In this paper I claim that Heidegger exposes himself to phenomenological vulnerability in his encounter with Jünger’s reflections upon nihilism. Jünger insists in the essay “Over the Line” on the necessity of the alternative to nihilism because nihilism reveals itself as an existential global threat. Heidegger challenges Jünger’s suggestion, proposing that one’s alternative to nihilism needs to take into account one’s fundamental complicity in its global domination. Nihilism necessitates the fundamental-ontological investigation into its essence, which is the way of the (...) access to the question of being. Furthermore, the turn of being, according to Heidegger, emanates precisely through its forgetfulness in nihilism. I challenge Heidegger’s ability to remain faithful to the co-constitution between the turn of being and its forgetfulness in nihilism by observing that the turn of being is, at times, given an uncanny significance that extends beyond its capacity to point back at its forgetfulness through nihilism. (shrink)

I propose in this text that Husserl’s response to his contemporaries, critics and immediate predecessors in Logical Investigations consists in the development of circular strategy. Husserl does not challenge psychologsim, empiricism or neo-Kantianism by immediately assuming a position of epistemological primacy over these philosophies. To the contrary, Husserl philosophically challenges these positions by enacting a circularity that already underlies them. Husserl’s critical distance from these theories implies a methodological proximity which enables him to advance his phenomenological project with constant backward (...) reference to the theories he challenges. Husserl’s circular philosophy transforms the themes it investigates and the theories it criticizes, transforming itself in that process. (shrink)

I propose in this text that Husserl’s response to his contemporaries, critics and immediate predecessors in Logical Investigations consists in the development of circular strategy. Husserl does not challenge psychologsim, empiricism or neo-Kantianism by immediately assuming a position of epistemological primacy over these philosophies. To the contrary, Husserl philosophically challenges these positions by enacting a circularity that already underlies them. Husserl’s critical distance from these theories implies a methodological proximity which enables him to advance his phenomenological project with constant backward (...) reference to the theories he challenges. Husserl’s circular philosophy transforms the themes it investigates and the theories it criticizes, transforming itself in that process. (shrink)

I propose in this text that Husserl’s response to his contemporaries, critics and immediate predecessors in Logical Investigations consists in the development of circular strategy. Husserl does not challenge psychologsim, empiricism or neo-Kantianism by immediately assuming a position of epistemological primacy over these philosophies. To the contrary, Husserl philosophically challenges these positions by enacting a circularity that already underlies them. Husserl’s critical distance from these theories implies a methodological proximity which enables him to advance his phenomenological project with constant backward (...) reference to the theories he challenges. Husserl’s circular philosophy transforms the themes it investigates and the theories it criticizes, transforming itself in that process. (shrink)

In this text I suggest the possibility of the strategic-philosophical closeness between Husserl and Kracauer,by closely reading Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation and Kracauer’s essay «The Mass Ornament». Although the both thinkers come from the traditionally different and often mutually opposing philosophical schools, neither of them simply dismisses or crosses out the position they criticize. To the contrary, I propose that both thinkers exaggerate the seeming self-evidentiality of the phenomenon they analyze. In the Third Logical Investigation Husserl rearticulates the whole-part relation (...) as it is conceived within the formal ontology and psychologistic logic. The connection between parts is available to us only as the relational tension, which is «accumulated» in the mutuality between the irreparably self-enclosed parts. Fusion is therefore a modification in the unfolding of the relation between parts, where every «term in relation» conditions another one through its own positional completion, while being conditioned by another term. The phenomenological analysis, which is conducted through the intensification of the fixity of the above-mentioned poles, is «measured» by the inability of these poles to be self-evidentially isolated and subsequently reconciled. In the second part of my essay I pay attention to Kracauer’s suggestion that the vitality of the mass ornament is reflected in the contextual insignificance of its parts. Kracauer addresses the problem of mass depersonalization through the close and sarcastic inspection of the role of abstract rationality in the capitalist mode of production. This close inspection adopts the strategy of exaggeration, where the critical distance must not be considered beyond its ability to disclose the selfobscuring apparatus of the mass performances and spectacles. This disclosure, as Kracuaer suggests,must therapeutically lead through the center of the mass ornament, and not away from it. (shrink)

In this text I suggest the possibility of the strategic-philosophical closeness between Husserl and Kracauer,by closely reading Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation and Kracauer’s essay «The Mass Ornament».Although the both thinkers come from the traditionally different and often mutually opposing philosophical schools, neither of them simply dismisses or crosses out the position they criticize. To the contrary, I propose that both thinkers exaggerate the seeming self-evidentiality of the phenomenon they analyze. In the Third Logical Investigation Husserl rearticulates the whole-part relation as (...) it is conceived within the formal ontology and psychologistic logic. The connection between parts is available to us only as the relational tension, which is «accumulated» in the mutuality between the irreparably self-enclosed parts. Fusion is therefore a modification in the unfolding of the relation between parts, where every «term in relation» conditions another one through its own positional completion, while being conditioned by another term. The phenomenological analysis, which is conducted through the intensification of the fixity of the above-mentioned poles, is «measured» by the inability of these poles to be self-evidentially isolated and subsequently reconciled. In the second part of my essay I pay attention to Kracauer’s suggestion that the vitality of the mass ornament is reflected in the contextual insignificance of its parts. Kracauer addresses the problem of mass depersonalization through the close and sarcastic inspection of the role of abstract rationality in the capitalist mode of production. This close inspection adopts the strategy of exaggeration, where the critical distance must not be considered beyond its ability to disclose the selfobscuring apparatus of the mass performances and spectacles. This disclosure, as Kracauer suggests,must therapeutically lead through the center of the mass ornament, and not away from it. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the strategy of circularity employed by Kant and Husserl in their treatment of categoriality. I focus on the relation between transcendental and metaphysical deductions in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and on the problem of “epistemic foundationalism” and categoriality in Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation. I propose that the strategy of circularity is manifested through the peculiar self-enclosure of the categories of transcendental deduction vis-à-vis metaphysical deduction (Kant) and categorial intuition vis-à-vis sensuous intuition (Husserl). Although it (...) is usually regarded as a deficient and damaging occurrence in argumentation, circularity appears to be a crucial component in the analysis of both thinkers. The analytical realms recognized by both these thinkers, are acknowledged as continually dependent upon the self-evidential “contingency” of the realms they are supposed to hierarchically overarch. The strict separation between the transcendental and phenomenological realms and their addressees appears to be founded on mutual circularity, where the relation between investigator and investigated extends beyond their separation and reconciliation. Both Kant and Husserl, through the circular relationship with empiricism-rationalism and psychologism radically re-articulated the logic-ontology and founding-founded polarities. (shrink)