought’, designed to capture the difference between objective and subjective kinds of ‘ought’ This account resembles the classical semantics for deontic logic: according to this account, these truths conditions involve a function from the world of evaluation to a domain of worlds (equivalent to a so-called “modal base”), and an ordering of the worlds in such domains; this ordering of the worlds itself arises from two (...) further elements – a probability function and a value function – since this ordering ranks the worlds in accordance with the expected value of certain propositions that are true at those worlds. Thus, a proposition of the form ‘Ought (p)’ is true at a world of evaluation w if and only if p is true at all the top-ranked worlds in the domain assigned to w. This domain of worlds consists of metaphysically possible worlds, while the probability function is defined over a space of epistemically possible worlds (which may include metaphysically impossible worlds, such as worlds where Hesperus is not Phosphorus). Evidence is given that this account assigns the correct truth conditions to a wide range of sentences involving ‘ought’. Since these truth conditions involve both a domain of metaphysically possible worlds and a space of epistemically possible worlds, there are two corresponding kinds of conditional involving ‘ought’, depending on which space of worlds is restricted by the conditional. Finally, some objections that might be raised against this account are answered. (shrink)

Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative. (This claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative.) But what exactly does this claim mean? And what reason is there for believing it? In this paper, I shall first try to clarify the content of the claim that the intentional is normative. Then I shall examine a number of the arguments that philosophers have (...) advanced for this claim (and for the parallel claim that meaning is normative). As we shall see, many of these arguments are unsuccessful. However, I shall close by giving a sketch of what may be a successful argument for this claim. (shrink)

Pursuing Justice, Second Edition, examines the issue of justice by considering the origins of the idea, formal systems of justice, current global issues of justice, and ways in which justice might be achieved by individuals, organizations, and the global community. Part 1 demonstrates how the idea of justice has emerged over time, starting with religion and philosophy, then moving to the justice as a concern of the state, and finally to the concept of social justice. Part 2 outlines the very (...) different mechanisms used by various nations for achieving state justice, including systems based on common law, civil law, and Islamic law, with a separate discussion of the US justice system. Part 3 focuses on four contemporary issues of justice: war, genocide, slavery, and the environment. Finally, Part 4 shows how individuals and organizations can go about pursuing justice, and describes the rise of global justice. This updated timely book helps students understand the complexities and nuances of a society's pursuit of justice. It provides students with the foundations of global justice systems, integrating Greek philosophies and major religious perspectives into a justice perspective, and contributes to undergraduate understanding of international justice bodies, NGOs, and institutions. New edition is completely updated and revised to achieve relevance for today's students Covers concepts of justice as well as ideas for pursuing and achieving justice Examines how our modern laws began, and traces their evolution to today's laws Presents concepts and issues in justice studies as well as a comparison of several systems of law Teaching resources include discussion questions and real-world examples. (shrink)

This book is Emerson's portrait of the England and the English.

In The Demoralization of Western Culture Ralph Fevre undertakes an explanation of these difficulties.

Nach wie vor formuliert der Hinweis darauf, wie «es in Wirklichkeit ist», einen Wahrheitsanspruch, und nach wie vor hat es eine disqualifizierende Wirkung, wenn wir jemandem «Realitätsverlust» bescheinigen, obgleich man in Philosophie und Kulturwissenschaften seit mindestens einem Jahrhundert und seit einiger Zeit auch in der Psychiatrie darüber diskutiert, ob es «die Wirklichkeit» überhaupt gibt, ob nicht viele - möglicherweise gleichberechtigte - Wirklichkeiten nebeneinander existieren. In dem Band befassen sich Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler aus Ethnologie, Jurisprudenz, Medizin, Philosophie, Psychologie und Soziologie u.a. (...) mit der Frage, ob das Festhalten an einer Wirklichkeit unter bestimmten Umständen sinnvoll ist und was geschieht, wenn unterschiedliche Realitätsauffassungen miteinander konfligieren. (shrink)

St. Thomas Aquinas enables the reader to appreciate both Thomas's continuity with earlier thought and his creative independence. After a useful account of the life and work of St. Thomas, McInerny shows how the thoughts of Aristotle, Boethius, and Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius were assimilated into the personal wisdom of St. Thomas. He also offers a helpful study of the distinctive features of Aquinas's Christian theology.

This anthology is a thorough introduction to classic literature for those who have not yet experienced these literary masterworks. For those who have known and loved these works in the past, this is an invitation to reunite with old friends in a fresh new format. From Shakespeare's finesse to Oscar Wilde's wit, this unique collection brings together works as diverse and influential as The Pilgrim's Progress and Othello. As an anthology that invites readers to immerse themselves in the masterpieces of (...) the literary giants, it is must-have addition to any library. (shrink)

Richard Price’s moral epistemology provides a distinctive account, not only of the sources of our moral knowledge, but also of its limits – that is, of the moral truths that we do not and even cannot know. According to this moral epistemology, the fundamental moral truths are necessary rather than contingent; if they are knowable at all, they are knowable a priori. In general, fundamental moral truths are akin to mathematical truths. Specifically, these necessary moral truths are grounded in the (...) essences of act-types, which are knowable through ‘intuition’ if knowable at all. However, Price firmly rejects utilitarianism, recognizing several different ‘branches of virtue’, which can conflict with each other. As he argues, we cannot know the truth about act-types that exemplify such conflicting branches of virtue if the competing considerations are too finely balanced. This view of moral epistemology is compared with those of several other philosophers, including W. D. Ross. It is argued that Price has a more unified view than Ross: for Price, all moral knowledge flows from a priori intuition, but this is compatible with our being ignorant of many of the fine details of the fundamental truths of morality. (shrink)

This edited book examines conditionals from a number of interdisciplinary perspectives, drawing on research from fields as diverse as linguistics, psychology, philosophy and logic. Across 13 chapters, the authors not only investigate and examine various commonly-held perceptions about conditionals, but they also challenge many of the assumptions underpinning current conditionals scholarship, setting an agenda for future research. Based in part on the papers presented at a unique international summer school - Conditionals in Paris - this volume represents the cutting edge (...) in the study of conditionals, and it will be of interest to scholars in fields including linguistics and psychology, semiotics, philosophy and logic, and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

This work is Emerson's set of essays published in 1860 just before the start of the Civil War: 'Fate,' 'Power,' 'Wealth,' 'Culture,' 'Behavior,' 'Worship,' 'Considerations by the Way,' 'Beauty,' 'Illusions.'.