Explores the complex nature of truth in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

Semantic antirealists such as Dummett read Wittgenstein as endorsing the view that we must reject a truth conditional account of meaning in favor of one based on assertibility conditions. I take issue with that interpretation: I argue that Wittgenstein held a unique account of truth which does not fit neatly into the categories of realism and antirealism and which, moreover, undermines the dichotomy between them. Wittgenstein identified truth conditions with conventions and criteria whereby we predicate "is true" of our sentences. (...) And he held that because different sentences in a language are accepted as true upon different kinds of grounds, what is meant by calling a statement "true" varies for statements within different language games. Therefore, Wittgenstein has a novel conception of truth which can be applied, across the board, to all sentences in a language; a conception which links the truth condition of a statement to the way that the statement is used. I further argue that an implication of "meaning is use" is that we should revise our project of formulating an account of truth simpliciter, and focus instead on articulating the concept of truth that emerges from our uses of the predicate "is true". (shrink)

Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy as an activity rather than a subject. Thus, his work is highly relevant to the contemporary philosophical counseling movement. This paper explores the ways in which his views on how to do philosophy shed light on how we can approach philosophical counseling. First, Witgenstein's anti-theoretical approach to conceptual analysis highlights the dangers of interpreting clients? symptoms in light of theory. Second, his notion that "pictures hold us captive" underscores the need to help clients recognize unfounded assumptions (...) underlying their apparent dilemmas. Finally, Wittgenstein's Socratic conception of philosophy as a means to lead an authentic life shows the value of philosophizing beyond the confines of the academy. (shrink)

Frege's doctrine that the demonstrative ‘I’ has a private, incommunicable sense creates tension within his theory of meaning. Fregean sense is supposed to be something objective, which exists independently of its being cognized by anyone. And the notion of a private sense corresponding to primitive aspects of an individual of which only he can be awaredoes violence both to Frege's theory of sense as well as to our notionof language as something essentially intersubjective. John Perry has arguedthat Frege was led (...) to the doctrine of private senses in spite of his beliefin the objectivity of sense through his attempt to solve a problem which indexicals posed for his theory. And while philosophers have argued about whether the notion of a private sense is in fact problematic for Frege, they have tended to share Perry's assumption about its origin. (shrink)