The problem of psychologism in the philosophy of logic and the different solutions of this problem are considered. Both traditional psychologistic and antipsychologistic solutions are shown to be untenable and the need for a new solution is demonstrated. The original program of metapsychologism is advanced as a solution to the problem of psychologism based on deduction-search theory. Two formalized levels of a logical procedure are distinguished: 1) an object-level at which a notion of inference is formalized; 2) a metalevel at (...) which principles of deduction-search are formalized, and a thesis of metapsychologism according to which metalevel processes are formulated. Metapsychologism lifts usual psychologist considerations one level up in the hierarchy of logical procedure, while a nonpsychologist justification of logical relations is kept at the object-level. The application of the thesis of metapsychologism to different concrete logical procedures is considered. (shrink)