The present study extends the meaningful work and ethics literature by comparing three ethics-related antecedents. The second contribution of this paper is that in using a multi-dimensional MFW construct we offer a more fine-tuned understanding of the impact of ethical antecedents on different dimensions of MFW, such as expressing full potential and integrity with self. Using an international data set from 879 employees and structural equation modelling, we confirmed an updated seven-dimension Comprehensive Meaningful Work Scale. The structural model found that (...) fairness, responsible leadership and worthy work are all significant and positively related to the majority of meaningfulness dimensions. However, different antecedents are related to different dimensions of MFW, showing that a complex and multi-level combination of ethics-related practices are required to cultivate MFW. All relationships were in the expected positive direction except responsible leadership, which was negatively related to the MFW dimension of integrity with self. Across the seven dimensions of MFW, only the dimension ‘Service to Others’ was uniformly not predicted by any antecedent. However, all three antecedents significantly related to important dimensions of MFW not usually measured in the ethics literature, such as ‘Unity with Others’ and ‘Expressing Full Potential’. In addition, we conducted dominance analysis to test the relative importance of the three antecedent across the MFW dimensions, and found that worthy work is the most dominant antecedent, although all three antecedents are the most dominant for at least one MFW dimension—further highlighting the importance of exploring MFW as a multi-dimensional construct. We discuss the implications for MFW theory and practice. (shrink)

The present study extends the meaningful work and ethics literature by comparing three ethics-related antecedents. The second contribution of this paper is that in using a multi-dimensional MFW construct we offer a more fine-tuned understanding of the impact of ethical antecedents on different dimensions of MFW, such as expressing full potential and integrity with self. Using an international data set from 879 employees and structural equation modelling, we confirmed an updated seven-dimension Comprehensive Meaningful Work Scale. The structural model found that (...) fairness, responsible leadership and worthy work are all significant and positively related to the majority of meaningfulness dimensions. However, different antecedents are related to different dimensions of MFW, showing that a complex and multi-level combination of ethics-related practices are required to cultivate MFW. All relationships were in the expected positive direction except responsible leadership, which was negatively related to the MFW dimension of integrity with self. Across the seven dimensions of MFW, only the dimension ‘Service to Others’ was uniformly not predicted by any antecedent. However, all three antecedents significantly related to important dimensions of MFW not usually measured in the ethics literature, such as ‘Unity with Others’ and ‘Expressing Full Potential’. In addition, we conducted dominance analysis to test the relative importance of the three antecedent across the MFW dimensions, and found that worthy work is the most dominant antecedent, although all three antecedents are the most dominant for at least one MFW dimension—further highlighting the importance of exploring MFW as a multi-dimensional construct. We discuss the implications for MFW theory and practice. (shrink)

: Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism and methodological contextualism. I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in its mechanism for (...) changing contexts. However, methodological contextualism still faces two challenges: explaining why we are solidly committed to some contexts, and explaining why knowledge within a context is valuable. I propose virtue contextualism as a useful extension of methodological contextualism, focusing on the way that our virtues depend on our social roles. My proposed virtue contextualism retains the benefits of methodological contextualism while explaining both our commitment to particular contexts and the value of knowledge held within those contexts. (shrink)

What is the best model of epistemic agency for virtue epistemology? Insofar as the intellectual and moral virtues are similar, it is desirable to develop models of agency that are similar across the two realms. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics present a model of the virtues on which the moral and intellectual virtues are unified. The Stoics’ materialism and determinism also help to explain how we can be responsible for our beliefs even when we cannot believe otherwise. In this paper I (...) show how a neo-Stoic model of epistemic agency can address common objections to treating epistemic and moral agency similarly and allow a robust explanatory role for character in determining our actions and beliefs. The picture of epistemic responsibility that flows from this model also explains why we often deserve credit for our knowledge, while demonstrating that the truth of our beliefs is not something for which we are epistemically responsible. (shrink)

Attributor contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism both suggest ways in which our concept of knowledge depends on a context. Both offer approaches that incorporate traditionally non-epistemic elements into our standards for knowledge. But neither can account for the fact that the social role of a subject affects the standards that the subject must meet in order to warrant a knowledge attribution. I illustrate the dependence of the standards for knowledge on the social roles of the knower with three types of examplesand (...) show why neither attributor contextualism nor subject-sensitive invariantism can explain them. I then suggest that subject-sensitive invariantism should be supplemented with insights from virtue epistemology so that it can explain the dependence of the standards of knowledge on social roles. This supplementation of subject-sensitive invariantism helps to solve a persistent problem facing that theory: the case of knowledge attributions made by those in high-stakes contexts about subjects in low-stakes contexts. (shrink)

What role can intellectual virtues play in an account of knowledge when we interpret those virtues internalistically, i.e., as depending only on internal states of the cognizer? Though it has been argued that internalist virtues are ill suited to play any role in an account of knowledge, I will show that, on the contrary, internalist virtues can play an important role in recent accounts of knowledge developed to utilize externalist virtues. The virtue account of knowledge developed by Linda Zagzebski is (...) intended to be supplemented by her version of the intellectual virtues which require an external success component. John Greco and Wayne Riggs both develop credit accounts of knowledge on which the abilities we use when we get credit for a true belief must be reliable. I examine the similarities between these three accounts of knowledge and demonstrate that internalist virtues fit into these accounts just as well as externalist virtues. Thus, although internalist virtues do not require a reliable connection to truth, they can still play an important role in defining the truth-requiring concept of knowledge. (shrink)

If we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual virtue, though constructed to (...) accommodate our intuitions in such cases, cannot fully do so. I further argue that only adopting an internalist structure of the virtues will provide intellectual virtues that appropriately mirror the structure of the classical moral virtues. Finally, I argue that only an internalist structure of the virtues can explain why the intellectual virtues are valuable in themselves. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Virtues and Our Social Roles: Moral and Epistemic Epistemic Contextualism Attributor Contextualism Problems for Attributor Contextualism Methodological Contextualism Problems for Methodological Contextualism Virtue Contextualism: Methodological Contextualism Supplemented with Social Roles An Objection Considered Conclusion Acknowledgments References.

“Songspirals are a university for us, they are a map of understandings” (Gay’wu Group of Women, 2019, p. 33). This paper is authored by Bawaka Country, acknowledging Country’s ability to teach and share. Country is homeland and place. Country is everything and the relationships that bring everything to life. Country is knowledge. This paper is shaped and enabled by songspirals. Songspirals are sung and cried by Yolŋu people in north east Arnhem Land, Australia, to awaken Country, to make and remake (...) the life-giving connections between people and place. The Goŋ-gurtha songspiral leads this paper, showing us how a Yolŋu Country-led pedagogy centres Country’s active agency by learning through, with, and as Country. This pedagogy shares with us the ongoing connections within and between generations to ensure that knowledge remains strong and that sharing is done the right way, according to Yolŋu Rom, Law/Lore. This learning is predicated on relationality and responsibility. It is a more-than-human learning in which human knowing is decentred and Country is knowledgeable. It is a learning which recognises and respects its limits and it is a learning in which the ongoing sovereignty of Yolŋu people is front and centre. (shrink)

Catherine Elgin has recently offered compatibility with autonomy as a plausible criterion for the epistemic virtues. This approach mixes elements of Kantianism with virtue theory. Sasha Mudd has criticized this combination on the grounds that it weakens the structure of Kantian autonomy and undermines its resources for responding to cultural relativism. Elgin’s more recent defense of the role of autonomy has taken a more Kantian turn. Here, I defend Elgin’s original claim, grounding it in a distinctively virtue theoretic account of (...) the development of virtues. Exploring how individuals develop their epistemic virtues within a social context, I show how these virtues can be grounded in both developmental and constitutive relational autonomy. I further argue that a virtue theoretic conception of autonomy should be substantive, not just procedural, and this limits concerns about relativism. (shrink)

Abstract Can the wise person be fooled? The Stoics take a very strong view on this question, holding that the wise person (or sage) is never deceived and never believes anything that is false. This seems to be an implausibly strong claim, but it follows directly from some basic tenets of the Stoic cognitive and psychological world-view. In developing an account of what wisdom really requires, I will explore the tenets of the Stoic view that lead to this infallibilism about (...) wisdom, and show that many of the elements of the Stoic picture can be preserved in a more plausible fallibilist approach. Specifically, I propose to develop a Stoic fallibilist virtue epistemology that is based on the Stoic model of the moral virtues. This model of the intellectual virtues will show that (in keeping with a folk distinction) the wise person is never befooled, though that person might be fooled. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0158-0 Authors Sarah Wright, Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, 107 Peabody Hall, Athens, GA 30602, USA Journal Acta Analytica Online ISSN 1874-6349 Print ISSN 0353-5150. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker identifies a specific kind of epistemic harm that comes from assigning diminished credibility to others; when this is the result of identity prejudice it results in testimonial injustice. Fricker argues that this kind of injustice follows only from assigning diminished credibility to a person; assigning inflated credibility is never a testimonial injustice. In this paper I examine and expand arguments to the effect that assigning inflated credibility to one person can epistemically harm another. I extend this argument to (...) self-evaluation. Psychological research on the overconfidence bias reveals ways in which we may systematically assign too much epistemic credibility to ourselves. However, our biases are not simple; they have a complex pattern revealed by the Dunning–Kruger effect. I will argue that we need to develop virtues of self-evaluation help counteract our self-bias. These virtues will be an important tool in helping us to avoid committing epistemic injustice to ourselves and to others. (shrink)

As I travel the highways of Georgia, I am regularly appalled by the ubiquitous presence of kudzu. It covers trees, telephone poles, open swathes of land, and old houses, making many locations indistinguishable from one another; all I can see from the road is a wave of green covering any formerly distinctive markings. Thinking back to the intentional introduction of kudzu to the American southeast, I recognize that those individuals who encouraged the planting of kudzu made a serious mistake.1 Their (...) introduction of an invasive species has produced real harms to my local ecosystem.In this paper I will argue that the introduction of invasive species should be avoided, not only because it may directly interfere with .. (shrink)