(2000). The Potentiality Argument in the Debate relating to the Beginning of Personhood. Human Reproduction & Genetic Ethics: Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 19-26.

Bezüglich Lehre und Praxis der Kirche empfindet man vielfach einen Mangel an Barmherzigkeit, vor allem da, wo ein Handeln gemäss der traditionellen Lehre für die Betroffenen eine erhebliche Belastung bedeutet. Im Brennpunkt stehen dabei besonders wiederverheiratete und homosexuelle Menschen, denen sexuelle Enthaltsamkeit zugemutet wird. Da es für solche Zumutung aber starke Argumente geben müsste, sind die vor allem mit Rekurs auf die Bibel vorgebrachten Gründe zu überprüfen. Falls diese aber der Überprüfung nicht standhalten, geht es nicht um Barmherzigkeit, sondern um (...) Gerechtigkeit für die Betroffenen. In anderem Kontext kann der Ruf nach Barmherzigkeit der Bagatellisierung von Unrecht und Schuld dienen. Im Fall der kalabrischen Mafiosi hat Papst Franziskus diese für exkommuniziert erklärt, gegen Plädoyers für Barmherzigkeit von anderer Seite. Dabei umfasst die Rede von der Barmherzigkeit durchaus unterschiedliche Handlungsweisen, die jeweils einer gesonderten ethischen Beurteilung bedürfen. Auch das neuerdings vielfach bemühte Gesetz der Gradualität versucht, ethischen Rigorismus abzumildern und so auf diese Weise eine Art Barmherzigkeit zu ermöglichen, ohne eine 'Gradualität des Gesetzes' zu proklamieren. Sollte dieser Versuch freilich misslingen, ginge es auch hier eher um Gerechtigkeit"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Peter Singer and Christian Ethics: Beyond Polarization by Charles E. CamosyWerner WolbertPeter Singer and Christian Ethics: Beyond Polarization CHARLES E. CAMOSY Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 278 pp. $29.99Peter Singer’s “Copernican revolution” against a sanctity of life ethic may be regarded, from a Roman Catholic viewpoint, as an expression of the “culture of death” denounced by John Paul II. One must keep in mind, however, that “we know (...) that historically there have been times where those participating in discussions about ethics disagree deeply about theory, but nevertheless come to important and even broad agreement about applied or practical ethics” (179). The aim of Camosy’s book is to sketch the various areas of agreement and disagreement between Peter Singer and Catholic moral theology as well as the possibilities of working together.There are issues even about the subject of abortion on which Singer and the Church agree: that moral relativism is wrong; that it is seriously wrong to kill a person; that the right to privacy (see Roe vs. Wade) does not apply to acts harming others; and that the right to abortion is not a constitutional matter (chapter 1). Both positions see a connection between abortion and infanticide, but both draw different conclusions. The disagreements between them are about who is to count as a person, which Camosy comments on in the rest of chapter 1 (27–37). In the area of euthanasia, the Church and Singer share some skepticism about brain death (chapter 2). Camosy discusses the church’s position on one’s moral status at the end of life and the Roman Catholic understandings of ordinary and extraordinary means, acts, and omissions. Commenting on public policy in that field, Camosy gives some useful and convincing illustrations of the slippery slope effect in different countries that have legalized active euthanasia or assisted suicide (68–81).With regard to problems of killing, however, Helga Kuhse’s The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine (Oxford University Press, 1987) should perhaps have been considered. On the subject of acting and refraining, I would recommend Dieter Birnbacher’s Tun und unterlassen (Reclam 1995).Commenting on Singer’s championing of the moral status of nonhuman animals, Camosy points to elements in the Christian tradition that may support Singer’s issue of animal liberation (chapter 3). I wonder why the discussion concentrates on domestic animals and the problems of eating meat or [End Page 225] vegetarianism but omits problems of environmental ethics (e.g., ecological balance). Would the aim of avoiding animal harm include saving animals from predators? And if some animals are to be regarded as persons, we may get in trouble with our basic conviction of the equality (of the dignity) of human beings—as the debate on the margins of human life shows.Duties to the poor are not in dispute except for “partial preferences” (166) for members of our family, kinship, or country (chapter 4). Speaking of “partiality” in this context is, however, a bit misleading. Since no one can care for all people, preferences of an ordo caritatis (order of love) are a necessary part of a system of coordination from which—ideally—all humans can benefit. (Recall Augustine in De doctrina Christiana, 1.28–29: “The interests of society, however, and its common bonds will be best conserved if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion to the closeness of his relationship.”) Chapter 5, which compares Singer’s ethical theory with Catholic moral theology, would need more discussion (e.g., on double effect, object, and act), which I cannot cover within the limits of this review. Overall, Camosy’s book makes a valuable contribution to the dialogue between Christian and secular ethics.Werner WolbertUniversity of SalzburgCopyright © 2014 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)