One cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any mortal substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and again gathers; it forms and dissolves, and approaches and departs—Heraclitus. Play is always play of absence and presence, but if one wishes to think it radically, one must think it before the alternative of presence and absence; it is necessary to think of Being as presence or absence from the possibility of play on, and not the other (...) way around—Derrida. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility is a recognised and common part of business activity. Some of the regularly cited motives behind CSR are employee morale, recruitment and retention, with employees acknowledged as a key organisational stakeholder. Despite the significance of employees in relation to CSR, relatively few studies have examined their engagement with CSR and the impediments relevant to this engagement. This exploratory case study-based research addresses this paucity of attention, drawing on one to one interviews and observation in a large UK (...) energy company. A diversity of engagement was found, ranging from employees who exhibited detachment from the CSR activities within the company, to those who were fully engaged with the CSR activities, and to others who were content with their own personal, but not organisational, engagement with CSR. A number of organisational context impediments, including poor communication, a perceived weak and low visibility of CSR culture, and lack of strategic alignment of CSR to business and personal objectives, served to explain this diversity of employee engagement. Social exchange theory is applied to help explore the volition that individual employees have towards their engagement with CSR activities, and to consider the implications of an implicit social, rather than explicit economic, contract between an organisation and its employees in their engagement with CSR. (shrink)

One cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any mortal substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and again gathers; it forms and dissolves, and approaches and departs—Heraclitus. Play is always play of absence and presence, but if one wishes to think it radically, one must think it before the alternative of presence and absence; it is necessary to think of Being as presence or absence from the possibility of play on, and not the other (...) way around—Derrida. (shrink)

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This article examines the nonhistoricist higher-order compatibilist theory of moral responsibility devised and defended by Harry G. Frankfurt. Intuitions about certain kinds of cases of moral responsibility cast significant doubt on the wide irrelevancy clause of the nonhistoricist feature of Frankfurt’s theory. It will be argued that, while the questions of the nature and ascription of moral responsibility must be separated in doing moral responsibility theory, the questions of whether or not and the extent to which an agent is morally (...) responsible for performing certain kinds of actions cannot be settled without also answering the question of the history of that agent’s attitudes, preferences, etc. which may have contributed to the agent’s performing such actions. Thus Frankfurt’s repeated claim that the history of an agent’s action is “irrelevant” to the question of that agent’s moral responsibility for it is rendered dubious, thereby rendering problematic the strongly nonhistoricist component of his theory. The methodological difference between my challenge to Frankfurt’s nonhistoricism and those of others is that, while others have challenged Frankfurt’s nonhistoriciams by way of thought experiments involving hyper-manipulation, mine presents a set of counter-examples to his nonhistoricism which emanate from morality and the law. Indeed, if my counter-example is plausible, then Frankfurt’s nonhistoricism cannot make good sense of some standard instances of racism. Furthermore, while many believe that racist hate crimes ought to be punished more heavily than crimes committed absent hate, the argument herein provides reasons for mitigating, rather than increasing, the responsibility and punishments of many such crimes. What matters in such cases is the extent to which the hatred accompanying said crimes has a history in the agent’s life, one which makes it significantly difficult for her to do other than what she did in committing the racist crime. (shrink)

Professor Keith Lehrer has recently argued for what this author shall refer to as his “preference compatibilism,” according to which, among other things, knowledge of S’s preferences is what a counterfactual intervener uses to decide when S will depart from the counterfactual intervener’s plan. Lehrer assumes, among other things, Harry G. Frankfurt’s notion of “effective wants,” which are what Lehrer calls “preferences that reveal themselves in choice given the opportunity to act”. While the author here generally concurs with Lehrer’s preference (...) compatibilism, he shall make some suggestions with the intention of increasing its plausibility even further, especially with regard to its conception of free will when it is considered in light of certain matters of philosophy of law in particular and the ethics of responsibility more generally. (shrink)

Much has been written about recidivist punishments, particularly within the area of criminology. However there is a notorious lack of penal philosophical reflection on this issue. This book attempts to fill that gap by presenting the philosopher’s view on this matter as a way of furthering the debate on recidivist punishments.

A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a Bayesian predictive processing framework to account for the formation of delusions. The key here is that delusions form because of disrupted prediction error signalling. Parrott’s recent critique argues that the framework is incomplete in two respects: it leaves unclear why delusional hypotheses are selected over none at all or over more plausible alternatives; it leaves unclear how exactly it is that delusional hypotheses are (...) generated in the first place. In this paper, we defend the framework’s explanatory power by way of showing how it can go a long way in helping disentangle these concerns. We take up each of them in turn. As for the first, our argument turns on two claims: a) believing nothing, although possible in principle, may not be a viable procedure in the circumstances; b) alternative hypotheses may be rendered unavailable for selection, due to aberrant prediction errors. As for the second concern, we distinguish three ways in which delusional hypotheses may be initially acquired, all of which are based on experience broadly construed. (shrink)

Mouthpiece interpreters of Plato such as Richard Kraut and Julia Annas believe that Plato had philosophical beliefs, doctrines, and theories that he intended to convey in his dialogues. We argue that some of their primary arguments for this approach to Plato are problematic and that there is a more promising approach to Plato’s dialogues than the mouthpiece interpretation, all things considered.

Mouthpiece interpreters of Plato such as Richard Kraut and Julia Annas believe that Plato had philosophical beliefs, doctrines, and theories that he intended to convey in his dialogues. We argue that some of their primary arguments for this approach to Plato are problematic and that there is a more promising approach to Plato’s dialogues than the mouthpiece interpretation, all things considered.

A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a Bayesian predictive processing framework to account for the formation of delusions. The key here is that delusions form because of disrupted prediction error signalling. Parrott’s recent critique argues that the framework is incomplete in two respects: it leaves unclear why delusional hypotheses are selected over none at all or over more plausible alternatives; it leaves unclear how exactly it is that delusional hypotheses are (...) generated in the first place. In this paper, we defend the framework’s explanatory power by way of showing how it can go a long way in helping disentangle these concerns. We take up each of them in turn. As for the first, our argument turns on two claims: a) believing nothing, although possible in principle, may not be a viable procedure in the circumstances; b) alternative hypotheses may be rendered unavailable for selection, due to aberrant prediction errors. As for the second concern, we distinguish three ways in which delusional hypotheses may be initially acquired, all of which are based on experience broadly construed. (shrink)

This volume provides discussions of both the concept of responsibility and of punishment, and of both individual and collective responsibility. It provides in-depth Socratic and Kantian bases for a new version of retributivism, and defends that version against the main criticisms that have been raised against retributivism in general. It includes chapters on criminal recidivism and capital punishment, as well as one on forgiveness, apology and punishment that is congruent with the basic precepts of the new retributivism defended therein. Finally, (...) chapters on corporate responsibility and punishment are included, with a closing chapter on holding the U.S. accountable for its most recent invasion and occupation of Iraq. The book is well-focused but also presents the widest ranging set of topics of any book of its kind as it demonstrates how the concepts of responsibility and punishment apply to some of the most important problems of our time. “This is one of the best books on punishment, and the Fourth Edition continues its tradition of excellence. The book connects punishment importantly to moral responsibility and desert, and it is comprehensive in its scope, both addressing abstract, theoretical issues and applied issues as well. The topics treated include collective responsibility, apology, forgiveness, capital punishment, and war crimes. Highly recommended.”—John Martin Fischer, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside. (shrink)

Introduction : approaching Plato's dialogues -- The mouthpiece interpretation -- The anti-mouthpiece interpretation -- A Socratic interpretation of the concept of art as mimesis -- Conclusion : appreciating Plato's dialogues.

This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and a (...) concern with the concept of desert. Each objection is deflected in order to ward-off what seem to be the most serious criticisms of a retributivist view of punishment and to clarify the depth of the retributivist position. (shrink)

The history of scholarship, philosophical or otherwise, about Plato and his writings reveals a quandary pertaining to the interpretation of the contents of Plato's dialogues. To understand Plato one must come to terms with this problem: how ought Plato's writings to be interpreted?

In some recent articles, Dr. Leigh Turner [Doffing the Mask: Why Manuscript Reviewers Ought to Be Identifiable,” Journal of Academic Ethics, 1 (2003), pp. 41–48; “Promoting F.A.I.T.H. in Peer Review: Five Core Attributes in Effective Peer Review,” Journal of Academic Ethics, 1 (2003), pp. 181–188.] makes some rather critical observations regarding the processes of peer-review in academic journals. I shall note them in turn, note wherein I concur and wherein I disagree, and discuss some of Turner's suggestions to resolve such (...) difficulties. It is hoped that my comments on Turner's much-appreciated points will engage readers of this august and well-edited journal to take more seriously Turner's arguments for the sake of the betterment of academic research. (shrink)

This paper summarizes some of the major concepts of Raimo Tuomela’s social ontology as it is articulated and defended in his most recent major works and provides a set of objections to it. It also suggests some ways to plausibly revise Tuomela’s analysis of social groups in order to evade our concerns.

This paper challenges Professor Myles Brand’s position on the role and value of intercollegiate athletics in U.S. colleges and universities on the ground that it fails to account for considerations of deep fiscal responsibility. It presents both a philosophical and ethical criticism of his position that broadens the discussion beyond athletics to include a particular kind of higher educational institution more generally.

In his famous essay, "A Puzzle About Belief," Saul Kripke poses a puzzle regarding belief. In this paper I shall first describe Kripke's puzzle. Second, I shall introduce and examine five positions one might take in attempting to solve Kripke's Puzzle. In so doing, I shall show why each of these attempts fails to solve Kripke's Puzzle. The significance of this analysis is that if Kripke's Puzzle remains unresolved, then (as Kripke himself claims) the normal apparatus for belief ascription needs (...) rethinking. (shrink)

Equality and Liberty: Analysing Rawls and Nozick is an indispensable source for those seriously interested in some rigorous assessments of the ideas of America's two most popular political philosophers. The essays in this volume cover a wide range of topics, some engaging each other in their analyses of particular Rawlsian or Nozickian themes. This collection of recent essays brings the student up-to-date concerning some of the more recent developments and assessments of Rawlsian and Nozickian ideas.

This article is a critical philosophical assessment of John Searle’s theory of human rights as it is articulated both in his earlier book, The Construction of Social Reality and especially in his more recent book, Making the Social World.

Given the basic tenets of just war theory and those of United States law regard- ing compensatory justice, it is argued that the U.S. invasion of Iraq from 2003-present is morally unjust and that the U.S. owes substantial reparations to Iraq.