Abstract According to Aristotle, human beings are by nature political animals. It is now common knowledge that being political is not a human privilege for him: bees, wasps, ants and cranes are other political species. Although they are not the only political animals, human beings, for Aristotle, are still more political than the other political animals. The present article investigates the precise sense of this comparison; and it claims that the higher degree of human politicalness is not to be explained (...) by reference to those exclusively human features like having capacity for speech and moral perception. It is claimed that human beings are more political rather because they live in a multiplicity of communities differing in form. -/- . (shrink)

: In Parts of Animals II.10, 655b37-656a8, Aristotle tacitly identifies a group of animals which partake of “ living only”. This paper is an attempt to understand the nature of this group. It is argued that it is possible to make sense of this designation if we consider that some animals, which are solely endowed with the contact senses, do nothing more than mere immediate nutrition by their perceptive nature and have no other action. It is concluded that some of (...) Aristotle ’s merely living animals would be certain kinds of sponge, certain sea anemones and the ascidians among testacea. (shrink)

Protagoras’ Grand Speech is traditionally considered to articulate a contractualist approach to political existence and morality. There is, however, a newly emerging line of interpretation among scholars, which explores a naturalist layer in Protagoras’ ethical and political thought. This article aims to make a contribution to this new way of reading Protagoras’ speech, by discussing one of its most elaborate versions.

Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations and opinions; in addition, it does not explain how to (...) achieve the state of being “without opinions” about individual things. It is argued that a Fregean analysis of Pyrrho’s views can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. The purpose of the paper, however, is to refine, rather than rebut, the metaphysical reading. (shrink)

This paper claims that Socrates’ refutation of Gorgias in the eponymous dialogue is designed not to find out the truth about the nature of the art of rhetoric itself but to refute the master of rhetoric himself. I try to justify this claim by displaying some major contradictions between the conclusions reached at with Gorgias and those reached at with Polus. When these contradictions are taken into account, the discussion with Polus is to be seen as reflecting the genuine Socratic (...) position about rhetoric, whereas the discussion with Gorgias seems only to be devised as a dexterity in refutation. (shrink)

Observing certain affinities with Plato’s Alcibiades I , this paper argues that a distinction between care (epimeleia ) of the soul and philosophy as its art (technê ) is reflected in Aristotle’s Protrepticus . On the basis of this distinction, it claims that two notions of philosophy can be distinguished in the Protrepticus : philosophy as epistêmê and philosophy as technê . The former has the function of contemplating the truth of nature, and Aristotle praises it as the natural telos (...) of human beings; whereas philosophy as technê helps nature to accomplish the end it designed for human beings. It emerges that according to Aristotle in the Protrepticus philosophy is the art of making oneself coincide with one’s nature as a human being. (shrink)

It has often been argued, in scholarly debate, that Aristotle’s denial of citizenship to the working population of his ideal city in Book VII of the Politics constitutes a fundamental injustice. According to this view, although it is true that their way of life prevents them from living a morally virtuous life, it does not follow that the working people are naturally devoid of the human qualities required for such a life. So, rather than finding a just way to distribute (...) citizenship among the diversity a city’s population would naturally exhibit, Aristotle would commit himself to oligarchic measures in Book VII. In this article, it is argued that the main concern of Book VII is less with a just determination of the extent of citizenship than with conceiving the most efficient way for a city to be happy: this consists in establishing a community composed of individuals who lay claim to happiness in the same way and to the same degree. In other words, it consists in reducing the diversity of Book III to a certain kind of homogeneity. (shrink)

Bu yazı, Phaidon diyaloğunda Sokrates’in ruhun ölümsüzlüğünü ispatlamak için öne sürdüğü argümanlardan biri olan Karşıtların Döngüselliği argümanını değerlendirmektedir. Argümanın merkez terimleri olan “yaşıyor olma” ve “ölü olma”nın argüman boyunca aldığı ya da alabileceği çeşitli anlamlar göz önüne alınarak dört itiraz öne sürülmektedir. Bu iki terimin alabileceği farklı anlamlar, öznenin “beden” ya da “ruh” olarak alınmasına göre farklılık göstermektedir. Yazıda, bu terimlerin alabileceği anlamların hiçbirinde Karşıtların Döngüselliği argümanının başarılı sayılamayacağı yani ruhun ölümsüzlüğünü ispatlayamadığı ileri sürülmüştür. Argümandaki temel sorun, ruhun yaşıyor olması (...) ve ölü olmasının döngüselliğe izin veren bir karşıtlık oluşturacak şekilde kullanılamamasıdır. (shrink)

This paper claims that the argument that Aristotle seems to ascribe to Melissus in Physics III.6 about infinity is different from Melissus’ original argument. On scrutiny, it turns out that the Aristotelian version of the argument takes Melissus to suppose that being is unlimited because it is not in contact with anything else. I claim that this is not Melissus’ notion of unlimitedness for being, and that the Aristotelian version hinges on a reversal of Melissus’ own reasoning.

Ce recueil, préfacé par Pierre Pellegrin et introduit par Emmanuel Bermon, rassemble les contributions de trois journées consacrées aux Politiques d’Aristote, qui ont eu lieu de 2005 à 2007 à l’Université Michel de Montaigne Bordeaux 3. Dans le premier texte du volume, à partir d’un passage célèbre mais peu étudié de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, qui dit que la famille présente des homoiomata et des paradeigmata des différents régimes politiques, Claudio Veloso s’interroge sur le sens à donner à ces...

Susan D. Collins’s turn to Aristotle takes its main motive from a recent need for a reconsideration of the question “What is a citizen?”. According to Collins, from Enlightenment up to now, liberalism’s incessant skepticism towards the existence of a highest human good obscured liberalism’s own position regarding the private and public virtues which make citizens’ life better and worthy of living, and that is the reason why a return to Aristotle’s account of citizenship proves to be pertinen...