For naturalism, fed on recent cosmological speculations, mankind is in a position similar to that of a set of people living on a frozen lake, surrounded by cliffs over which there is no escape, yet knowing that little by little the ice is melting, and the inevitable day drawing near when the last film of it will disappear, and to be drowned ignominiously will be the human creature’s portion. The merrier the skating, the warmer and more sparkling the sun by (...) day, and the ruddier the bonfires at night, the more poignant the sadness with which one must take in the meaning of the total situation. —William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience1. (shrink)

Depuis près de cent cinquante ans, l’essai du mathématicien William Kingdon Clifford intitulé The Ethics of Belief est au centre de la plupart des discussions sur les rapports entre éthique et épistémologie, plus précisément sur les questions d’épistémologie et d’éthique de la croyance religieuse car, même si la croyance religieuse n’est jamais la cible exclusive de Clifford, le contexte de sa rédaction ainsi que la quasi-totalité des exemples pris par Clifford portent sur la religion. On opp...

The question of a pragmatist justification of religious beliefs appeared in James’s writing in 1898, as an alternative to Royce’s theory of the absolute. This pragmatist justification was repeated in The Varieties of Religious Experiences in 1902 but it failed to give a proper account of the truth of religious beliefs based on private religious experiences and ultimately failed to answer Royce’s arguments. James knows that any possible pragmatist justification of religious belief based on the practical consequences of religious belief (...) must be completed by a metaphysical theory of the non-natural causality of religious experiences. But that would require going beyond the dualistic and naturalistic account of the Varieties. Nevertheless, the difficulties of the monistic theories of the Essays in Radical Empiricism pushed James to defend, in A Pluralistic Universe, a pantheistic theory in which the Absolute is accepted as a logical possibility, which in turn supposes to accept the composition theory of consciousness that he had rejected in The Principle of Psychology. Therefore, James’s final theory isn’t very different to Royce’s theory, since Royce’s theory is not a theory of the necessity of the Absolute but rather a theory of its possibility. (shrink)

Many aspects of The Varieties of Religious Experience found their theoretical background in other books of James psychology or philosophy. In this article I try to connect his theory of imagination in The Principle of Psychology with his supernaturalism regarding religious experience. Both suppose a theory of the “feeling of reality” that explains how, under the working of imagination, abstract ideas or remote ideals can be perceived as real and lively, becoming motives for action, although they may not have anything (...) to do with sense experience. Although imagination is not mentioned in James’s doctrine of the will to believe, it is central in both understanding this doctrine as well as the overall vision of James psychology and philosophy of religion. Similarly, imagination is essential to grasp a better understanding of how ideas and ideals unite with reality in Dewey’s thoughts concerning religion. I find it useful, in order to have a better understanding of James position, to compare it with what Dewey has to say about it in A Common Faith. Contrasting their theories will show that James’s understanding of imagination can only be understood if rooted in a kind of realism about the ‘unseen universe’. (shrink)