This chapter sheds new light on the interaction between Chinese Buddhism and Confucianism by exploring and comparing the thoughts of the ninth century Huayan-Chan Buddhist Zongmi 宗密 and the twentieth century Neo-Confucian Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. It reveals the structural parallel between their opposing theories: both hold a doctrine of true mind as the central component, and both are influenced by the tathāgatagarbha 如來藏 doctrine of The Awakening of Faith. The former uses them to synthesize Huayan and Chan Buddhist soteriology; the (...) latter assimilates them into his framework of Neo-Confucian moral metaphysics. Seen as a response to Zongmi’s criticism of Confucian metaphysics in general, and the shortcomings of the mandate of heaven and the lack of causal theory in particular, Mou stresses the universality of the Confucian Dao, which is supported by the Song Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi’s unified ontological principle. Rather than appealing to the mandate of heaven, Mou makes clear in following Wang Yangming that the Confucian Dao can be manifested by the sage through his infinite intellectual mind, which is immanent in every human being, so as to solve the problem of the highest good without postulating a transcendent god nor appealing to the karmic causality. Mou’s response, supplemented by other Neo-Confucian theories such as Xiong Shili’s and Tang Junyi’s, is a prominent example of how Confucian tradition meets the challenge of Chinese Buddhism while absorbing Buddhist influence. However, the author also points out that Mou’s Neo-Confucian philosophy provides a possibility of defending Chinese Buddhism in face of the critique raised by Critical Buddhism. (shrink)

Laozi says, “The reason why I have great trouble is that I have a body.” Zhuangzi also asks us to forget the body. These seem to suggest that Daoism holds a negative view on the body. However, I will argue for a positive understanding of the Daoist doctrine of the body. In The Visible and the Invisible, the later Merleau‐Ponty aims to introduce an ontology of the flesh. With the help of his concept of the flesh of the world, one (...) can clarify and justify the positive relation between the Dao and the body from a phenomenological standpoint. (shrink)

With the thesis that life is auto-affection, the French philosopher Michel Henry introduced a phenomenology of life. By disclosing the parallels between the Ming Neo-Confucian Liu Zongzhou's and Henry's philosophy, this article tries to develop a more radical understanding of the essential difference between Liu Zongzhou's and Wang Yangming's Confucianism. Moreover, it will show in what sense Liu Zongzhou's doctrine is a phenomenology of life. In contrast to Henry's founding of the phenomenology of life upon Christianity, Liu Zongzhou's approach is (...) nontheological. In recent years, Henry's theological phenomenology has been challenged. Particularly, Henry's Christian account for the possibility of selfhood is charged for lacking phenomenological evidence. It will show that such a difficulty might be overcome by Liu Zongzhou's thesis of the essential connection between pure feeling and the will. (shrink)

Fuzhi’s philosophies of qi. In this essay, both the strength and weakness of their interpretations will be critically examined. As a contrast, an alternative interpretation of the School of qi in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism will be outlined. This new interpretation will uncover that, like Leibniz, Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzhi introduced a non-substantivalist approach in natural philosophy in terms of an innovative concept of force. This interpretation not only helps to show the limitations of Mou Zongsan’s and Tang Junyi’s understandings of (...) Zhang Zai’s and Wang Fuzhi’s doctrines of qi, but also indicates a way to bridge the traditional Chinese philosophy of nature and modern physics. More generally, our critical discussions will bring to light a new angle with which to re-appreciate Mou Zongsan’s and Tang Junyi’s contributions to the development of Confucianism. (shrink)

Traditionally, Zhu Xi’s Mencius-interpretation had enjoyed for a long time an authoritarian status. However, it is challenged by Mou Zongsan in modern scholarship. Mou revolutionarily identifies Lu Xiangshan instead as the authentic follower of Mencius. Given the significance of the famous debate between Zhu and Lu in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism in history of Chinese philosophy, it is especially of interest to explore the essential difference between these two Confucians’ Mencius-interpretations. In sum, this paper aims to show that in contrast to Lu’s (...) subjectivistic approach, Zhu opts for a communitarian and anti-idealistic understanding of Mencius’ philosophy. Whereas Lu’s image of Mencius is volitionistic, Zhu’s picture of Mencius is rationalistic. Methodologically, Zhu’s bottom-up orientation is more concrete. In term of a reconstruction of Zhu’s epistemology, it will develop a new defence of Zhu’s Mencius-interpretation against Mou’s misunderstanding. (shrink)

Yang, Zebo 楊澤波, An Examination of Mou Zongsan’s Three-fold Typology 牟宗三三系論論衡 Shanghai 上海: Fudan Daixu Chubanshe 復旦大學出版社, 2006, 327 pages.