ABSTRACT The paper has three parts. The first specifies a, notion of philosophy as both a critical discipline and a process of theoria independent of utilitarian or ideological commitment. The second part shows how philosophical paradigms can be ideologically exploited, often unwittingly, by the teacher in a way that sacrifices truth and clarity to utility. Three examples are given, viz. over‐simplification in science‐teaching of the Lockean primary/secondary qualities distinction, misuse of Wittgenstein's nuanced theories to inculcate relativism in the social sciences, (...) and use of the ethical fact/value paradigm to promote a simplistic liberalism in moral teaching. The third part distinguishes teaching a skill and communicating an insight. It is claimed that the theoretical capacities of the learner are routinely subordinated to the practical needs of the teacher. (shrink)

The ancient theory of an identity of some sort between subject and predicate is not merely out of fashion. Rejection of it is just about the cornerstone of the Fregean analysis of propositions in terms of argument and function.

The ancient theory of an identity of some sort between subject and predicate is not merely out of fashion. Rejection of it is just about the cornerstone of the Fregean analysis of propositions in terms of argument and function.

This book is a supplement to the author's earlier New Hegelian Essays. It continues the project of presenting the narrative(s) of religion as intelligible metaphysics, "interpreting spiritual things spiritually", as St. Paul says. After an introductory recall of the unreality of the phenomenal individual except insofar as viewed as "in" God, the Absolute, so that all depend upon all, the first subject to be considered is faith itself, too often seen as the polar and hence negative opposite of reason. After (...) this, we plunge straight for the hidden philosophical implications of the Trinity, leading on to a rational viewing of the doctrines of Creation and Incarnation, actually essentially connected. A false view of Creation, as, consequently, of divine transcendence, is here corrected. God has no otherness with which he is not at the same time united and hence identified and this is the very opposite of pantheism, is acosmism rather, God being "all in all". Regarding Incarnation, its full humanistic implications, in a context of Absolute Idealism as the philosophical and true view, are here teased out. Finally, we move to a consideration of "practical reason", virtues, ethical imperatives, their true character and import. The book concludes with some consideration of the eventual role of such philosophy as holding together a great contemporary political project, the European Union. (shrink)

In this paper I first point out that happiness might of its nature be unamenable to the calculating ‘plan of life’ approach, and argue that the incompatible model of a personal search, by no means implying ‘ontological subjectivity’ though, fits in more smoothly with the idea. Secondly, I discuss the arguments assembled by Aquinas for a view of this type. I argue thirdly that although we can show there is some one thing in which all happiness consists, whatever it may (...) be it must be incompatible with temporal life, whether or not any other is possible. Hence a discussion which excludes ‘transcendence’ will not get to grips with the concept of happiness. (shrink)

This book highlights Hegel's application of Absolute Idealism's logical truth, the basis of all mystical insight, to Christian orthodox confession. The systematic interpretation thus yielded illuminates the profound spirituality of this unitary sophia as (the) idea. The truth represented by spontaneous pictorial presentation, in Biblical or other proclamations at other times, is thereby further unveiled, understanding spiritual things spiritually. The book traces philosophy and theology through Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas up to Hegel. It then applies its findings to topical issues, (...) notions of revelation and creation principally, and then church order, sacraments, and ecumenism. Finally, history and theology are subsumed to the Absolute Idea or full self-consciousness. Philosophy is, thus, shown to be highest Gottesdienst, worship. Transcendence of abstract moralism, value-theory and all dualisms, as of life itself, is carried out here by thought, Aristotles nous. Hegel claims coincidence of freedom and necessity in speculative reason. A Prologue unifies these threads, presenting Hegels system as grounded upon Trinity and Incarnation as in turn resulting from it. (shrink)

It is worthwhile to study Aquinas’s now classical treatment of the virtue of justice at the point where he distinguishes legal obligation, owed directly to the other, from moral obligations to give something to the other in virtue of what is due to oneself, one’s own decency of character (honestas). To fulfill these moral obligations is itself, on his view, a “legal” obligation to God. We might say it is directly owed to a proper order of decency requiring us at (...) least quasi-legally, at second level, to be moral in the sense of kind, merciful, truthful, affable, and so forth. The distinction provides an argument against legally compelling a whole population to act thus morally towards others (thus incidentally diluting the sense of properly legal obligation), which is also an argument for supporting measures for refining moral awareness in schools and elsewhere. There is some concluding discussion of obligation as attaching primarily to the ends of action. (shrink)

It is worthwhile to study Aquinas’s now classical treatment of the virtue of justice at the point where he distinguishes legal obligation, owed directly to the other, from moral obligations to give something to the other in virtue of what is due to oneself, one’s own decency of character (honestas). To fulfill these moral obligations is itself, on his view, a “legal” obligation to God. We might say it is directly owed to a proper order of decency requiring us at (...) least quasi-legally, at second level, to be moral in the sense of kind, merciful, truthful, affable, and so forth. The distinction provides an argument against legally compelling a whole population to act thus morally towards others (thus incidentally diluting the sense of properly legal obligation), which is also an argument for supporting measures for refining moral awareness in schools and elsewhere. There is some concluding discussion of obligation as attaching primarily to the ends of action. (shrink)

In this paper I wish firstly to argue that moral or practical reasoning is of a different type from theoretical reasoning and not merely an application of it. Secondly I offer some considerations as to why it is nonetheless genuine reasoning which can be right or wrong in the sense of true or false. Thirdly I discuss how in that case we can justify the first principles of practical reason and of the moral systems in which it issues.

After this there follows a kind of commentary upon Hegel's choice of Being and his justification for taking Being as starting-point for his Science of Lope. We then pass to consider logical relations generally and in particular Identity, which leads naturally into rational treatment of Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity and, after that, Incarnation, "Signs and Sacraments" and some of the at first sight odder manifestations of piety, viewed now philosophically. This is followed by consideration of Religion in (...) relation to both Philosophy and Freedom. To illuminate the vision yet more we end with commentaries upon Hegel's text, first that on "The Subjective Notion as Notion" and why it is called that, second upon his Introduction to the third part of his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, namely, "The Philosophy of Spirit". --. (shrink)

"God became man that man might become God. This thought, expressed in terms of a sharing of natures, human and divine, is to be found in the most ancient Christian liturgies and still in use, at the Offertory typically. This book shows how Hegel fleshes this thought out, shorn though of picture-language, in conscious or less-than-conscious continuity with this Biblical belief in the power to become the sons of God. This involves some stripping away of the false fleshliness cast over (...) Hegels philosophy of spirit by interpreters ignorant of and hence unable to see this element in him, wishing, quite hopelessly, rather to adapt his work to a current materialist vision of development. The book is, thus, in the line of Thomas Aquinas and, obliquely, McTaggart and other idealist thinkers immediately prior to the rediscoveries of this strand and more in Hegel by todays theologians and others, such as Charles Taylor in our English-speaking world, who, nonetheless, regrettably, mostly fail to go the whole hog. They cannot believe that Hegels thought corresponds, in development as charted by, say, Newman, to the original Patristic line. Nonetheless, in these respects, at least, it does, as is brought out here."--Back cover. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas offers teleological systematisation of the habits needed for human flourishing. His metaphysical jurisprudence remodels ethics upon this, rather than on a moral precept. 'Eternal law' governing the world determines 'natural law', reflected in human legislation (a variety of the 'anthropic principle'). Finally, law, unwritten, is infused spirit as self-consciousness, 'universal of universals'. Acquired virtues elicit this, become effusion, represented in religion as gifts or graces. But mind's or spirit's omnipresence, necessarily 'closer to me than I am to myself', (...) supersedes the abstractions of heteronomy versus autonomy. The habitual well-being brought by prudence, justice, courage and temperance prompts this picture of gifts and graces. The 'theological virtues', faith (explicit or implicit) and hope fulfilled in love, 'crown' our natural rationality, set toward as being the universal. 'Become what you are'. Heteronomous law is thus 'defused' at root by grounding it entirely upon immovable spiritual (mental) inclination towards universal fulfilment as naturally desired, reflection shows. Virtue, finally, is best assessed as a capacity for the individually beautiful yet habit-based action, Aristotle's to kalon. Aquinas puts this picture as summed up in the beatitudes of the 'Sermon on the Mount'."--back cover. (shrink)

A general metaphysical account of logic, meaning, and reference that developed from the Greeks through the medievals and up into modem times can be called Aristotelian. “Copernican” claims (Kant, Frege), radically to replace this paradigm as quasi-“Ptolemaic,” actually participated in the prolonged decline of scholasticism, after Aquinas in particular. We need to recognize, or to remember, thepriority of being to truth and not to conflate them. We need to explicate the origin of thinking (abstraction) as at one remove from immediate (...) sense-experience. Syllogistic logic then emerges as a true causal account of reasoning in general; it is not some primitive attempt to outline a formal logical system. An account of suppositio as controlling the analogous uses of our finite store of words in reference to an infinite reality itself shaped by criss-cross patterns of likenesses, governs the general picture supplied here. (shrink)

Western intellectual history, viewed as the way things occurred, simultaneously or in a time sequence, requires interpretation even more substantively than does history in general. This is because as being a history of specifically intellectual activity it is a history of a type of activity that necessarily includes concurrent self-interpretation, as he who understands understands that he understands. There is, though, a sense in which all human activity is intellectual, as, for Aquinas, the intellectual soul is forma corporis. Hence it (...) is that any piece of historiography is necessarily a work of interpretation of what has happened, if only because it is never in the first place a record of what happened but of what was done, only as a result of which certain things happened. All the same, in a history of theoretical intellect the bond of interpretation with things thought or said will be that much closer than it is with things done as recorded in the various histories of practical intellect. (shrink)