This paper builds on a debate between Velasquez and Fleming: Do multinational enterprises (MNEs) have ethical obligations to their host countries? Velasquez applies Thomas Hobbes' realism approach in arguing that MNEs have no special moral obligations to host countries: (a) obligations do not exist independently in a "state of nature," (b) MNEs exist in a "state of nature" independent of any sovereign authority or power, (c) therefore, MNEs cannot be compelled toward moral or ethical behavior. Fleming counters that the lack (...) of an international authority to compel morality from MNEs is irrelevant. MNEs are for-profit entities making rational economic decisions based on their perceived self-interest. Since they operate in "the goldfish bowl of international media," MNEs are very aware of the stakeholder model. First, the paper supports Fleming's position: Even if a philosophical case cannot be established for MNEs to act ethically - they still should. Being unethical in any arena, but especially in the international arena, is both bad-for-business and bad business. Applying stakeholder theory, if stakeholders perceive the MNE as unethical (which may or may not be true), the firm will ultimately lose business. (shrink)

In a target article that appeared in this journal, Thomas Stoffregen 2000 questions the possibility of ecological event perception research. This paper describes an experiments performed to examine the perception of the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances, a variety of event as defined by Chemero 2000. We found that subjects reliably perceive both gap-crossing affordances and the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances. Our findings provide empirical evidence in favor of understanding events as changes in the layout of affordances, shoring up event perception (...) research in ecological psychology. (shrink)

The development of technology raises an array of ethical issues related to work. Many of these ethical issues are old issues surfacing under new guises. Technology has not changed the issues, but technology makes the issues' analysis and application more complex. This paper identifies several new ethical issues raised by technological change: computer crime, an over-reliance on computer controlled systems, bio-technical developments, degradation of quality-of-life at work and new categories of work-related injuries. These issues are discussed in the context of (...) management responsibilities and responses. The paper offers a five-step process for the effective management of these ethical issues: Be aware of the issues, develop an ethical framework, be consistent, communicate clearly, stay alert for future developments. (shrink)

In a way that is rarely even attempted, and even more rarely actually pulled off, Susan Hurley, in her book Consciousness in Action, brings scientific ideas into contact with mainstream philosophy. It is not at all unusual for empirical results from cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience to be raised in discussion of issues in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind--Dennett and the Churchlands, for example, have been doing so for years. But Hurley attempts to draw empirical results even closer (...) to the center of philosophy, using them to make points about metaphysics and epistemology more broadly, especially PutnamÂ’s Twin Earth cases. We are very fond of Hurley's book, and we agree with nearly all of her conclusions. We do think, though, that there are two important cases where Hurley has misunderstood scientific work. First, we think she misunderstand dynamical systems theory; second, we think her criticism of ecological psychology is misplaced. In neither case do these misunderstandings derail HurleyÂ’s overall project--indeed, the former of them makes her conclusions all the more plausible. We consider them in order. (shrink)

Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind Franklin and Marshall College Lancaster, PA 17604-3003 USA .