Polanyi’s response to Snow’s problem is a two-step strategy. First, he undermines the supposed gap between the natural sciences and the study of man and establishes the continuity between them. Second, based upon what is achieved in the first step, he explores the distinctions between scientific and humanistic meanings. All this is achieved on the basis of his theory of tacit knowing. Three features of this theory merit attention: (1) the predominance of the participatory perspective; (2) the recovery of the (...) hermeneutic dimension of science; and (3) the constructive use of Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world.”. (shrink)

There is an interesting convergence between Michael Polanyi and Wittgenstein with respect to the problem of doubt. Polanyi carries out his “critique of doubt” on the basis of the distinction between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge and examines explicit doubt and tacit doubt. On the level of explicit doubt, Polanyi debunks the paradoxical nature of the principle of universal doubt and illuminates the fiduciary character of doubt. The introduction of the tacit dimension into the discussion of the problem of human (...) knowledge leads Polanyi to discover tacit doubt. Polanyi’s critique of doubt finds strong echoes in Wittgenstein, especially in his On Certainty. Nevertheless, there are important differences between two thinkers. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the practical aspect of a world-picture and Polanyi’s sensitivity to tacit doubt are among the most prominent items that set them apart. (shrink)