In most everyday instances of reasoning, reasoners can gain, lose, and reacquire entitlement to (or justification for) a possible commitment (or belief) as a result of their consecutively acquiring new commitments. For example, we might initially conclude that ‘Tweety can fly’ from ‘Tweety is a bird,’ but later have to reject this conclusion as a result of our coming to learn that Tweety is a penguin. We could, even later, reacquire entitlement to ‘Tweety can fly’ if we became committed (and (...) presumably entitled) to the claim ‘Tweety has a jetpack.’ I will call this very common feature of reasoning entitlement recovery. In this paper I will argue that the types of inferential relations that are central to Brandom’s entire account of language and reasoning make entitlement recovery impossible. I will then briefly attempt to diagnose why this problem arises for Brandom and suggest how his account should be modified so that it will successfully allow entitlement recovery. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Brandom argues that functionalism must ultimately fail because it will not be able to explain how we can holistically update our beliefs solely in terms of abilities possessed by non-linguistic things. In this paper I respond to this argument by arguing that non-linguistic animals encounter and overcome an analogous sort of holistic updating problem. I will also try to demystify holism and de-intellectualize language use/reasoning.

This dissertation will use neopragmatist philosophy to examine three important concepts in entrepreneurship theorizing: entrepreneurial uncertainty, venture ideas, and entrepreneurial opportunities. Neopragmatist philosophers typically understand meaning, objectivity, correct reasoning, and knowledge in terms of social-linguistic interpretive practices. Each of these concepts are perspectival in the sense that different people will interpret others as having a different view than themselves on what is actually objective etc.. According to neopragmatists we should analyse these concepts not by trying to identify any sort of (...) criteria which distinguishes which perspectives are actually correct, but instead identify how these concepts are used when people try to interpret the perspectives of others in relation to their own. This dissolves many difficult ontological problems. I will argue that the concepts ‘entrepreneurial uncertainty’, ‘venture ideas’, and ‘entrepreneurial opportunities’ are similarly perspectival and that a neopragmatist lens allows us to fruitfully understand them in terms of how we scholars use them when interpreting the perspectives of the entrepreneurs we are studying—who are in turn interpreting the perspectives of their stakeholders. In chapter two I will argue that Knightian uncertainty seems largely irrelevant to practicing entrepreneurs, and that we should reconceptualize and study entrepreneurial uncertainty as a lack of social justificatory resources. In chapter three I argue that instead of conceptualizing venture ideas as mental representations we should instead conceptualize them in terms of their role in social justificatory practices whereby entrepreneurs have to navigate how their perspectives diverge from their stakeholders. In Chapter four I argue that when an entrepreneurship scholars says that an entrepreneur pursues an opportunity they are not only claiming that the entrepreneur perceives the course of action as favourable, but are themselves taking a stand on its favourability relative to whatever theoretical lens they are using. The question “what are entrepreneurial opportunities” ceases to be an ontological debate and becomes instead a more fruitful debate about how we scholars can bring relevant theoretical insights to the perspectives of practicing entrepreneurs. (shrink)