This book is devoted to the problems of the growth of science. These prob lems, neglected for a long time by the philosophers of science, have become in the 60's and 70's a subject of vivid discussion. There are philosophers who stress only the dependence of science upon various sociological, psycho logical and other factors and deny any internal laws of the development of knowledge, like approaching the truth. The majority rejects such nihilism and searches for the laws of the (...) growth of science. However, they often overlook the role of the Correspondence Principle which connects the suc cessive scientific theories. On the other hand, some authors, while stressing the role of this principle, overlook logical difficulties connected with it, e. g. the problem of the incompatibility of successive theories, of the falsity of some of their assumptions, etc. I believe the Correspondence Principle to be a basic principle of the pro gress of contemporary physics and, probably, of every advanced science. How ever, this principle must be properly interpreted and the above-mentioned logical difficulties must be solved. Their solution requires, as it seems, revealing the idealizational nature of the basic laws of science, in any case of the quantitative laws of advanced sciences. This point has been recently emphasized by some Polish philosophers, especially in Poznan. (shrink)

There are three main kinds of causal connections between two events: the transfer of energy, the transfer of information and the triggering of the transfer of one of them or both. There are also other kinds of causal connections.

This paper considers the method of idealization and factualization as the main method of all advanced empirical science. The procedure is as follows. Some idealizing conditions are assumed: the vanishing of factors $(p_{i}=0)$ which never vanish in the real world. An idealization law is formulated -- a law which is exactly (non-vacuously) fulfilled only in an ideal model, not in any real system. Then the idealizing assumptions are abrogated one by one-it is a process of gradual factualization, of the transition (...) to the factual laws which are fulfilled in real systems. These laws may be directly applied and tested by experience. (shrink)

The chromatin‐regulatory principles of histone post‐translational modifications (PTMs) are discussed with a focus on the potential alterations in chromatin functional state due to steric and mechanical constraints imposed by bulky histone modifications such as ubiquitin and SUMO. In the classical view, PTMs operate as recruitment platforms for histone “readers,” and as determinants of chromatin array compaction. Alterations of histone charges by “small” chemical modifications (e.g., acetylation, phosphorylation) could regulate nucleosome spontaneous dynamics without globally affecting nucleosome structure. These fluctuations in nucleosome (...) wrapping can be exploited by chromatin‐processing machinery. In contrast, ubiquitin and SUMO are comparable in size to histones, and it seems logical that these PTMs could conflict with canonical nucleosome organization. An experimentally testable hypothesis that by adding sterical bulk these PTMs can robustly alter nucleosome primary structure is proposed. The model presented here stresses the diversity of mechanisms by which histone PTMs regulate chromatin dynamics, primary structure and, hence, functionality. (shrink)

Modern philosophy has benefited immensely from the intelligence and sensitivity, the creative and critical energies, and the lucidity of Polish scholars. Their investigations into the logical and methodological founda­ tions of mathematics, the physical and biological sciences, ethics and esthetics, psychology, linguistics, economics and jurisprudence, and the social sciences - all are marked by profound and imaginative work. To the centers of empiricist philosophy of science in Vienna, Berlin and Cambridge during the first half of this century, one always added (...) the great school of analytic and methodological studies in Warsaw and Lw6w. To the world centers of Marxist theoretical practice in Berlin, Moscow, Paris, Rome and elsewhere, one must add the Poland of the same era, from Ludwig Krzywicki (1859-1941) onward. (From our preface to Wiatr [1979p. Other movements also have been distinctive in Poland. Phenomenology was developed in the impressive school of Roman Ingarden at Cracow, semiotics from the early work of the philosopher and psychologist Kazimierz Twardowski at Lw6w in the 1890's, with masterful develop­ ment by his disciples Kotarbinski and Ajdukiewicz onward, conceptual foundations of physics in the incisive methodological reflections of Marian Smoluchowski, and mathematical logic from Jan I:.ukasiewicz and Stanislaw Lesniewski to Tarski, Mostowski, and many others. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The aim of the present volume is to introduce prominent Polish philosophers of the 20th century as well as their significant accomplishments in ...

The volume is a collection of essays about prominent Polish 20th century philosophers of science and scientists who were concerned with problems in the philosophy of science. The contribution made by Polish logicians, especially those from the Lvov-Warsaw School, like Lukasiewicz, Kotarbiński, Czeżowski or Ajdukiewicz, is already well known. One of the aims of the volume is to offer a broader perspective. The papers collected here are devoted to the work of such philosophers as Zawirski, Metallmann, Dąmbska, Mehlberg, Szaniawski and (...) Giedymin as well as to the work of such scientists as Smoluchowski, Fleck, Infeld and Chyliński. The introduction to the volume, written by the editor and Jacek Jadacki, presents an overview of the history of the Polish philosophy of science from the foundation of the Cracow Academy (in 1364) to the present. (shrink)

The paper is a sketch of a conception of approximative truth (or verisimilitude). The concepts of relative error, and degree of inadequacy are introduced. By means of them the concept of truth-content of quantitative facts-statements, laws and theories is defined. Laws and theories accepted in science have a high truth-content, i.e. they are approximately true.

The dynamics of ancient civilisations according to credited historians can be explained by means of a simple linear time-invariant feedback model whose loop only consists of a first-order process and a pure time delay. It is shown that, despite its simplicity, this model can give rise to a variety of responses, either oscillatory or aperiodic, such as those envisaged by A. Toynbee. Since modern civilisations are characterised by fast parameter variations, their description calls instead for a time-variant model. Simulations with (...) the linear parameter-varying model obtained from the aforementioned LTI model by letting its parameter vary are carried out to show the influence of different scenarios on the system response. Even if this model is elementary, it is believed that it may serve as a stimulating “tool for thought” in the ever-popular debate on the growth and decline of civilisations. (shrink)

There are two concepts of the scope of a law: 1) the set of bodies (in our world) in which the law is fulfilled, 2) the set of models of the law, or the set of possible worlds in which it is fulfilled. Their use leads to opposite answers to the question which law is broader than the other.

Abstract Three main concepts of model in science are distinguished: (1) semantical model of a theory; (2) real model of another real thing; (3) mathematical model of a real thing. The last concept is the most important for the empirical sciences. The mathematical model is not identical with a theory: it is an ideal object which is directly described by the theory. We have here an intermediate level between reality and theory.

There is one fundamental and many non-fundamental kinds of existence. Things (material bodies) exist fundamentally. Many other objects exist non-fundamentally: properties, events, relations, states; abstracts (universals), laws of Nature; possible states, virtual particles; minds, mental processes; ideal objects created by minds (Popperian "World 3"). All of them are always based on material bodies, but they exist really.

Abstract The problem of the existence of the objects of knowledge is the main problem in the controversy between realism and anti?realism. This controversy appears on three levels: (i) perceptions, (ii) concepts, (iii) scientific theories. According to perception?realism, things exist objectively; according to subjective idealism, they are only bundles of impressions. According to conceptual realism, genera (classes) exist objectively; according to nominalism, they do not exist (there are only general names). According to scientific realism, the objects of confirmed theories, including (...) unobservable entities, exist objectively; according to phenomenalism, only observable bodies exist. On each level a naive realism and a critical realism is distinguished. On the level of scientific theories direct objects (ideal models) are distinguished from ultimate objects (real entities). (shrink)