The most famous chapter of Montesquieu’s _ The Spirit of the Laws _ (1748), Book XI, Chapter 6, 'On the constitution of England,' was an important i nspiration to the creators of modern constitutions, to which they often referred. However, as a result of scholarly focus on the political institutions discussed in this book, Montesquieu’s economic analysis has been woefully neglected. In order to correct this scholarly imbalance, this paper will elucidate the essential significance of Montesquieu’s comparison between the constitution (...) of modern England and that of ancient Rome in Book XI of _ The Spirit of the Laws _ ; inextricable relationship between military and political institutions on the one hand, and the transfer and distribution of wealth on the other. To argue this point, this paper will focus on Montesquieu’s other writings in the same year and shortly after the publication of _ The Spirit of the Laws _ : the revised edition in 1748 of _ The Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of t... _. (shrink)

One influential positive argument for moral realism is the Explanatory Indispensability Argument. A crucial premise of this argument is the explanatory relevance of moral properties. On this premise, moral properties, such as wrongness, rightness, courage, and cowardice, are explanatorily indispensable to some empirical phenomena. Although there has been a lively debate on this premise, one crucial challenge to this thesis, what I call the Scientific Standard Challenge, has not been properly discussed. After explaining this challenge and a related concern, I (...) argue that in response to this central challenge, the proponents of the argument should take what I call the localist turn to defend the explanatory indispensability of moral properties. The localist turn encourages the defenders of moral explanations to be more sensitive to the nature of each moral explanation. For instance, some moral explanations are explanations of social matters, so the standards they need to meet are provided by relevant branches of the social sciences. On the other hand, some other moral explanations are about our psychology, so the theoretical standards those explanations need to meet should come from psychology. I illustrate how this localist project can be conducted in the case of the moral explanation that appeals to injustice. I argue that the field of comparative politics provides the theoretical standards moral explanations of institutional change need to meet. I shall then illustrate how a sophisticated moral explanation can meet those theoretical standards and how this moral explanation can be strong evidence of injustice’s explanatory indispensability. (shrink)

Abstract“The wrongness of Albert's action causally explains why Jane judged that his action was wrong”. This type of causal moral explanation has been extensively discussed in the recent metaethical literature. This paper motivates the following claims about this type of moral explanation. First, a typical defence of this type of moral explanation suggested in the literature does not work because it predicts inaccurate modal information. Second, focusing on different aspects of the ways moral judgements are generated provides better chances for (...) the defender of this type of moral explanation. Third, the strategy mentioned in the previous point leads us to the following alternative evaluative explanation: The property of being a harmful action explains a recognisable pattern of moral judgements observed in the relevant empirical studies. One crucial implication the paper alludes to is a localist approach to the debates concerning moral realism: We should consider each moral property's ontological genuineness separately, referring to specific empirical findings that are particularly relevant to the target moral property in question. Such a localist approach can provide solid resources for realists to respond to various anti‐realist challenges, such as an influential evolutionary debunking argument. (shrink)

朱子学は現代に生きる私たちにとって価値なきものなのだろうか? 儒教思想と近代的権利概念の親和性に着目、再検証を試みる。.

We develop intuitionistic public announcement logic over intuitionistic \({\textbf{K}}\), \({{\textbf{K}}}{{\textbf{T}}}\), \({{\textbf{K}}}{{\textbf{4}}}\), and \({{\textbf{S}}}{{\textbf{4}}}\) with distributed knowledge. We reveal that a recursion axiom for the distributed knowledge is _not_ valid for a frame class discussed in [ 12 ] but valid for the restricted frame class introduced in [ 20, 26 ]. The semantic completeness of the static logics for this restricted frame class is established via the concept of pseudo-model.

In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation (...) implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results. (shrink)

Proof-theoretical notions and techniques, developed on the basis of sentential/symbolic representations of formal proofs, are applied to Euler diagrams. A translation of an Euler diagrammatic system into a natural deduction system is given, and the soundness and faithfulness of the translation are proved. Some consequences of the translation are discussed in view of the notion of free ride, which is mainly discussed in the literature of cognitive science as an account of inferential efficacy of diagrams. The translation enables us to (...) formalize and analyze free ride in terms of proof theory. The notion of normal form of Euler diagrammatic proofs is investigated, and a normalization theorem is proved. Some consequences of the theorem are further discussed: in particular, an analysis of the structure of normal diagrammatic proofs; a diagrammatic counterpart of the usual subformula property; and a characterization of diagrammatic proofs compared with natural deduction proofs. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates an empirical analysis of the visual order of membership categories in a way consistent with both an early ethnomethodological research interest and recent arguments in membership categorization analysis. Early ethnomethodological studies have highlighted that we can infer and understand the membership categories of observed people about whom we have no information in advance, even without talking to them. Recent membership categorization analysts have argued the methodological importance of using video data. Given this, fictional films serve as video (...) data to advance the investigation into the visual order of membership categories since audiences do not know the fictional characters’ information in advance and cannot talk to them. We analyze how potential audiences understand fictional characters’ membership categories and how production crew members organize the visual and conversational order of membership categories. The analysis illustrates that our practical inferences of fictional characters’ membership categories are based on conversations among characters and visually available information. Such visually available information includes environments and lighting, as well as characters’ clothes, body orientations, facial expressions, and physical distance from each other. In other words, production crew members of fictional films design the visual and conversational order for remote audiences by arranging visually available information and fictional characters’ conversations. The findings provide insights into the “possible correctness” and “defeasibility” of membership categorization practices. Particularly regarding fictional characters’ membership categories, production crew members can employ the “possible correctness” and “defeasibility” of categorization practices to mislead audiences. (shrink)

To investigate the relationship between logical reasoning and majority voting, we introduce logic with groups Lg in the style of Gentzen’s sequent calculus, where every sequent is indexed by a group of individuals. We also introduce the set-theoretical semantics of Lg, where every formula is interpreted as a certain closed set of groups whose members accept that formula. We present the cut-elimination theorem, and the soundness and semantic completeness theorems of Lg. Then, introducing an inference rule representing majority voting to (...) Lg, we introduce logic with majority voting Lv. Formalizing the discursive paradox in judgment aggregation theory, we show that Lv is inconsistent. Based on the premise-based and conclusion-based approaches to avoid the paradox, we introduce logic with majority voting for axioms Lva, where majority voting is applied only to non-logical axioms as premises to construct a proof in Lg, and logic with majority voting for conclusions Lvc, where majority voting is applied only to the conclusion of a proof in Lg. We show that both Lva and Lvc are syntactically complete and consistent, and we construct collective judgments based on the provability in Lva and Lvc, respectively. Then, we discuss how these systems avoid the discursive paradox. (shrink)

One of the traditional applications of Euler diagrams is as a representation or counterpart of the usual set-theoretical models of given sentences. However, Euler diagrams have recently been investigated as the counterparts of logical formulas, which constitute formal proofs. Euler diagrams are rigorously defined as syntactic objects, and their inference systems, which are equivalent to some symbolic logical systems, are formalized. Based on this observation, we investigate both counter-model construction and proof-construction in the framework of Euler diagrams. We introduce the (...) notion of “counter-diagrammatic proof”, which shows the invalidity of a given inference, and which is defined as a syntactic manipulation of diagrams of the same sort as inference rules to construct proofs. Thus, in our Euler diagrammatic framework, the completeness theorem can be formalized in terms of the existence of a diagrammatic proof or a counter-diagrammatic proof. (shrink)

The logic CD is an intermediate logic which exactly corresponds to the Kripke models with constant domains. It is known that the logic CD has a Gentzen-type formulation called LD and rules are replaced by the corresponding intuitionistic rules) and that the cut-elimination theorem does not hold for LD. In this paper we present a modification of LD and prove the cut-elimination theorem for it. Moreover we prove a “weak” version of cut-elimination theorem for LD, saying that all “cuts” except (...) some special forms can be eliminated from a proof in LD. From these cut-elimination theorems we obtain some corollaries on syntactical properties of CD: fragments collapsing into intuitionistic logic. Harrop disjunction and existence properties, and a fact on the number of logical symbols in the axiom of CD. (shrink)

This paper presents a polarized phase semantics, with respect to which the linear fragment of second order polarized linear logic of Laurent [15] is complete. This is done by adding a topological structure to Girard's phase semantics [9]. The topological structure results naturally from the categorical construction developed by Hamano—Scott [12]. The polarity shifting operator ↓ (resp. ↑) is interpreted as an interior (resp. closure) operator in such a manner that positive (resp. negative) formulas correspond to open (resp. closed) facts. (...) By accommodating the exponentials of linear logic, our model is extended to the polarized fragment of the second order linear logic. Strong forms of completeness theorems are given to yield cut-eliminations for the both second order systems. As an application of our semantics, the first order conservativity of linear logic is studied over its polarized fragment of Laurent [16]. Using a counter model construction, the extension of this conservativity is shown to fail into the second order, whose solution is posed as an open problem in [16]. After this negative result, a second order conservativity theorem is proved for an eta expanded fragment of the second order linear logic, which fragment retains a focalized sequent property of [3]. (shrink)

The present contribution shows that a Hilbert-style axiomatization for dynamic logic of relation changers is complete for the standard Kripke semantics not by a well-known rewriting technique but by the idea of an auxiliary semantics studied by van Benthem and Wang et al. A key insight of our auxiliary semantics for dynamic logic of relation changers can be described as: “relation changers are bounded morphisms.” Moreover, we demonstrate that this semantic insight can be used to provide a modular cut-free labelled (...) sequent calculus for the logic in the sense that our calculus can be regarded as a natural expansion of a labelled sequent calculus of iteration-free propositional dynamic logic. (shrink)

In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation (...) implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results. (shrink)

We introduce several restricted versions of the structural rules in the implicational fragment of Gentzen's sequent calculus LJ. For example, we permit the applications of a structural rule only if its principal formula is an implication. We investigate cut-eliminability and theorem-equivalence among various combinations of them. The results include new cut-elimination theorems for the implicational fragments of the following logics: relevant logic E, strict implication S4, and their neighbors (e.g., E-W and S4-W); BCI-logic, BCK-logic, relevant logic R, and the intuitionistic (...) logic. (shrink)

In this essay, I first argue that the Gray’s Elegy Argument—the dense passage in Bertrand Russell’s ‘On Denoting’—can be interpreted as a single, coherent argument against the notion that a definite description corresponds to what I call a multifaceted object—an object having multiple facets or sides. I then look into some manuscripts Russell wrote in 1904 and in 1905. I show that he had envisaged the notion of a multifaceted object and used it for two different purposes before he discovered (...) various objections to it, which he turned into the Gray’s Elegy Argument. (shrink)