In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sharon O'Dair FREELOADING OFF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES In Profession 89, published by the MLA, Martin Mueller complains that the fashion for interdisciplinary work in literary studies is mostly an intradepartmental affair. In English departments interdisciplinary work results not in cross-fertilization between disciplines but in the establishment ofsubdisciplines within English. To support his assertions, Mueller focuses on the efforts of new historicists, most of which, he claims, would not (...) pass muster in history departments orjournals.1 But literary critics who import from sociology or psychology can be arraigned on the same charge; seldom do they engage sociologists or psychologists in the way envisioned by Mueller, that is, intensely. Ifthey did, the subdisciplines would not be defined as narrowly as they are; Marxism would not dominate our sociology of literature and psychoanalysis would not dominate our psychology of literature. If they did, critics would better understand the norms of science and thus be less likely to appropriate terms and theories for use outside the specialized arenas for which they were designed. And, to anticipate my conclusion, critics might then be less likely to further what psychologist Liam Hudson calls his discipline's "psychic engineering." My concern with how literary critics use social science results from grappling with the problem myself. Like most critics, I used to be rather uncritical in my borrowings from social science, figuring that ifit works, it works, and being, no doubt, somewhat off-put by the notion of "science." But as I read sociology and psychology on the problem of the self/subject, I became troubled by the way science structures discourse on the problem ofthe selfor subject and its relationship to surrounding environments. What do these discourses include and leave out? What are their boundaries? What is the status of the images of men and Philosophy and Literature, © 1991, 15: 260-267 Sharon O'Dair261 women offered by them? These are questions thatought tobe addressed by literary critics, but seldom are. To be more specific: although literary critics borrow heavily from the social sciences, most notably, of course, from those derived from the work of Marx and Freud, we do not often acknowledge the limits of the scientific discourses from which we borrow. Sociological "man" (the alienated role-player)—like psychological "man" (one pushed by drives and molded by stimuli) or economic "man" (the rational optimizer)— is an abstract and artificial description, a construct, useful as a tool in scientific analysis. As such, homo sociologicus or homo psychologicus maintains heuristic strength, but neither is intended to capture the whole of a human being or to account for the entirety of determining and enabling influences on him or her. Neither is a philosophy of human nature, and certainly neither was offered by social scientists to account for the creations of Kafka or Shakespeare. Ralf Dahrendorf has observed that "man in his entirety not only is safely removed from the attack ofany single discipline, but may possibly remain forever a nebulous shape in the background of scientific endeavor."2 Generalizing that point, Kenneth Burke explains that "insofar as any science has a nomenclature especially adapted to its particular field of study, the extension of its special terms to provide a definition in general would necessarily oversociologize, overbiologize, overpsychologize, or overphysicize, etc., its subject."3 So, in general, the social sciences, like the physical sciences from which they draw methodological inspiration, aim not to describe reality but to construct categories that allow each social science to capture a certain part, and only a certain part, ofreality in analysis. To get on with thejob, the sociologist controls for the fact of individuality—what is personal or unique in human beings—just as to get on with thejob, the psychologist controls for the fact ofsociety—what is social in human beings. Each discipline simplifies its notion of a person to proceed as science. As an object of study in much social science of this century and the last, a person is necessarily quite different from a person one meets on the streets, in a city or town. To the sociologist, then, if I may focus my argument, the person is nothing but his or her social roles. Erving Goffman, therefore... (shrink)

This is the fourth volume of a series entitled `Current Legal Issues' that are published each Summer as a sister volume to `Current Legal Problems'. The interaction of religious practice and the law raises a number of difficult and fascinating issues. What exactly do we mean by religious faith? To what extent are the Courts competent to pass judgement on disputes arising within religious organisations? Are some religious faiths more legitimate than others? Should the law grant special privileges to religious (...) believers? - for example exemption from provisions in human rights legislation which would otherwise restrict their activities. (shrink)

This article tracks Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as an emergent organizational process that places the employee at its center. Predominantly, research on CSR tends to focus on external pressures and outcomes leading to a neglect of CSR as a dynamic and developing process that relies on the involvement of the employee as a major stakeholder in its co-creation and implementation. Utilizing case study data drawn from a study of a large multinational energy company, we explore how management relies on employees' (...) interaction with CSR as the process of initiation → implementation → maturation develops. Employee involvement grows from a minor element in the CSR initiation stage to a vital contributory factor in CSR's success in the later stages of the process. The article offers new insights into a processual and interactional approach to CSR that accounts for the actions of different actors involved at each stage. Most unusually, it also recognizes the dual impact this has on broader issues concerning the management and involvement of employees through CSR actions, and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of not only external stakeholders but internal too. (shrink)

Background Nurses experienced intense ethical and moral challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our 2020 qualitative parent study of frontline nurses’ experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic identified ethics as a cross-cutting theme with six subthemes: moral dilemmas, moral uncertainty, moral distress, moral injury, moral outrage, and moral courage. We re-analyzed ethics-related findings in light of refined definitions of ethics concepts. Research aim To analyze frontline U.S. nurses’ experiences of ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic. Research design Qualitative analysis using a directed content (...) methodology. Participants and research context The study included 43 nurses from three major metropolitan academic medical centers and one community hospital in the northeastern, mid-Atlantic, midwestern, and western United States. Ethical considerations Participant privacy and data confidentiality were addressed. Findings Moral dilemmas arose from many situations, most frequently related to balancing safety and patient care. Moral uncertainty commonly arose from lacking health information or evidence about options. Moral distress occurred when nurses knew the right thing to do, but were prevented from doing so, including with end-of-life issues. Moral injury (accompanied by suffering, shame, or guilt) occurred after doing, seeing, or experiencing wrongdoing, often involving authority figures. Nurses expressed moral outrage at events and people within and outside healthcare. Despite difficult ethical situations, some nurses exemplified moral courage, sometimes by resisting policies they perceived as preventing compassionate care, guided by thinking about what was best for patients. Discussion This content analysis of ethics-related subthemes revealed conceptual characteristics and clarified distinctions with corresponding exemplars. Conceptual clarity may inform responses and interventions to address ethical quandaries in nursing practice. Conclusions Ethics education in nursing must address the moral dilemmas of pandemics, disasters, and other crises. Nurses need time and resources to heal from trying to provide the best care when no ideal option was available. (shrink)

We recently discovered a novel subset of beta cells that resemble immature beta cells during pancreas development. We named these “virgin” beta cells as they do not stem from existing mature beta cells. Virgin beta cells are found exclusively at the islet periphery in areas that we therefore designated as the “neogenic niche.” As beta cells are our only source of insulin, their loss leads to diabetes. Islets also contain glucagon‐producing alpha cells and somatostatin‐producing delta cells, that are important for (...) glucose homeostasis and form a mantle surrounding the beta cell core. This 3D architecture is important and determines access to blood flow and innervation. We propose that the distinctive islet architecture may also play an important, but hitherto unappreciated role in generation of new endocrine cells, including beta cells. We discuss several predictions to further test the contribution of the neogenic niche to beta cell regeneration. (shrink)

This document presents the Bonn PRINTEGER Consensus Statement: Working with Research Integrity—Guidance for research performing organisations. The aim of the statement is to complement existing instruments by focusing specifically on institutional responsibilities for strengthening integrity. It takes into account the daily challenges and organisational contexts of most researchers. The statement intends to make research integrity challenges recognisable from the work-floor perspective, providing concrete advice on organisational measures to strengthen integrity. The statement, which was concluded February 7th 2018, provides guidance on (...) the following key issues: § 1.Providing information about research integrity § 2.Providing education, training and mentoring § 3.Strengthening a research integrity culture § 4.Facilitating open dialogue § 5.Wise incentive management § 6.Implementing quality assurance procedures § 7.Improving the work environment and work satisfaction § 8.Increasing transparency of misconduct cases § 9.Opening up research § 10.Implementing safe and effective whistle-blowing channels § 11.Protecting the alleged perpetrators § 12.Establishing a research integrity committee and appointing an ombudsperson § 13.Making explicit the applicable standards for research integrity. (shrink)

Drawing on a landscape analysis of existing data-sharing initiatives, in-depth interviews with expert stakeholders, and public deliberations with community advisory panels across the U.S., we describe features of the evolving medical information commons. We identify participant-centricity and trustworthiness as the most important features of an MIC and discuss the implications for those seeking to create a sustainable, useful, and widely available collection of linked resources for research and other purposes.

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 78-80.

In its most recent form, the debate about the relationship between quantitative and qualitative methodology in political science has been shaped by the publication of Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research by Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba in 1994 (hereafter DSI). The focus of this debate has been case study research. DSI advocates that qualitative research, particularly case study research, be modeled on the template of quantitative research. The authors claim that all research has the (...) same logic of inquiry and that this is most clearly exemplified in quantitative work. I argue that the underlying philosophy of science of DSI is monistic and positivistic in ways not productive for understanding various different purposes that political science knowledge may have. Different methodologies have different strengths and so are suited to different ends. I examine this in relation to Julian Reiss’s discussion of different concepts of causality and argue that case study research is suited to understanding causal mechanisms in ways that make such research better suited to inform policy decisions. I finish with an example using David Fearon’s 2006 Congressional Testimony on Iraq. (shrink)

Background Ethics of care provides a framework for health care professionals to manage ethical dilemmas and moral resilience may mitigate stress associated with the process and outcomes of ethical reasoning. This review addresses the empirical study of ethics of care and moral resilience, published in the health care literature, and identifies potential research gaps. Methods and procedure Arksey O’Malley's framework was adopted to conduct this scoping review. A literature search was conducted across six databases: CINAHL Plus with full text, PubMed, (...) PsycINFO, EMBASE, Scopus and MEDLINE. We collected and synthesised information on the nature of studies including study design, methods and key findings. Results While there is an abundance of literature describing the potential strengths of an ethics of care approach to ethical reasoning and growing interest in the role of moral resilience in protecting against moral distress, both concepts have received little empirical attention. A total of six relevant publications were selected for review. No studies explored the relationship between ethics of care and moral resilience. However, studies focused upon ethics of care approach as a facilitator of patient-practitioner professional relationships and effective ethical decision making in health care practice. Current evidence explores key characteristics consistent with moral resilience in health care professionals. Conclusion This review identified a dearth of research in ethics of care and moral resilience in healthcare practice. Further empirical investigation may provide a deeper understanding of the translation of ethics of care and moral resilience to health care practice to facilitate workplace culture. (shrink)

Roman elegy is well known for its reversal of traditional Roman gender roles: women are presented in positions of power, chiefly but not exclusively erotic, that bear little or no relation to women's lived experience in the first centuryb.c.e. Yet the way elegy presents the beloved in a position of power over her lover, as Sharon James has observed, ‘retains standard Roman social and power structures, thus suggesting an inescapable inequity even within a private love affair: rather than sharing (...) goals and desires, lover and beloved are placed in a gendered opposition … Hence resistant reading by thedominais an anticipated and integral part of the genre’. James's remark is indeed correct for each of the instances in which thedomina, or female beloved, speaks directly. When she does so, as James also shows, she speaks at cross-purposes with her lover, following a script that is designed ‘to destabilize him’ in an attempt to keep his interest. Yet what has not been noticed is that when the beloved is instead male, the situation is quite different. Tibullus' Marathus in poem 1.8, our sole example of a male elegiac beloved-turned-speaker, is the exception that proves the fundamental rule of gender inequity. Marathus, that is, when given the opportunity to speak, does in fact share the aims of a male lover, albeit in pursuit of his ownpuella. When the gendered opposition so integral to elegy is erased, the beloved no longer protests against the strictures of the genre; when both are male, lover and beloved alike are entitled to speak as elegiac lovers. (shrink)

Este reciente libro de la filósofa Sharon Krishek aborda de forma profunda y exhaustiva el tema del amor (en especial, el amor romántico) en el contexto de los planteamientos que Kierkegaard elaboró en sus obras acerca de esta importantísima dimensión de la existencia humana. El proyecto del libro es definido por Krishek, valientemente, como “neo-kierkegaardiano”; este apelativo responde con cuidado a su propósito: si bien los planteamien- tos y nociones del filósofo danés son la base y el motor de (...) la reflexión, los desarrollos y conclusiones a los que llega la autora exceden por mucho la filosofía de Kierkegaard e, incluso, en ocasiones, llegan a señalar sus deficiencias o ambigüedades. (shrink)

Allah’ın ilk insanı, ilk peygamber yapmak suretiyle, insanoğlu ile iletişim kurmayı ve ona hitap eden vahiyler göndermeyi amaçladığı anlaşılmaktadır. Söz gelimi Tevrât’ı İbranice, İncîl’i Süryanice ve Kur’ân’ı Arapça göndermek suretiyle insanlar tarafından anlaşılmak istemiştir. Bununla birlikte onun İbranice kelâmı, Süryanice sözünden ve Arapça kelâmı da diğer dillerdeki sözünden farklı bir tabiata sahiptir. Bu gerçeklikten hareketle İslâm düşünce-fikir tarihine bakıldığında ilim adamlarının ilâhî kelâmın mâhiyetini, tabiatını anlamak ve bunu anlamlandırmak konusunda bir çabanın içerisine girdikleri görülmektedir. Esasen Allah’ın nasıl bir kelâma sahip (...) olduğunu anlamak ve kavramak, cismanî/fizik âleminden gayrı cismanî/fizikötesine doğru bir bakış çabasıdır. Buna rağmen hakikatin yılmaz arayıcısı insan, bu konuda söyleyecek bir söz bulabilme çabası içindedir. “İlâhî kelâmı”, Allah’ın bir sıfatı olarak değerlendirenler olduğu gibi bunu “ilâhî bir fiil” olarak telakki edenler de bulunmaktadır. İlâhî kelâm sıfatının veya fiilinin tecellîsinin Kur’ân olduğu da ehlince müsellemdir. Kur’ân lafızlarının aidiyeti konusunda başlıca üç görüş ortaya konulmuştur. Bu görüşler içerisinde hâkim ve râcih bakış açısına göre Kur’ân metni, lafız ve mana itibariyle Allah’a aittir. Buna göre Hz. Muhammed’e nâzil olan Kur’ân vahyi hem lafız hem de manadan oluşmaktadır. Bu telakkîyi savunan müelliflere göre vahyin oluşumu ve iletimi konusunda ne Cebrâil’in ne de Hz. Muhammed’in herhangi bir müdahale veya katkısı olmuştur. Dolayısıyla peygamberin vahiy nüzûl sürecinde rolünün tamamen pasif olduğu söylenebilir. Cibrîl, Kur’ân’ı önceden yazılı olarak bulunan bir mekândan, yani levh-i mahfûzdan ezberleyerek veya Allah’tan işiterek ya da Allah’ın lafızları ona vahyetmesiyle Hz. Peygamber’e indirmiştir. İkinci yaklaşıma göre Kur’ân metninin manası Allah’a, lafızları Hz. Peygamber’e aittir. Bu yaklaşıma göre Cebrâil, sadece manaları Hz. Peygamber’e indirmiştir. Hz. Peygamber de kendisine bildirilen manaları kavramış ve onları Arapça ifade kalıplarında söylemiştir. Üçüncü yaklaşıma göre ise Kur’ân’ın manası Allah’a, lafızları Cebrâil’e ait olmaktadır. Yani Cebrâil’e yalnız mana ilkâ edildi ve o lafızları oluşturdu. Bu çalışmada İslâm düşünce tarihinde ilim adamlarının kelâmullâhın tabiatını anlamak ve bunu anlamlandırmak konusunda lafızların aidiyeti konusunda ortaya koydukları söz konusu yaklaşımlar öncelikle deskriptif (tasvîrî/betimleyici) bir üslupla incelenmektedir. Akabinde bu doğrultuda serdedilen yaklaşımlar Kur’ân’ın bütünlüğü ve klasik dönem tefsir merviyyâtı açısından analitik (tahlîlî/istidlâlî) bir bakış açısıyla irdelenmektedir. Denilebilir ki Kur’ân’ın mana yönüyle Allah’a aidiyeti konusunda ilim ehli arasında herhangi bir ihtilâf yoktur. Temel ihtilâf Kur’ân lafızlarının Allah’a mı Cebrâil’e mi yoksa Hz. Muhammed’e mi ait olduğu hususudur. Kur’ân’ın bütünlüğü ve vahyin nüzûl keyfiyetine dair klasik dönem tefsir rivayetleri dikkate alındığında hâkim görüşün diğer iki görüşe göre daha tutarlı olduğu kanaatine ulaşılmaktadır. (shrink)

In Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Longino offers a contextual analysis of evidential relevance. She claims that this "contextual empiricism" reconciles the objectivity of science with the claim that science is socially constructed. I argue that while her account does offer key insights into the role that values play in science, her claim that science is nonetheless objective is problematic.

Contemporary realist theories of value claim to be compatible with natural science. In this paper, I call this claim into question by arguing that Darwinian considerations pose a dilemma for these theories. The main thrust of my argument is this. Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes. The challenge for realist theories of value is to explain the relation between these evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes, on the one hand, and the (...) independent evaluative truths that realism posits, on the other. Realism, I argue, can give no satisfactory account of this relation. On the one hand, the realist may claim that there is no relation between evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes and independent evaluative truths. But this claim leads to the implausible skeptical result that most of our evaluative judgements are off track due to the distorting pressure of Darwinian forces. The realist’s other option is to claim that there is a relation between evolutionary influences and independent evaluative truths, namely that natural selection favored ancestors who were able to grasp those truths. But this account, I argue, is unacceptable on scientific grounds. Either way, then, realist theories of value prove unable to accommodate the fact that Darwinian forces have deeply influenced the content of human values. After responding to three objections, the third of which leads me to argue against a realist understanding of the disvalue of pain, I conclude by sketching how antirealism is able to sidestep the dilemma I have presented. Antirealist theories of value are able to offer an alternative account of the relation between evolutionary forces and evaluative facts —
an account that allows us to reconcile our understanding of evaluative truth with our understanding of the many non-rational causes that have played a role in shaping our evaluative judgements. (shrink)

Dünyada müxtəlif dillər mövcuddur. Hal-hazırda əlavə xarici dil öyrənməyə maraq artmaqdadır. Təbii ki bu hər bir şəxsin öz istəyinə və seçiminə bağlıdır. Yəni hər kəs, hər hansı bir dili öyrəndiyi zaman, qarşısında iki məqsəd dayanır; ya o dili sevir, ya da o dili öyrənmək onun üçün lazımdır. Hər bir vətəndaşın borcudur ki, əvvəlcə öz ana dilini mükəmməl şəkildə öyrənsin. Lakin elm və texnologiyanın yüksək inkişaf etdiyi bir zamanda yalnız ana dilini bilmək kifayət etmir. İnsanın hər bir sahədə inkişafı üçün bacardığı (...) qədər başqa dillərə də yiyələnməsi artıq zəruridir. Yeni dil öyrənmənin faydaları çoxdur, yaddaşın güclənməsinə, söz ehtiyatının artmasına, nitqin gözəlləşməsinə səbəb olur. Həmçinin yeni dil öyrənməklə, insanın özünə güvəni artır, ünsiyyət dairəsi genişlənir. Bununla insan yalnız yeni sözlər deyil, yeni mədəniyyətlərlə də tanış olur və nəticədə dünyagörüşü artır. (shrink)

Argumentos evolutivos debunking (AEDs), de maneira geral, têm o objetivo de danificar o status epistêmico de um domínio de crenças ao se apelar para suas origens evolutivas. No horizonte da metaética, AEDs normalmente são direcionados a teses realistas da moralidade e consistem essencialmente em afirmar que se nossas crenças morais sofreram influência significativa de pressões seletivas durante nossa história evolutiva, então se segue algum tipo de ceticismo moral. Um dos argumentos paradigmáticos articulados nessa direção é o Dilema Darwiniano de (...) class='Hi'>Sharon Street. Nossa proposta no artigo presente é colocarmos o argumento evolutivo contra o naturalismo (AECN) de Alvin Plantinga – um AED oriundo da filosofia analítica da religião – como possível resposta ao problema do ceticismo moral proposto por Street. Dessa forma, Plantinga pontua que considerações evolutivas tomadas dentro do framework do naturalismo ontológico acarretam em um conflito epistêmico para o sujeito que deseja manter em seu sistema doxástico tanto a crença na teoria contemporânea da evolução, quanto a crença no naturalismo ontológico. Argumentamos, a partir dessa questão, que o Dilema Darwiniano sofre de um problema estrutural por causa do seu comprometimento com a ontologia naturalista, o que faz com que o dilema se generalize em seu escopo e afete, de maneira nociva, crenças não-morais, se tornando autorreferencialmente incoerente. Palavras-chave: realismo moral. Naturalismo. Crenças. (shrink)

In many ways set theory lies at the heart of modern mathematics, and it does powerful work both philosophical and mathematical – as a foundation for the subject. However, certain philosophical problems raise serious doubts about our acceptance of the axioms of set theory. In a detailed and original reassessment of these axioms, Sharon Berry uses a potentialist approach to develop a unified determinate conception of set-theoretic truth that vindicates many of our intuitive expectations regarding set theory. Berry further (...) defends her approach against a number of possible objections, and she shows how a notion of logical possibility that is useful in formulating Potentialist set theory connects in important ways with philosophy of language, metametaphysics and philosophy of science. Her book will appeal to readers with interests in the philosophy of set theory, modal logic, and the role of mathematics in the sciences. (shrink)

Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive metaethical view. I argue that the widely accepted 'proceduralist characterization' of constructivism in ethics is (...) inadequate, and I propose what I call the 'practical standpoint characterization' in its place. I then offer a general taxonomy of constructivist positions in ethics. Since constructivism's standing as a family of substantive normative positions is relatively uncontested, I devote the remainder of the paper to addressing skeptics' worries about the distinctiveness of constructivism understood as a metaethical view. I compare and contrast constructivism with three other standard metaethical positions with which it is often confused or mistakenly thought to be compatible: realism; naturalist reductions in terms of an ideal response; and expressivism. In discussing the contrast with expressivism, I explain the sense in which, according to the constructivist, the distinction between substantive normative ethics and metaethics breaks down. I conclude by distinguishing between two importantly different debates about the mind-dependence of value. I argue that a failure to make this distinction is part of what explains why the possibility of constructivism as a metaethical view is often overlooked. (shrink)

Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment is often considered a decisive refutation of hedonism. I argue that the conclusions we draw from Nozick's thought experiment ought to be informed by considerations concerning the operation of our intuitions about value. First, I argue that, in order to show that practical hedonistic reasons are not causing our negative reaction to the experience machine, we must not merely stipulate their irrelevance (since our intuitions are not always responsive to stipulation) but fill in the (...) concrete details that would make them irrelevant. If we do this, we may see our feelings about the experience machine becoming less negative. Second, I argue that, even if our feelings about the experience machine do not perfectly track hedonistic reasons, there are various reasons to doubt the reliability of our anti-hedonistic intuitions. And finally, I argue that, since in the actual world seeing certain things besides pleasure as ends in themselves may best serve hedonistic ends, hedonism may justify our taking these other things to be intrinsically valuable, thus again making the existence of our seemingly anti-hedonistic intuitions far from straightforward evidence for the falsity of hedonism. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss a trivialization worry for Hartry Field’s official formulation of the access problem for mathematical realists, which was pointed out by Øystein Linnebo. I argue that various attempted reformulations of the Benacerraf problem fail to block trivialization, but that access worriers can better defend themselves by sticking closer to Hartry Field’s initial informal characterization of the access problem in terms of general epistemic norms of coincidence avoidance.

Artykuł zawiera prezentację teorii konstruktywizmu metaetycznego Sharon Street i stanowi próbę ustalenia, czy koncepcja ta posiada status adekwatnej teorii metaetycznej pociągającej wiarygodne konsekwencje normatywne. W toku analizy okazuje się, że konstruktywizm Street jest stanowiskiem niedookreślonym w szczegółach, a jego relacja do ekspresywizmu pozostaje niejasna. Normatywne konsekwencje konstruktywizmu głębokiego są nieintuicyjne i kontrowersyjne – przede wszystkim dlatego, że teoria ta uzależnia sferę powinności od dokonywanych przez jednostkę wartościowań, o ile tylko wartościowania te są ze sobą wzajemnie spójne i są instrumentalnie (...) racjonalne w świetle prozaicznych faktów. Konstruktywizm pada ofiarą problemu autoreferencji, który to problem może być sformułowany w postaci następującego pytania: czy konstruktywistyczne ujęcie warunków prawdziwości twierdzeń normatywnych wynika z każdego praktycznego punktu widzenia, czy też jego trafność jest niezależna od praktycznego punktu widzenia w ogóle? Problem jest poważny, ponieważ stawia pod znakiem zapytania wewnętrzną spójność dyskutowanego stanowiska. Ponadto jest rzeczą wątpliwą, czy konstruktywizm jest najmocniejszym poglądem antyrealistycznym w metaetyce – wydaje się, że teorie odwołujące się do reakcji podmiotów znajdujących się w idealnych okolicznościach posiadają przewagę. Te ostatnie są zasadnie bardziej restrykcyjne w dziedzinie etyki normatywnej, nie wchodzą w konflikt z wnioskami wyciąganymi przez Street z tzw. dylematu darwinowskiego oraz w mniejszym stopniu niż konstruktywizm dopuszczają wpływ nieistotnych procesów przyczynowych. (shrink)

This chapter accepts for the sake of argument Ronald Dworkin’s point that the only viable form of normative skepticism is internal, and develops an internal skeptical argument directed specifically at normative realism. There is a striking and puzzling coincidence between normative judgments that are true, and normative judgments that causal forces led us to believe—a practical/theoretical puzzle to which the constructivist view has a solution. Normative realists have no solution, but are driven to conclude that we are probably hopeless at (...) recognizing the independent normative truths they posit. Since this is an unacceptable conclusion, we must conclude that normative realism is false. Drawing on evolutionary considerations, it is explained why this internal skeptical argument does not carry over to our knowledge of objects in our manifest surroundings, and why the challenge does not depend on any assumption that the epistemology of the normative domain must be a causal one. (shrink)

The recognition and incorporation of evidence-based neuroscientific concepts into creative arts therapeutic knowledge and practice seem valuable and advantageous for the purpose of integration and professional development. Moreover, exhilarating insights from the field of neuroscience coincide with the nature, conceptualization, goals, and methods of Creative Arts Therapies, enabling comprehensive understandings of the clinical landscape, from a translational perspective. This paper contextualizes and discusses dynamic brain functions that have been suggested to lie at the heart of intra- and inter-personal processes. Touching (...) upon fundamental aspects of the self and self-other interaction, the state-of-the-art neuroscientific-informed views will shed light on mechanisms of the embodied, predictive and relational brain. The conceptual analysis introduces and interweaves the following contemporary perspectives of brain function: firstly, the grounding of mental activity in the lived, bodily experience will be delineated; secondly, the enactive account of internal models, or generative predictive representations, shaped by experience, will be defined and extensively deliberated; and thirdly, the interpersonal simulation and synchronization mechanisms that support empathy and mentalization will be thoroughly considered. Throughout the paper, the cross-talks between the brain and the body, within the brain through functionally connected neural networks and in the context of agent-environment dynamics, will be addressed. These communicative patterns will be elaborated on to unfold psychophysiological linkage, as well as psychopathological shifts, concluding with the neuroplastic change associated with the formulation of CATs. The manuscript suggests an integrative view of the brain-body-mind in contexts relevant to the therapeutic potential of the expressive creative arts and the main avenues by which neuroscience may ground, enlighten and enrich the clinical psychotherapeutic practice. (shrink)

In this paper, I will attempt to develop and defend a common form of intuitive resistance to the companions in guilt argument. I will argue that one can reasonably believe there are promising solutions to the access problem for mathematical realism that don’t translate to moral realism. In particular, I will suggest that the structuralist project of accounting for mathematical knowledge in terms of some form of logical knowledge offers significant hope of success while no analogous approach offers such hope (...) for moral realism. (shrink)

This chapter reviews developments and difficulties in the nonverbal behavior literature. Despite the atheoretical bias of the discipline, four implicit models may be found there-the ethological, the enculturation, the internal states, and the situational resource models. After reviewing research based on these models, we conclude that the situational resource paradigm has much to offer nonverbal theorizing.

The concept of social structure is crucial in social analysis, yet sociologists' use of the term is often ambiguous and misleading. Contributing to the ambiguity is a tendency to imply the meaning of "social structure" either by opposing it to agency or by contrasting it to culture, thus reducing "structure" to pure constraint and suggesting that "culture" is not structured. Even more damaging is the tendency to conflate these two contrasts. To add to the confusion, these contrasts are often mapped (...) inappropriately onto other dichotomies prevalent in social theorizing, including material versus ideal, external versus internal, static versus active, and objective versus subjective, to produce a conceptual prism in which structure, agency, and culture are all poorly understood. This article attempts to disentangle these concepts from the aforementioned system of contrasts, to specify the connections between structure and agency, and to make a case for the inclusion of culture in the sociological conception of social structure. (shrink)

While most business ethics texts focus exclusively on individual decision making--what should an individual do--this resource presents the whole business ethics story. Highly realistic, readable, and down-to-earth, it moves from the individual to the managerial to the organizational level, focusing on business ethics in an organizational context to promote an understanding of complex influences on behavior. The new Fifth Edition is the perfect text for students entering the workplace, those seeking to become professionals in training, communications, compliance, in addition to (...) chief ethics officers, corporate counsel, heads of human resources, and senior executives. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss a trivialization worry for Hartry Field’s official formulation of the access problem for mathematical realists, which was pointed out by Øystein Linnebo (and has recently been made much of by Justin Clarke-Doane). I argue that various attempted reformulations of the Benacerraf problem fail to block trivialization, but that access worriers can better defend themselves by sticking closer to Hartry Field’s initial informal characterization of the access problem in terms of (something like) general epistemic norms of (...) coincidence avoidance. (shrink)