In this new contribution to moral theory, Todd Lekan argues for a pragmatist conception of morality as an evolving, educational, and fallible practice of everyday life. Drawing on the work of John Dewey, Lekan asserts that moral norms are neither timeless truths nor subjective whims, but habits transmitted through practices. Like the habits that make up medicine or engineering, moral habits are subject to rational evaluation and change according to new challenges and circumstances.

In this paper I seek to make sense of James's account of strenuous moral living, and the role that theological belief plays in the strenuous life. I will show that some of his arguments for the moral necessity of belief in the "theological postulate" are not tenable, and that his case is stronger if his conclusion is weakened to the claim that theological belief may be necessary for some, but not all serious moral agents. I suggest that by drawing on (...) the rich insights about ethical attention in works such as James's Talks to Teachers, we can make better sense of the theological postulate as strategy for attending to one's agency in a way that unleashes strenuous moral action. (shrink)

The paper defends a pragmatist account of metaethics that challenges the standard view of justificatory structure at the heart of many rule-based normative ethical theories. The standard view of justificatory structure assumes that deliberation must be constrained by antecedent justificatory procedures. I consider some of the radical implications of the pragmatist idea that deliberation is the conceptual context within which to interpret, evaluate, and explain moral justification.

abstract In this paper I argue that the standoff between justice and care approaches to animal ethics presents us with a false dilemma. We should take justice's focus on reasoning from principles, and care's use of sympathetic awareness, as two integrated deliberative capacities necessary for the consideration of arguments for extending moral concern to animals. Such an integrated approach rests on a plausible account of the psychology of moral deliberation. I develop my argument as follows. Section I summarizes the nature (...) of the debate between justice and care approaches to animal ethics, focusing on Brian Luke's arguments against justice approaches. Section II provides pro‐justice rebuttals to Luke's objections. These rebuttals, while largely successful against Luke's objections, do not account for the intuition that sympathy does play a central epistemological role in animal ethics. Section III explains how sympathy cognitively simulates the perspective of the other, and thus can play an epistemological role in animal ethics. I argue that the abilities to simulate the perspective of the other and to reason from moral principles can complement each other. In section IV, I argue that though it may not be desirable to use both sympathy and reasoning from principles in all moral deliberation, it is a desirable aim when offering, and considering, moral arguments for what I will term the “extensionist project” of extending over moral concern to animals. I make this idea plausible by elucidating the claim that arguments for this project are best thought of as second‐order deliberations about our first‐order deliberative life. (shrink)

James's moral philosophy is a valuable resource for environmental philosophy because it reveals and impugns some deep, unhelpful assumptions about the relationship between moral theory and the moral life. In particular, James's ethics demonstrates that the debates in environmental ethics are better regarded as disputes about ideals of the kind of self and world we want, rather than as disputes over abstract propositions about the intrinsic value of nature.

This paper defends a broadly Aristotelean account of character friendship that maintains that the impersonal value of acquiring a virtuous character is the ultimate basis for our reasons for caring about friends. This view of friendship appears to conflict with the entrenched intuition that viewing our connections to particular friends as merely contingent occasions for the cultivation of virtue is alienating and undesirable. I argue that far from being an alienating feature of character friendships, a focused appreciation of the contingent (...) nature of friendships represents a morally sound attitude of honest self-acceptance. On my account, honest selfacceptance is an impersonal value—an ideal that anyone has a reason to cultivate. Although the ideal is impersonal, its content specifi es that we appreciatively acknowledge the particular contributions that friends make to the development of virtue. (shrink)

Jim Campbell's new book Experiencing William James: Belief in a Pluralistic World is one of the best philosophical examinations of all areas of William James' work through a close sympathetic attention to the James texts themselves. Campbell writes well and demonstrates a deep familiarity with James' corpus. Moreover, Campbell has a good command of the writings of James' interlocutors and venerable commentators. I recommend keeping a bookmark on the endnotes. They constitute an entire bonus text, reminding me of James' own (...) approach in Varieties of Religious Experience. They serve as a stage for diverse voices to state reactions and raise questions about the topics Campbell explores.To be sure, there are a... (shrink)

Stuart Rosenbaum’s book Recovering Integrity: Moral Thought in American Pragmatism is a creative and daring exploration of a pragmatist account of integrity as a central moral value. Rosenbaum offers an expansive treatment of integrity connecting it to wide-ranging topics: racism, religious intolerance, suicide, environmental values, the problem of induction, and contemporary quantum mechanics. Given this diversity, I confine my remarks to what I regard as central insights of the book as well as a few disagreements that I have with Rosenbaum. (...) Nevertheless, I do want to stress that there are many creative insights in this book. If they do not get mention, it is not due to lack of merit but to the limitations... (shrink)

In the title of the essay by the same name, James gives this answer to the question “What Makes a Life Significant:” “The solid meaning of life is always the same eternal thing—the marriage, namely, of some unhabitual ideal, however special, with some fidelity, courage, and endurance; with some man’s or woman’s pains.—And, whatever or wherever that life may be, there will always be the chance for that marriage to take place.”1 Significant lives, therefore, are comprised of two married components: (...) they are based on consciously chosen ideals, which are energetically pursued with a devoted discipline. James’ metaphor of “marriage” richly indicates the relationship between ideals and... (shrink)

many of william james's ethical writings celebrate appreciation and respect for diverse ways of life. For example, in the essay "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings", James argues that it is a worthy endeavor to strive to overcome blindness to alien values in order to appreciate their rich diversity. In the essay "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life", he defends an inclusivity principle enjoining us to create a world that allows for the greatest diversity of ideals and demand (...) satisfaction. James writes: Since everything which is demanded is by that fact a good, must not the guiding principle for ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in... (shrink)

This book offers a compelling new interpretation of James' moral philosophy: an "ethics of responsible self-fashioning." James' performative writing style articulates this conception by showing how moral inquiry serves both social and personal transformation. James the social moral philosopher seeks to create an inclusive moral order through expansion of sympathetic concern among those committed to different ideals. James the existential moral philosopher defends the right to adopt hope-grounding metaphysical beliefs which encourage strenuous moral action in the face of evil and (...) suffering. The power of James' ethics is demonstrated by its application to current discussions about the status of marginalized nonhuman animals and that of the cognitively disabled. William James and the Moral Life is of interest to a wide variety of ethicists and has special appeal to scholars and advanced students in moral philosophy, social philosophy, pragmatism, and American philosophy. (shrink)

It does seem that beliefs and desires slip back into such “externalist” accounts of reasons precisely when we ask the question of why something is a reason for a person. That the threatening tornado is a reason for you to speed is plausibly tied to your desire not to die and your belief that speeding is the best way to avoid dying in this situation. Bittner agrees that people are “reason selectors,” meaning that a state becomes a reason for an (...) agent because of features of the agent. However, he insists that the reason is normally not a feature of the agent. (shrink)