In this article, I explore the promise and pitfalls of medium as environment by tracking the twin developments of environmental thinking and set design in China, considering it as a problematic of epistemology, technology, and aesthetics. I treat huanjing (environment) as a neologism, a new episteme, a dispositif, and a mode of power, taking set design as the companion medium that reconnects art and technology, aesthetics and politics. Reconceptualizing set, design, and environment at the intersection of industrial design and progressive (...) education, I focus on modernist and propagandistic practice of set design in China in the 1930s and ’40s, moving from set design in film and theater to the design and practice of human/environment that constitutes the landscape of the social. How these aesthetic and technical experiments rework the social will help us reconfigure the human in the reassemblage of our medium/environment complex. (shrink)

The logical intuition hypothesis proposes a difference in the strength between logical and heuristic intuitions. The labels of logical and heuristic intuitions are exclusive to conventional reasoning research. This paper reports the result of testing intuition strength using the dot-probe methodology in a novel multiplication paradigm. Here, “logical intuition” and “heuristic intuition” were relabeled as “weaker intuition” (-1 × 5 = 5) and “stronger intuition” (1 × 5 = 5), respectively, to assess the assumptions about the difference in the strength (...) of “Chinese multiplication mnemonics” intuitions. The dot-probe paradigm was utilized in the following experiments to measure attentional bias. This was assessed by calculating the difference in reaction time between incongruent (the target location is opposite to the probe location) and congruent (the target location is the same as the probe location) conditions. Experiment 1 found attentional bias directed attention to the correct answer for both weaker and stronger intuitions. Experiment 2 replicated and extended Experiment 1 with a secondary task to manipulate high and low cognitive loads. Consequently, stronger intuitions were unaffected by cognitive load and participants were biased toward the correct answer, whereas attentional bias for weaker intuitions only occurred in low load conditions. These results revealed that although both intuitions can guide attention, stronger intuition may guide attention bias in a high-load situation due to its robust automation. Our findings extend the logical intuition hypothesis that proposes a difference in the automated strengths of intuitions to mathematical and analytic thinking. (shrink)